



Resituating the Local in Cohesion
and Territorial Development

Spatial injustice and place-based policies: The role of the “local”

Deliverable 4.2 Summary of case study findings - local perceptions, capacities and policies

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Abbreviations, general

CP	Cohesion Policy
LEADER	Liaison Entre Actions de Développement de l'Économie Rurale
NUTS	Nomenclature of Territorial Units for Statistics
SGI	Services of General Interest

Abbreviations, Case Studies

Cases are listed by numbers or short names in this report.

List of Case Study Reports, NUTS 3 Regions and Authors

	Action	Authors
DE 1	Smart Country Side Ostwestfalen-Lippe Digitalisation as a Tool to Promote Civic Engagement in Rural Villages, Germany	Felix Leo Matzke, Viktoria Kamuf, Sabine Weck (ILS Dortmund)
DE 2	Local Youth as Urban Development Actors the Establishment of a Centre for Youth and Socioculture in Görlitz, Germany	Viktoria Kamuf, Felix Leo Matzke, Sabine Weck (ILS Dortmund)
EL 3	A Post-Mining Regional Strategy for Western Macedonia, Greece	George Petrakos, Lefteris Topaloglou, Aggeliki Anagnostou, Victor Cupcea (UTH Research Team)
EL 4	The Establishment of the Alexander Innovation Zone in the Metropolitan Area of Thessaloniki, Greece	George Petrakos, Lefteris Topaloglou, Aggeliki Anagnostou, Victor Cupcea (UTH Research Team)
EL 5	Overcoming Fragmentation in Territorial Governance. The Case of Volos, Greece	George Petrakos, Lefteris Topaloglou, Aggeliki Anagnostou, Victor Cupcea, Vasiliki Papadaniil (UTH Research Team)
EL 6	Karditsa's Ecosystem of Collaboration, Greece	George Petrakos, Lefteris Topaloglou, Aggeliki Anagnostou, Victor Cupcea (UTH Research Team)
ES 7	Monistrol 2020. Local Strategic Plan in a Small-Scale Municipality, Spain	Andreu Ulied, Oriol Biosca, Marite Guevara, Laura Noguera (MCRIT – Multicriteria)
ES 8	Transformation Plan for La Mina Neighbourhood in Barcelona Metropolitan Region, Spain	Andreu Ulied, Oriol Biosca, Rafa Rodrigo, Laura Noguera (MCRIT – Multicriteria)
ES 9	Llei de Barris in Premià de Dalt Action Plan for the Promotion of Quality of Life in a Segregated Neighbourhood, Spain	Andreu Ulied, Oriol Biosca, Rafa Rodrigo, Sally Guzmán, Laura Noguera (MCRIT – Multicriteria)
ES 10	Eix de la Riera de Caldes Association of Municipalities for a Coordinated Local Development, Spain	Andreu Ulied, Oriol Biosca, Albert Solé, Laura Noguera (MCRIT – Multicriteria)
FI 11	Liekka Development Strategy 2030, Finland	Matti Fritsch, Patrik Hämäläinen, Petri Kahila, Sarrota Németh (University of Eastern Finland)
FI 12	Civil-Action-Based Local Initiative for the Activation of Youth in the City of Kotka, Finland	Matti Fritsch, Patrik Hämäläinen, Petri Kahila, Sarrota Németh (University of Eastern Finland)
HU 13	Give Kids a Chance: Spatial Injustice of Child Welfare at the Peripheries. The Case of Encs, Hungary	Judit Keller, Tünde Virág (Centre for Economic and Regional Studies Budapest)
HU 14	György-telep. Ten Years of Urban Regeneration in a Poor Neighbourhood, Hungary	Csaba Jelinek, Tünde Virág (Centre for Economic and Regional Studies Budapest)
HU 15	May a Production Organisation prevent Mass Pauperisation? An Example from Hungary	Katalin Kovács, Melinda Mihály, Katalin Rác, Gábor Velkey (Centre for Economic and Regional Studies Budapest)
HU 16	The Balaton Uplands. LEADER Local Action Group, Hungary	Katalin Kovács and Gusztáv Nemes (Centre for Economic and Regional Studies Budapest)
FR 17	Euralens. An Innovative Local Tool to Redevelop Pas-de-Calais Former Mining Basin? France	Cyril Blondel (University of Luxembourg)
FR 18	The EPA Alzette-Belval. A National Tool to Address Spatial Disparities at the Lorraine-Luxembourg Border, France - Luxembourg	Estelle Evrard (University of Luxembourg)
NL 19	Northeast Groningen. Confronting the Impact of Induced Earthquakes, Netherlands	Jan Jacob Trip, Arie Romein (Faculty of Architecture and the Built Environment - Delft University of Technology)
NL 20	National Program Rotterdam South. Neighbourhood Development in a Large Deprived Urban Area, Netherlands	Kees Dol, Joris Hoekstra, Reinout Kleinhans (Faculty of Architecture and the Built Environment - Delft University of Technology)

PL 21	The Participatory Budget for Lodz, Poland	Karolina Dmochowska-Dudek, Tomasz Napierała, Paulina Tobiasz-Lis, Marcin Wójcik (University of Lodz)
PL 22	Communal Service. A Social Cooperative as Part of a Local Revitalisation Program in Brzeziny, Poland	Pamela Jeziorska-Biel, Anna Janiszewska, Marcin Wójcik, Karolina-Dmochowska-Dudek, Paulina Tobiasz-Lis, Tomasz Napierała (University of Lodz)
PL 23	A Thematic Village in Maslomecz as an Anchor for New Local Identity and Multifunctional Development of Rural Areas, Poland	Paulina Tobiasz-Lis, Karolina Dmochowska-Dudek, Marcin Wójcik, Pamela Jeziorska-Biel, Tomasz Napierała, Anna Janiszewska (University of Lodz)
PL 24	The Development of Rural Public Places in the Villages of Domachowo, Potarzyce and Stara Krobia, Poland	Pamela Jeziorska-Biel, Anna Janiszewska, Marcin Wójcik, Karolina-Dmochowska-Dudek, Paulina Tobiasz-Lis, Tomasz Napierała (University of Lodz)
RO 25	The Pata Cluj Project Residential Desegregation of the Landfill Area of Cluj-Napoca, Romania	Cristina Bădiță, Enikő Vincze (Foundation Desire for Social Reflection and Openness)
RO 26	Micro-Regional Association Mara-Natur in Maramures County, Romania	George Iulian Zamfir (Foundation Desire for Social Reflection and Openness)
RO 27	Mălin-Codlea Legalization of an Informal Settlement in Braşov County, Romania	Iulia-Elena Hossu, Enikő Vincze (Foundation Desire for Social Reflection and Openness)
RO 28	Plumbuita PIDU. Regenerating a Micro-Urban Area in Bucharest, Romania	Ioana Vrăbiescu (Foundation Desire for Social Reflection and Openness)
SE 29	Digital Västerbotten. Promoting Equal Standards of Living for Inland Municipalities through Digital Technologies, Sweden	Linnea Löfving, Gustaf Norlén, Timothy Heleniak (NORDREGIO)
SE 30	The Stockholm Commission. Measures for an Equal and Socially Sustainable City, Sweden	Thomas Borén (University of Stockholm)
UK 31	The Northumberland Uplands Local Action Group (NULAG) LEADER in Sparsely Populated Northern England, United Kingdom	Elizabeth Brooks, Mark Shucksmith, Ali Madanipour (University of Newcastle)
UK 32	Homelessness Project in Lewisham, Borough of London, United Kingdom	Elizabeth Brooks, Ali Madanipour, Mark Shucksmith (University of Newcastle)
UK 33	Strengthening Communities on the Isle of Lewis in the Western Isles, United Kingdom	Mags Currie, Annabel Pinker, Andrew Copus (The James Hutton Institute)

Executive Summary

This comparative study analyzes the various manifestations of spatial injustice and the competences and capacities of localities to counteract spatial injustice through different place-based approaches. Methodologically, the report is based mainly on qualitative and narrative data provided by the 33 RELOCAL case studies and the 11 national reports. Instead of a more rigid quantitative analysis, our aim was to highlight typical patterns and trends that are connected to the perceptions of the local stakeholders on the one hand, and to the higher-level structural processes that provide the framework of perceiving and (re-)producing localities on the other.

Three overarching trends can be identified in RELOCAL countries' institutional processes influencing the implementation and perception of place-based projects: (1) varying dynamics of austerity-driven state withdrawal and welfare retrenchment (HU, EL, ES, FR, RO, NL, UK, SE), accompanied by (2) selective decentralization, which can range from downloading responsibilities to the local level (NL, UK, SE, RO) to outsourcing services or policy coordination to non-state actors, such as NGOs, charity organizations, public/private companies (UK, HU, DE, RO); (3) varying temporality of fiscal centralization and disciplining (HU, RO, EL, UK, ES, NL, DE). As an overall feature of contemporary governance structures in EU member states, a plethora of state and non-state actors are present in the policy-fields and engaged in policy processes to varying degrees.

Regarding local perceptions, we found four main dimensions of spatial injustice, which are typically relevant locally: (1) access to public services and the quality of governance structures supporting this access (2) employment possibilities (3) demographic changes and spatial isolation of rural areas (4) stigmatization and other labelling process. Furthermore, we show through a series of examples that various boundary making processes – intertwined with different acts of labelling and stigmatization – are important elements of the localities, which might hinder, or in a few cases enable place-based interventions.

We identified three typical localities, where actions were carried out: disadvantaged urban neighbourhoods, urban areas and rural areas. While there are some patterns specific to these different categories, an overarching conclusion is that the impact of place-based interventions highly depends on larger scale institutional and structural factors. It was expressed by several stakeholders that injustices rooted in large scale structural processes will never be completely erased without changing the roots of the problems. However, there are important differences in perception by local inhabitants. It seems that some rural areas can be characterized both as disadvantaged places with vulnerable social groups, and places chosen by households aiming to find refuge from contemporary urban habitats.

1. Introduction

This comparative study analyzes the various manifestations of spatial injustice and the competences and capacities of localities to counteract spatial injustice through different place-based approaches. As part of WP 4 of RELOCAL, the report departs from the main research questions of WP4:

What are the perceptions of various manifestations of spatial injustice within the locality?

To what extent does the locality have competences and capacities to treat causes/manifestations of spatial injustice?

Theoretically the report builds on Deliverable 1.1., and with minor practical modifications it is based on the analytical insights discussed in Deliverable 6.4. The starting point of the comparative report is the locality and it connects to the deliverables of WP3 (D3.1 and D3.2) and WP7 (D7.1), which are more focused on a comparison between different actions.

In the first analytical chapter we embed the studied local actions in a conceptual framework, which is based on intersecting streams of studies on the welfare state and Cohesion Policy. This first chapter also sketches out some overarching trends in institutional processes of welfare and territorial cohesion policies as they relate to the problem-solving capacity of the local level in matters of spatial injustice depicted in the national reports. RELOCAL national reports provide institutional overviews of policies that in the background of the studied actions generate challenges to wellbeing via diverse forms of social exclusion and promote or inhibit the tempering of spatial injustice. In the second chapter we focus on different strategies of defining “the local”. Place-based interventions are supposedly based upon local specificities, thus the way in which intertwining social and spatial injustices are produced and perceived in given localities is crucial to understand any action aimed at tackling these disadvantaged situations. The second chapter highlights how boundaries are made – and possibly unmade – in these localities socially and spatially. A crucial analytical entry point in this chapter is the process of stigmatization. The third chapter is about the relation of local problems and the scale of defining the “local” and the “problem”. In three subchapters we analyze three typical delineations of unjust places: deprived urban neighborhoods, urban areas and rural areas. Finally, in the conclusion we summarize our findings in relation to the overarching research question of RELOCAL: to what extent place-based developments might be suitable to tackle spatial injustices?

Methodologically, this report is based mainly on qualitative and narrative data provided by the 33 case studies and the 11 national reports. Instead of a more rigid quantitative analysis, our aim was to highlight typical patterns and trends that are connected to the perceptions of the local stakeholders on the one hand, and to the higher level structural processes that provide the framework of perceiving and (re-)producing localities on the other. As a result of this, the categorizations we use in the following chapters are built on the insight that different cases, local categories – and more broadly, local ontologies – are always made up of porous boundaries and to some extent unstable entities, which are subject to change through the dialectic of multi-scalar economic, political and social processes.

2. Local problems of social inclusion within the welfare framework

2.1 Local challenges to spatial justice: wellbeing and social exclusion

The RELOCAL case studies give account of local attempts to remedy or temper instances of spatial injustice. Despite the multifaceted nature of local issues delineated in the case studies, actions all pertain to diverse challenges to local citizens' wellbeing. The concept of wellbeing has been an interest to philosophy and social sciences for centuries. Aristotle believed that living a good life meant "achieving one's potential in knowledge, health, friendship, wealth, and other life domains" (Western and Tomaszewski 2016). In recent decades, a growing body of interdisciplinary studies have put forward a complex and multidimensional definition of the concept of wellbeing based on two approaches. The subjective approach emphasizes subjective wellbeing linked to people's own assessment of their lives and their perceptions of their conditions. All in all, subjective wellbeing concerns a cognitive evaluation of or an emotional state regarding life satisfaction. The objective approach is anchored in the notion of "capabilities" focusing on human ends and the individual's ability to live the life she or he values by having the freedom to choose among various "doings and beings" (capabilities) (Sen 1999, Stiglitz et al. 2009). Nussbaum (2000) enlisted core human capabilities including life, bodily health, bodily integrity, the ability to express emotions and to use senses for thinking and imagining, to exercise reason and autonomy with respect to one's own life, to affiliate, to live in through education, social and political participation (Western and Tomaszewski 2016). Stiglitz et al. identified a range of objective factors that influence people's objective conditions and the opportunities available to them: health, education, personal activities, political voice and governance (legislative guarantees, rule of law), social connections, environmental conditions, personal insecurity, economic insecurity (2009).

Subjective and objective approaches to wellbeing may have their differences in focus and measurement (Stiglitz et al. 2009), but ultimately, they are closely interlinked. On the one hand, people's own perceptions of their conditions may not have an "actual", objective measurement, since it is only them who can provide information on their state and values (Stiglitz et al. 2009). On the other hand, enhancing people's capabilities may improve their subjective perceptions about their lives even though expanding capabilities is an end to itself even if it does not trigger greater subjective wellbeing (Sen 1999, Stiglitz et al. 2009). Wellbeing occurs when individuals „have the psychological, social and physical resources they need to meet a particular psychological, social and/or physical challenge" (Dodge et al. 2012:230). These resources include economic such as income and consumption products as well as non-economic aspects, like opportunities for people in health, education, work, political voice, social connections, environment, security. When people have more challenges than resources in any or in several of these dimensions, their capabilities are restricted, or they are deprived of their capabilities. Capability deprivation is thus a source of social exclusion and non-wellbeing (Sen 1999).[¹

Studies have highlighted that inequalities in individual and in average conditions mean a cross-cutting challenge for the complex notion of wellbeing. Life satisfaction decreases with an increase in deprivation and exclusion (Bellani and D'Ambrosio 2011). Sources of

¹ As an antonym to wellbeing, social exclusion (capability deprivation) is also a multidimensional concept denoting both economic and tangible as well as non-economic and non-tangible forms of exclusion from the labour market, from healthcare and other public services, from the food market, from environmental safety, from social and political networks etc.

inequalities, such as class, gender, age, ethnicity can influence social relations and lead to systemic differences in opportunities and rewards. Inequalities, however, are also inherently „spatial” as the territory and the community (locality) provide the social space where resources and constraints manifest in people’s lives. Resources for wellbeing and social inclusion and the processes for opportunities to use them may be distributed in space in an unfair and non-equitable fashion, that would suffice for the definition of spatial injustice (Soja 2009). In other words, how one’s life is, often depends on the locality she or he lives in.

However, the distribution of resources, opportunities and procedures for establishing the equilibrium of wellbeing – i.e. justice – are not tied exclusively to the locality. Inequitable distribution of resources and imbalanced procedures to use them across and within localities are also shaped by structural variables, such as key aspects of governance (e.g.: rule of law, legislative guarantees), or the regulatory capacity of the state to uphold social cohesion across different localities, scales and social groups and to guarantee „citizens’ rights independently of the local conditions in which a person is embedded” (Andreotti et al., 2012).

2.2 Trends in local governance, welfare governance and Cohesion Policy

The rich and diverse literature on the concept of governance has identified a shift in regulatory systems and state building since the 1990s as a move away from “hierarchically organized, unitary systems of government that govern by means of law rule and order, to more horizontally organized and relatively fragmented systems of governance that govern through the regulation of self-regulating networks (Sorensen 2002, 693). Governance has been viewed by many to provide alternative mechanisms to the hierarchical operation of bureaucratic governments in a state and competition in markets through collaborative partnership arrangements and horizontal interaction among a diversity of actors from the state, the market and civil society (Penny 2016). Governance arrangements have also been argued to be key elements of democratic political systems as they guarantee greater access for citizens and civil society to participate in decision-making cycles.

The emergence of governance has been closely linked to the institutional evolution of the grand projet Européen, that has been an active supplier of new modes of problem-solving in its attempt to respond to Europe-wide socio-economic disparities and challenges of vertically overlapping authorities and a multitude of actors. Multi-level governance (Hooghe and Marks 2001) has emerged as the key term, building on one of the founding principles of the European Union: subsidiarity. Multi-level governance and subsidiarity together imply the sharing of competences across vertical scales (EU, national state, regional level, local authorities) and the involvement of non-state actors in designing and delivering policies. In this vein, EU documents have recommended that based on a clear division of responsibilities, all national and local actors should be involved in the process of policy design and delivery (Andreotti and Mingione 2016).

The trends that the EU’s multi-level governance framework and governance arrangements have forged in European countries have been studied by several authors. Stead and Pálné Kovács (2015) have emphasized, amongst other, the strengthening of lower levels of self-government, the increasing marketisation of the public domain and new cooperation and partnership mechanisms to accommodate heterogenous state and non-state actors in the policy process. They point out that in many European countries public authorities have been taking an “enabling” role, while other, non-state actors provide public services (Stead

and Pálné Kovács 2015). “Outsourcing is one of the ways in which non-state actors (including private and non-profit) are increasingly involved in delivering goods and/or services” (Stead and Pálné Kovács 2015, 27). These trends also illustrate the way the welfare state has been transformed to be less centralized and redistributive and more oriented towards market mechanisms (Stead and Pálné Kovács 2015).

The recalibration of welfare governance is anchored in the emergence of the social investment paradigm of the late 1990s. Triggered by new social risks of the post-industrial age, the social investment perspective has aimed to enhance social inclusion by preparing people to face life risks (increased demand for higher qualifications but less job security) through education, rather than repairing damages of the market through insurance and compensation. In policy terms, the social investment model emphasized life-long learning and skill development ushered by enabling and capacitating public services in response to increasingly individualized needs (Sabel et al., 2012; Hemerijck 2018). Social investment policies paid increasing attention to children, education, and „activation” strategies (Morel et al., 2012) as a form of investment in the future of communities. Social investment welfare reforms were thought to allow individuals and families to maintain responsibility for their wellbeing via market incomes and intra-family exchanges (Morel et al, 2012).

While the stated policy goal of the social investment paradigm was to achieve social cohesion, its activation approach ultimately gave rise to the localization of welfare policies (Andreotti et al. 2012). The localization of welfare is anchored in three arguments: i.) local welfare systems are assumed to be more effective in recognizing and tackling challenges at the level of the individual, ii.) less expensive and iii.) more participatory, hence more democratic compared to grand welfare programs at the national level (Andreotti et al. 2012). The activation of citizens and non-state actors is easier to start at the local level, which is viewed to be the source of empowerment and the strengthening of democracy (Andreotti et al. 2012).

However, critical readings of these trends in local governance have pointed out that decentralization has lost its democratic value (Kopric 2016), ironically geared by multi-level governance, which implicitly blurs the traditional central-local dichotomy. As a result, decentralization lost its role as an essential component of democratic political systems and became purely instrumental in delivering public services by the local level (Kopric 2016). At the same time, governance arrangements profoundly circumscribed “the parameters of political democracy” by privileging the market as “the preferred social institution of resource mobilization and allocation” and by introducing new, less hierarchical and allegedly more democratic governing techniques that organize diverse actors into horizontal, self-regulating networks across sectors and scales (Sorensen 2002, Penny 2016, 3). Analyses have underlined that these practices simply enabled states to download and outsource more and more social responsibilities to civil society and local administrations orchestrated as institutional reform and policy steering by the national state (Peck and Tickell 2002, Swyngedouw 2005, Andreotti et al. 2012, Penny 2016). This has been seen by some commentators as the „stretching of neoliberal policy repertoire” of central states to deploy neopaternalist modes of interventions in the form of overregulated and technocratic administrations and fiscal rigor, accompanied by „programs of devolution, localization, and interjurisdictional policy transfer” (Peck and Tickell 2002).

Hence, the state does not disappear entirely in a governance architecture, rather it takes the role of the “enabling state” (Evans 2014) that coordinates heterogeneity, develops consensus by setting a shared vision among diverse actors and regulates actors’ networks

through an institutional framework that distributes authority. These new forms of governmental interventions are particularly relevant to the functioning of local welfare systems, in which the ways devolved public services are delivered depends on institutional, fiscal and professional resources guaranteed by central governments. Central states “must transfer the necessary financial resources or allow local bodies to levy taxes in order to fund new welfare provision (Andreotti and Mingione 2016, 255). For this, the state must have an “enabling” institutional framework that also retains a regulatory capacity to guarantee objective standards and citizens’ rights to public services irrespective of the local conditions in which they live (Andreotti et al. 2012).

The idea that local welfare is more effective in providing public services to tackle individual needs has been actively promoted by the European Union and its Cohesion Policy (Andreotti and Mingione 2016). Since its inception, Cohesion Policy – the spatial variant of the European Social Model (Davoudi 2005) – has aimed at distributing opportunities for well-being fairly across space and reconciling conflicting goals of economic and social development in the face of multiple overlapping authorities. However, in the aftermath of the global economic crisis, the social principle of Cohesion Policy was hijacked by the “Lisbonisation of cohesion policy” as objectives of economic competitiveness and fiscal rigor triumphed over social equity and territorial cohesion (Mendez 2013; Vaughn-Williams 2015). In many European countries this was followed by “centralization reflexes”, in particular fiscal centralization and cuts in public expenditure (Andreotti and Mingione 2016, Pálné 2020), coupled with a general withdrawal of the central state from social policy, reduced funding for education and healthcare, and „radical reforms in a number of areas, such as social dialogue, social protection, pensions, labour market and social cohesion in general” (Vaughan and Williams 2015, 47-48).

The place-based approach is seen by commentators as an attempt to temper the effects of the Lisbon agenda and the economic crisis by offering a well-being-based approach to development through the provision of public goods and services tailored to places (Barca 2009; Mendez 2013). The place-based approach aims at social inclusion, an improvement in the well-being of people, in innovation and in the productivity of businesses (Barca 2009: xi). Its governance architecture builds on Cohesion policy’s principles of subsidiarity and integrated policy making, with “a strong case ... made for exogenous and top-down intervention to challenges vested interests and spur institutional change” through a contractual relationship between the Commission and members states (Mendez 2013: 646). In this framework national states are given responsibilities to assist local bodies in mobilizing local knowledge and resources for the implementation of EU recommendations and policy objectives (such as innovative social services, combatting child poverty, tackling social exclusion, etc...).

There is no uniform way to implement the place-based approach (European Union, 2015) and it can play out differently amidst EU member states’ institutional heterogeneity and commitment to subsidiarity, partnership and integrated policy mechanisms. Similarly, post-crisis institutional reforms – state withdrawal, selective decentralization and fiscal centralization – did not take a uniform, unilinear institutional pathway in Europe. In some countries, fiscal centralization was only temporary (Pálné 2020), while in others the governance of central-local relations has become characterized by overregulated state capacities and reaffirmed central state power. Linked to these institutional processes, in some EU member states strong regulatory and financial commitment of the central state to place-based mechanisms prevailed, while in others insufficient financial, professional and institutional resources have been provided by a centralized regulatory environment (An-

dreotti and Mingione 2016). In the latter, place-based interventions struggle with the absence of institutional space for local deliberation and inter-jurisdictional partnership as well as with the insufficient amount of financial resources of an overall disinvesting policy landscape (Andreotti and Mingione 2016, Keller and Virág 2019).

2.3 RELOCAL localities and structural trends: commonalities and differences

Challenges to people's wellbeing in RELOCAL case studies represent instances of perceived and actual spatial injustice (see 3.1. in this report and D 6.4.). The variety of place-based actions aiming to tackle challenges to wellbeing are embedded in the heterogeneous institutional environment of RELOCAL states that can accommodate the logic of place-based interventions in different ways. Based on contextual/national reports that give account of the heterogeneity of RELOCAL institutional environments, this report distinguishes post-crisis institutional processes from the "meta-level" of institutional and governance architecture of individual RELOCAL countries, both of which had influence over the implementation of place-based actions. While in terms of institutional processes RELOCAL contextual reports demonstrate some overarching trends having taken place in RELOCAL countries in the aftermath of the global economic crisis, the meta-level of institutional architectures displays diversity in states' commitment to subsidiarity, partnership, integrated policy mechanisms and support of place-based actions. Ultimately, the effectiveness and sustainability of RELOCAL place-based actions - i.e. the way they were accommodated in domestic policy fields - were shaped by the interplay between the dynamics of austerity-driven institutional processes and institutional/governance conditions at the meta level. In some countries the overall institutional/governance framework was more supportive of and accommodating towards place-based actions, while in others, meta-institutions of the countries' institutional environment overrode place-based mechanisms.

Three overarching trends can be identified in RELOCAL countries' institutional processes to have influenced the implementation of place-based projects: (1) varying dynamics of austerity-driven state withdrawal and welfare retrenchment (HU, EL, ES, FR, RO, NL, UK, SE), accompanied by (2) selective decentralization, which can range from downloading responsibilities to the local level (NL, UK, SE, RO) to outsourcing services or policy coordination to non-state actors, such as NGOs, charity organizations, public/private companies (UK, HU, DE, RO); (3) varying temporality of fiscal centralization and disciplining (HU, RO, EL, UK, ES, NL, DE). As an overall feature of contemporary governance, a plethora of state and non-state actors are present in the policy-fields and engaged in policy processes to varying degrees (all national cases).

In the immediate aftermath of the global economic crisis, fiscal centralization - fiscal rigor and/or public cuts - took place in all RELOCAL national cases. Both the temporality and degree of fiscal disciplining varied across national cases. In the Netherlands, Germany and Spain fiscal disciplining was temporary and less rigorous in degree, enabling the local level and non-state actors to still access funds for place-based projects. For instance, in the Netherlands, despite selective decentralization and cuts in welfare provisions, the central government remained committed to transferring funds for the local government of Rotterdam to pursue its housing policy. In Germany, the youth policy of Görlitz would not have been possible without the financial and conceptual support of higher policy levels and the wider institutional environment. In countries like Germany, the Netherlands, Sweden, the UK and Spain with stronger commitment to multi-level problem-solving, bottom-up place-based interventions are supported by the overall institutional framework. On the other

hand, in other countries, such as Hungary, Romania and Greece, the extent of fiscal centralization was greater and in the case of Hungary and Greece coupled with bureaucratic centralization. Fiscal rigor resulted in inadequate funding of local authorities to whom policy delivery was downloaded in Romania, and a dramatic withdrawal of the state from financing welfare policies in Hungary. Similar to the Romanian state's downloading strategy, selective decentralization in Hungary manifested in the outsourcing of welfare policy coordination to non-state actors. In the three countries, place-based interventions were impeded by fiscal and bureaucratic centralization, the absence of multi-level problem-solving approach and the subsequent lack of autonomous planning of lower state levels and one-size-fits-all solutions promoted by a state where election cycles and politics have a strong influence on the policy field.

3. How localities are defined?

Within RELOCAL, the most important criterion for case study selection was the relevance of the action for investigating the main research question. Thus, during the case study selection no geographical unit was predefined, therefore the selected cases are very diverse regarding their spatial scale. Selected localities range from villages to peripheral rural regions, from small cities to metropolitan areas. In the RELOCAL conceptual framework localities are not defined as bounded enclaves, but as functional units with multifarious and porous borders, which are interlinked with the wider socio-spatial context. The conceptual framework adopts a critical and relational approach, analysing the locality from a critical and open perspective, through four interrelated dimensions: differential, vertical, horizontal and transversal (Madanipour et al., 2017: 79). In this chapter we mainly focus on the differential aspects of the selected localities; we analyse localities as places of multiplicity, variation and diversity, which includes inequality and injustice within a given territory. Thus, in our view any understanding of the locality needs to take this inner diversity into account, rather than assuming that localities would be homogenous entities (Madanipour et al., 2017: 77).

We rely on the in-depth description and analysis of the territorial context and socioeconomic characteristics of the localities provided in the RELOCAL case studies and summarized by D.6.4. (Weck et al., 2019: 13-17). We attempt to broaden this analysis with two additional, interrelated perspectives: how local stakeholders perceive various manifestations of spatial injustice, and how localities are (re)produced and (re)defined through the process of boundary making.

We consider stakeholder perceptions as an integral element of the broader process of producing and conceiving space (Lefebvre 1991). Therefore, we analyse how different stakeholders perceive social and spatial injustice in the given localities in relation to other localities/scales, and how in turn they produce and reproduce socio-spatial distinctions between and within different localities.

3.1 How social and spatial injustice is perceived in relation to other localities/scales

Within the RELOCAL case studies, the local narratives of spatial injustice or justice generally appeared in dual semantic structures. In other words, the given localities were compared to or confronted with other, more desirable places. These dualities were presented on different scales, but most often they referred to (A) urban-rural divisions, typically when rural localities were compared to capital cities or regional centres, (B) differences between neighbourhoods within cities, (C) differences between more and less prosperous regions. These comparisons are usually telling in the sense that they express how stakeholders position their locality in a broader space, and how they define a relevant reference point as the spatial focus of their desired future development trajectories, and how they explain the injustices they identify. Generally, local stakeholders keep re-constructing spatial divisions along their own social, economic, and political interests, in a dialectical manner (Lefebvre 1991; Harvey 2006). Thus, the constructed positions and relations describing localities on various scales are not constant, but subject to change, reflecting the positions and relations of the local stakeholders in local processes, discourses, and policies.

Furthermore, the spatial position of the localities is always related to the main socio-economic issues; to put it differently, the way stakeholders perceive spatial injustice is always

connected to the challenges of local wellbeing. While in each case there are different combinations of these socio-economic factors, we found four main dimensions of spatial injustice, which are typically relevant locally: (1) access to public services and the quality of governance structures supporting this access (2) employment possibilities (3) demographic changes and spatial isolation of rural areas (4) stigmatization and other labelling process.

Besides these different socio-economic challenges, local histories were important elements in the narratives of many local stakeholders. The historical trajectory of the studied localities was often connected to large-scale socio-economic shifts, such as urbanization, (de)industrialization and different economic crises. In the case of remote rural areas, the common historical background of the perceived remoteness was the decade-long trend of depopulation, demographic change and economic restructuring. In the case of urban areas, the historical significance of mass immigration of lower status households was often mentioned as a factor resulting in local tensions and in the production of disadvantaged, segregated neighbourhoods. The most often mentioned socio-economic issue both in rural and in urban localities was the difficult access to various institutions. Thus, a crucial social aspect of spatial injustice is understood as the dysfunctionality of public services and basic infrastructure provision.

In the case of many localities there was a clear demand for better access to basic public services, such as education and healthcare. In sparsely populated rural areas (FI11, UK31-33, SE29, HU13-16, DE1, RO26) the fragmented settlement structure was an important cause of the difficulties in service provision. Generally, service providers are concentrated in more populous localities, and improvement in service provision is usually registered in these localities. At the same time, the surrounding villages experiencing an increasingly spatially unequal distribution of services, which forces the people to travel in order to access these services. Such situations are usually perceived as instances of spatial injustice and unequal power relations. However, central localities try to temper these unjust situations through different processes, aiming at fulfilling the demands of worse-off localities: sometimes there are service provider sub-centres set-up within rural areas, sometimes service provision is delegated to different local associations (FI11, HU13, RO26). It seemed very more common that local NGOs or group of volunteers tried to provide different services locally, in order to compensate the lack of municipal and governmental services. We interpret this phenomenon as the outsourcing of public responsibilities (see more details above in Chapter 2.3). In the case of urban areas, the main manifestation of differences in the quality of services within the city is connected to the existence of segregated, impoverished neighbourhoods.

In our view the demand for better public services is not solely the demand for equalizing rural life with urban life. Rather, this demand is based on the desire to make local specificities and demands recognized by more powerful actors, in order to generate measures specifically designed for supporting given localities: "We're not better or worse than the people in the city [...]. We want to have the same chances" (DE1). Thus, in these instances, spatial justice is understood in terms of equity, rather than equality. In other words, spatial justice would be produced by place-based and equitable procedures and distributive mechanisms, rather than measures that aim at (re-)producing equal performance in places with diverse backgrounds.

The other most important injustice mentioned in the case studies was connected to a larger structural shift, namely the lack of employment possibilities, which is mainly rooted

in deindustrialization, the disappearance of decades-old employment possibilities in “traditional” blue collar sectors such as mining, textile industry, etc. As a result, many people felt being ‘left behind’ with low and/or very specific educational attainment (FR 17-18, GR 3-5, HU 14, NL 20, ES 9, PL 21, RO26). However, there is an interplay between the employment possibilities and the positionality of locality: there are important differences in employment possibilities in cases when the whole locality (FR17) or even the whole region (EL3, RO26) is affected by economic decline, or when localities are part of a developed metropolitan region (ES8, NL20, RO25, RO28), or maybe in commuting distance from there (FR18, RO27). The lack of employment possibilities was perceived as injustice mainly in rural areas, from where there are no available workplaces in daily commuting distance. Geographical distance is important in that sense. Thus even though sparsely populated rural areas might be positively valued by locals for offering alternative life-styles and alternative possibilities for families, for creating stronger feelings of community and support, for providing higher social control and security, and for the beauty of the natural landscape (UK31, PL23-24, DE1, RO26), these areas are often perceived as “left behind” places at the same time. Dysfunctionalities of local public transportation systems (DE1, UK31, HU13, PL23-24, RO25) were also often regarded as key elements of physical isolation and remoteness in rural areas. In addition, the perception of remoteness can be based on the peripheral geographical position of the locality, when it is situated directly on the external border of the European Union (FI11, PL23). However, as shown above, the perceived remoteness does not necessarily connect to geographical distance per se (see the example of Kotka and Görlitz in Weck et al, 2019:31).

In rural areas the lack of employment possibilities go hand in hand with the absence of public services, and with the consequences of decades-long outmigration, as demographic data for the German, Polish, Finnish, Hungarian and Romanian cases show. Selective outmigration from rural to urban areas has led not only to the decline of the population, but to the transformation of local societies. Selective, job-related outmigration from rural to urban regions, particularly of younger and well-educated people, can lead to a constantly shrinking population, and to ageing. Usually, rural demographic shrinkage becomes indicative of a broader economic and labour market decline, and with the combination of these processes a vicious circle can be formed, which intensifies the feeling of peripheralization and the feeling of remoteness (Lang, 2015 Nagy et al 2015).

Empirical data from the case studies showed that in the most disadvantageous rural and urban localities the interplay of remoteness, social and demographic polarization and fragmentation is reinforced by stigmatization and negative labelling. Through these negative discourses based on the “bad” social image of the locality injustices are reproduced both externally and internally. These stigmatized territories are usually labelled with negative stereotypes such as ‘sewage drain’ (NL20), “racist”, “uneducated”, “no jobs, no future” “periphery” (LU17) ‘end of the world’ (HU13) ‘little Beijing’ (PL22) ‘penal colony’ (HU14), ‘Gypsyhood’ / Țigănie (RO27), ‘uncivilized’ or ‘garbage dump’ (RO25). Territorial stigmatization is internalised by inhabitants resulting in feelings of guilt and shame, leading to negative self-attributions (Wacquant 2007; Rhodes 2012), which can prevent development process in the future. Thus, stigmatization and negative labelling operating on different geographical scales are the most important ways of creating distinctions between spaces and social groups.

According to the literature, the process of stigmatization is the most important tool to solidify segregated areas within given localities. Stigmatization is present in everyday practices and daily social interactions: various social groups not only perceive spatial and social distinctions and boundaries, but they are actively affected by these on a daily basis.

Usually, the aim of the municipalities and the better-off social groups is to make vulnerable social groups living in segregated neighbourhoods invisible. Through this social problems and conflicts are kept in a distance, and the daily encounter with “problematic families” in different institutions can be avoided by “regular” families living in other neighbourhoods (Wacquant 2007, Wacquant et al 2014). The vulnerable groups are often perceived and labelled with social and behaviour difficulties, some stakeholders explicitly blame the residents for their low level of education and high level of criminality and connect postponed development to the lack of social and cultural capabilities of local inhabitants. However, there is a general experience that those local experts work as ‘street level bureaucracy’ (Lipsky, 1980 Gilson 2015) and have everyday relations and encounter with locals in these neighbourhoods usually have quite detailed and diverse ‘mental map’ about the social and ethnic diversity of the area, but higher level stakeholders and decision makers from ‘outside’ usually have more general picture about it and their narratives based on prejudice and construct a stigma for the entire district. The example of Social Cooperative in Breznany (PL22) highlight the role local stakeholders’ daily interactions and place-based knowledge about the vulnerable social groups can play in the implementation of projects. Visibility and recognition of vulnerable groups can break the vicious circle of social vulnerability, exclusion and stigmatization.

There are substantial differences in this process and in many cases (RO25-27-28, HU13, ES8), especially in the CEE countries, this narrative is linked to Roma ethnicity. The Roma population is very diverse and should not be interpreted only in socio-economic, social and ethnic terms, but also as lifestyles, attitudes, and activities which change from locality to locality. In most cases representations of ethnicity are based on external categorization processes imposed on them by the majority society, distinguished by the presence of unequal social and power relations. Thus, in the CEE countries there is little to no opportunity for Roma to voluntarily choose their group belonging or to rise to a position of recognition and empowerment (Neményi - Vajda 2014) as a result of the rise in radical racist discourse and discrimination against Roma coupled with the recent political success of the radical right (Vidra - Fox 2014). Moreover, this exclusionary dynamic is compounded by the social positions of the given Roma groups and the positionality of the locality which produces further differentiation within the neighbourhoods and between localities. In most cases segregated Roma neighbourhoods perceived as a dangerous, criminalized place and the aim of the mainstream society to set apart it from the town by sharp mental boundaries. Moreover, the formation of marginal and isolated residential spaces on stigmatized peripheries might go hand in hand with the racialization of labour while stigmatized Roma ethnics are entrapped within low-paid and stigmatized jobs, which, however, are playing a role in the local economy being subjected to the processes of adverse inclusion into the mainstream socio-economic order (Vincze et al, 2018). In the Spanish (ES8) and Rotterdam (NL20) cases the entire neighbourhood is stigmatized but different social and ethnic boundaries intersect the neighbourhood. In the Spanish case there is an interplay between the stigmatization of different criminal activities, illegal housing occupations and Roma ethnicity. These phenomena don’t overlap each another, but often lead to the criminalization of Roma ethnicity. In Rotterdam, in the ethnically diverse disadvantageous neighbourhood the boundaries between different social groups are defined by social stratification which determine the access to different institutions and services, especially social housing and produce further social differences.

3.2 How localities are produced through boundary making

Social and spatial boundary making is strongly related to how different stakeholder perceive the space, in terms of producing and reproducing socio-spatial distinctions between and within different localities. Perceiving and producing of boundaries shape the administrative and political relations between localities, and across the hierarchies of power at higher levels. Therefore, the processes of defining and maintaining these boundaries, and their impacts on the inter-local and intra-local processes, are important subjects of inquiry. (Madanipour 2017:11) However, boundary work (or boundary making) can be defined as a situational process of negotiating social contexts that at the same time involves spatial bounding (Kolossoff & Scott 2013) and can be interpreted as a tool for expressing power relations and building new or reinforcing previous inequalities between different (ethnic and social) groups, maintaining and legitimating different spatial position (Wimmer 2008, Lamont-Molnár 2002).

Borders are semantically fixed in space and time and can physically separate localities from each another and in this way limit their possibilities and room for manoeuvre. However legal (administrative) borders of different spaces could have different functions and can operate and be used by the stakeholders very differently and for different purpose which always express power relations. We distinguish predefined statistical or political units that have clear administrative borders and self-defined territories from continuously negotiated borders (Weck et al 2019:9). There are cases when the action intersects administrative territories and focus on localities defined by a common identity or shared development challenges rather than statistically or politically defined units. These self-defined territories are changing over time regarding the power relations within and interests of the settlements. For example, a LEADER group can be a self-defined territory based on common development challenges for the period of time and intersect official NUTS3 borders. For example, in the Romanian case (RO26), the LEADER program - initiated under some externally defined rules -, created a new type of territory that does not have administrative power in the Romanian territorial system. Likewise, in the case of RO25, the leadership of the desegregation project was outsourced to a private organization with public utility created after Romania's accession to the EU in order to absorb EU funds, but lacking any sort of administrative decision-making power. The Hungarian case highlight the situational facet of the spatial definition: the district centre situated in the northern periphery of the country sometimes defines itself as an administrative and service provision centre of the neighbouring villages, in another case, as a historical centre of the broader territory that includes different administrative districts on the basis of shared common identity.

In the following we focus on two facets of boundary making:

- (1.) we show those daily practices when different (social, spatial, mental) border crossing causes tensions and transform localities
- (2.) when different stakeholders relocate or redefine the spatial and social borders regarding their interest.

Obvious examples for border crossing are state borders caused different perceptions and injustices. The imbalanced economic position and differences in housing prices and salaries between the French and Luxemburg (LU18) side of borders induced mass commuting from France and caused several tensions and injustices on that side. The higher salaries and better employment possibilities in Luxemburg and affordable housing in France encourage people not to commute from the French side but to move from Luxemburg to France. Immigration of low-income families, many of them from third countries create new needs in social integration and language skills in the local institutions. This situation

highlights asymmetrical power relations that results in several injustices for the French side, such as dealing with negative externalities and social problems, including pollution, overloaded public transport and the degradation of French localities to dormitory towns in the agglomeration of the Luxemburg metropolitan area. The German case (DE2), highlights this imbalanced power relation from the other side: despite the mass daily commuting and relocation of Polish people and the city's active cross-border politics and development, the mental barriers can still exist between the countries. While due to better job-related possibilities more and more Polish people move or commute to the German part of the city, for the Germans there is no reason to go to the other side of the border. The state border still acts as a powerful mental barrier for many German inhabitants: "When you are going across the bridge, of course it's the language, but the people as well, the cars, the signs, the facades. Everything is somehow ... you really notice that it's a different town although it is actually the same town" (DE2) On the national level, the citizens of the East-German town feel asymmetry in social and mental border crossing: the former state borders between East and West are perceived as an injustice particularly in terms of economic strength and political representation i.e. living in the former GDR town means less possibility. A lot of people simply feel neglected, disadvantaged, and aggrieved due to transformation effects" (DE2).

There are examples when official administrative borders don't define localities functionally or the way in which inhabitants use places in their everyday practices. In these cases, the locality belongs to two or more municipal jurisdictions and there is a need for cooperation to provide services, which can lead to different tensions between the localities. Thus, in these cases the absence of crossing borders causes tensions between the localities. "the understanding between two municipalities is not sufficient...which means that it is difficult to solve the daily incidents and conflicts" (ES8) These tensions between the municipalities are sharper when the segregated nature of the contested neighbourhood is thought to be tackled at the level of the metropolitan area, involving several municipalities otherwise unequally placed in the micro-regional power structure (RO25). These cases lead us to the other type of changing borders when different stakeholders regarding their interest relocate or redefine the spatial and social borders. The marginalized and stigmatized Roma neighbourhood originally belongs to the municipality of Cluj-Napoca placed on the peripheries of the city. During the implementation of the development project aimed at the elimination of the Roma neighborhood, the City Hall decided to extend the project to the Metropolitan Area, which made the relocation of dwellers from the Roma neighborhood into the neighboring villages possible, where the service provision and employment possibilities are weaker than in the city. In this case with the spatial extension of the project the powerful city administration revised the municipality borders and used it as a tool to displace marginalized families and social problems to the periphery of the Metropolitan Area. It shows the unequal power relations of the municipalities within the Metropolitan Area and the powerless position of the marginalized families who were originally the beneficiaries of the project.

The contested sense of belonging to the localities and shared or even displaced responsibilities are often rooted in the emergence of these neighbourhoods and strongly connected to informality – a phenomenon more common in the South and Eastern parts of the EU (Tsenkova 2012). A major pattern of neighbourhood segregation has roots in the 1960s when industrialization led to mass migration from urban to rural areas, resulted in an unregulated built environment. The above-mentioned injustices in informal housing often overlap with scarcities in social services and lack of basic infrastructure. But this street was fine because people have made it so with voluntary work of people that lived here. When I arrived, there was electricity. The water was on the street in common pumps. I

cannot say it was hard, as we were used to it coming from the countryside and not knowing anything else. This neighbourhood remained the same, except that now they put in asphalt and sewage. (RO28). In some cases these neighbourhoods are the result of the elimination of informal shanty towns and relocation of families caused systematic reproduction of injustice happens through national and local policies. (HU13, ES8) “La Mina was the response to the need to clean several barrack neighborhoods in Barcelona. (...) la Mina became the place where Barcelona put all that wanted to get out of it” (ES8).

However, legalization of the informal housing situations is one of the most important issues in some cases, recently it is used to make the most impoverished part of the locality for eligible development but without actually solving the housing insecurity and underdevelopment in such neighbourhoods (RO27, 28), or in other cases (situated in polluted environments) legalization could not be actually possible (RO25). At the individual level the informal housing situation means that in the given neighbourhood families have lived for decades without legal, permanent stay (RO25-27-28), or valid housing contracts (NL20, HU14). In the Romanian cases, the transformation of temporary solutions to permanent conditions and even the continuous growth of informal housing areas is due to the fact that the state refused to recognize the tenants of such areas as legally entitled to make a living there in parallel with denying them the possibility of relocation into proper social housing. But this is also due to the lack of the tenants’ financial opportunities for making a living otherwise under the conditions of severe social housing shortage that characterizes the Romanian housing regime. In the Hungarian case (HU13) it generates a lack of local municipality capacity to manage and keep control of social housing and it is causing a lot of tensions between the municipality office and the local dwellers. In Rotterdam social housing shortages force the most vulnerable families to rent privately which often means illegally and/or informally. In this case social vulnerability and informality connect to trans-locality as affected mainly newcomers from CEE countries, as the mobile social group have different daily patterns, hardly have contacts with other residents and appeared as a challenge for local social institutions and can't easily involve them in development programmes. These issues raise the question as to how a neighbourhood, which officially does not exist or has contested belonging and borders could be a target area of a development, and how those who live informally or/and temporarily in the neighbourhood be beneficiaries of a development programme.

4. How local problems are defined

The definition of local problems highly depends on the definition of “locality”. Therefore, we structure this chapter following a scalar/territorial logic: we define **three typical strategies of defining localities affected by spatial injustice**, and then we analyze the characteristics of what these strategies imply in the domain of defining and addressing justice related problems. Some analytical dimensions are relevant in all cases but, given the different logics of actions designed for different scalar/territorial units, there will be slightly different findings and points to discuss in each sub-chapter. In the following we discuss separately how local problems are defined in the cases of deprived urban neighborhoods, urban areas and rural regions. We do not think that all the cases must fit into only one of these categories (e.g. the Görlitz or the Pécs cases [DE 2, HU 14] are related both to our first and second category), and we understand that the categories might have overlaps. In comparison to the more complex categorization deployed by Weck et al. in D. 6.4. of the RELOCAL project, our “deprived urban neighborhood” category is mostly covered by the “neighborhoods” category in Figure 12. Of D6.4.; our “rural regions” category is more or less the same as the “rural regions” cluster there; and our “urban areas” category covers the rest of that image. The small differences between the two categorizations are explained by small interpretative differences, and by the fact that the authors of this deliverable departed from the perceptions of local stakeholders, instead of solely looking at statistics-based grouping.

Our aim with this categorization is to explore typical patterns, and typical ways of problematization connected to different strategies of defining “the local” and the “place” during place-based interventions.

4.1 Actions targeting deprived urban neighborhoods

There were 10 case studies (DE 2, ES 8, ES 9, FI 12, HU 14, NL 20, RO 25, RO 27, RO 28, UK 32). This scale of problematization is not only widely discussed in the heterogeneous literature of urban studies, but there is also a rather long history of public policy making in the EU targeting disadvantaged urban neighborhoods (Atkinson, 2001; Piattoni and Polverari, 2016, p. 416). After the URBAN I and II community initiatives, urban interventions were mainstreamed into CP after 2007 (Wallace et al., 2005; Piattoni and Polverari, 2016). An important document underpinning this move was the Leipzig Charter, which declared that urban problems are always multi-dimensional, and thus they need integrated solutions crossing sectoral boundaries². This approach is part of the larger trend, which we can call the mainstreaming of place-based approaches into CP (Bachtler, 2010; Telle et al., 2019). This process has been going on parallel with the process of ‘Lisbonization’ described in Chapter 2.

Like this literature, the RELOCAL case studies focusing on deprived urban neighborhoods defined the main justice-related problems as complex issues, and consequently the actions were usually planned as integrated interventions. The most often mentioned problematic dimensions were the following: segregation, income inequality, (youth) unemployment, poverty, housing related problems, ethnic tensions or ethnic segregation. In almost all the case studies the interwoven, intersectional nature of these dimensions were emphasized; and implicitly the vicious circle of becoming disadvantaged and stigmatized was described.

² https://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/archive/themes/urban/leipzig_charter.pdf

On top of that, some case studies described the historical trajectory, through which disadvantaged neighborhoods were produced. As a common meta-trend, the production of disadvantaged neighborhoods is connected to larger structural shifts, most importantly to de-industrialization and to economic restructuring. Another important element in these historical narratives is immigration: as certain territories lost their economic significance, and as they were filtered down in the hierarchy of places (within a city, or within a larger regional/national setting), households with lower status moved into the neighborhood. This downward spiral of parallel economic and social downturn is usually reinforced by the process of stigmatization (see the previous section). All in all, it seems that the production of disadvantaged neighborhoods is inseparable from larger structural processes of uneven development (cf. Hadjimichalis, 2011; Vincze and Zamfir, 2019).

However, some case studies highlighted that being or becoming disadvantaged is not necessarily a natural, straightforward, all-encompassing process. We can identify “local” voices, which challenge, or even object the act of labeling places as being disadvantaged. In one case study (DE 2) it was stated that “when you live in the periphery, you do not necessarily experience yourself as peripheral”, and you can see a “discussion of central vs peripheral merely as an external act of attribution”. This insight is partly in line both with the literature, which challenges the concept of “neighborhood effect” (e.g. Slater, 2013), and with novel approaches advocating for a semantic shift in expert discourse from “deprived” or “disadvantaged” areas to “priority areas” (Bressaud et al., 2019).

This thought leads to an important discrepancy regarding available local capacities for a place-based development. While most of these places experience structural forces resulting in “being left behind”, which typically manifests in lack of material resources, there might be important local organizational capacities available for managing potentially available external funds. Typically, there are two ways of building upon existing organizational structures: either there are local NGOs and neighborhood groups already active in some areas of local life, or there are local governmental capacities potentially available for alternative developmental projects. These two options are dependent upon the broader traditions and structures of governance and welfare activities analyzed in the previous section. In short, when external sources are being channeled into disadvantaged neighborhoods, typically there is no such thing as a tabula rasa situation. The key moment in how an action is being planned or implemented hinges upon how the interface of local actors and external actors is being structured. In other words, how external developmental ambitions and local management capacities interact with each other is a crucial factor in the development trajectory of different localities.

Within this group there were three typical situations regarding the local actors taking part in the implementation.

1. In some cases (e.g. DE 2, ES 8, FI 12, RO25) locally already active third sector groups were mobilized during the implementation. Some of these are good examples how certain governmental duties are outsourced to the third sector through these projects (e.g. NL 20, UK 32, RO27, RO28), while in a few cases civic actors initiated their own projects, independently of governmental duties (e.g. DE 2).
2. In other cases, public actors had a crucial role in taking action, and in these instances the attempts to solve local problems focused on transforming existing structures of local public bodies.
3. Thirdly, in some localities (e.g. HU 14, RO 25) powerful external actors were involved during the process. In these situations, a lot of work was needed to reconcile the different institutional logics (or more precisely the institutional logic of the

external actors with the local realities). All in all, almost each of these cases demonstrate to some extent the larger process of outsourcing central governmental responsibilities to other actors. While at the first sight this trend might be in line with the requirement of making development interventions more place-based, in practice this shift can easily trigger suboptimal solutions, or even local tensions, if it is not embedded into larger structural or institutional solutions addressing the roots of the initial problems (Hadjimichalis, 2011).

In the category of targeting disadvantaged urban neighborhoods the nature of actions is usually as complex, as the way of problematization is. More precisely, as the process of becoming disadvantaged is usually depicted as a complex, multi-layered and multi-scaled process, the proposed solutions usually follow an integrated path, in the sense that both “hard” (infrastructural) and “soft” (organizational, community-related) project elements are designed. From the perspective of the RELOCAL conceptual framework it means that usually both redistributive and procedural aspects of justice issues are addressed at the same time. However, many case studies identify tensions between the two aspect throughout implementing actions (e.g. RO 25, RO27, RO 28, UK 32). Thus, it seems that there is a crucial importance of reconciling these two facets of urban development projects.

Finally, another typical pattern was identified in this category. Depending on the scalar focus, there are contradictory perceptions of how localities benefit from such integrated urban development projects. From a narrowly defined, local perspective – which could be the perspective usually manifested in project indicators – there were important achievements in all cases. At the same time, some case studies highlighted that the positive effects of the interventions remained only a “tiny drop in the ocean”, and that no significant institutional change could be achieved (HU 14, RO 25, UK 32). While it is not necessarily fair to expect far-reaching institutional or structural change from a single neighborhood-level project, it is remarkable how this “drop in the ocean” effect can cause local tensions (RO27), or just simply the feeling of disenchantment from the side of different local stakeholders (RO28). A good example could be a case study from London (UK 32), where a modular building was installed temporarily on a vacant lot, in order to house homeless people, create meeting points for locals, and to advance the image of the neighborhood. While from the perspective of spatial justice the key element of the project was to provide housing for homeless people and address the housing crisis, in the end the interests of the corporate stakeholders (experimenting with modular architecture and construction) outweighed the interest of the intended (homeless) users and that of the local community. Thus, while the project became replicated elsewhere, it failed to give an answer to the initial problem of the housing crisis, and it can be even argued that it contributed to the gentrification of the borough.

All in all, the main conclusion drawn from this cluster of case studies could be that even if neighborhood-level urban interventions are consciously designed in an integrated way, their impact highly depends on larger scale institutional and structural factors.

4.2 Actions targeting whole cities or functional urban areas

According to our categorization, there were 14 case studies, where the actions and the definition of localities were connected to city-wide (or functional urban area-wide) processes (DE 2, EL 4, EL 5, ES 7, ES 8, ES 9, FI 11, FI 12, HU 14, FR 17, FR 18, PL 21, PL 22, SE 30). The specificity of this cluster of cases is that while broader, higher-scale spatial justice related problems were identified, the planned actions were not significantly more robust than in the previous cluster. Spatial justice related problems were typically defined through the following issues: unemployment, access to SGI lack of cooperation between administrative entities, lack of cohesion, aging, economic hardships. These issues were less specific and broader in scope than in the case of deprived neighborhoods. In other words, as the scale of defining the local problem and solution became higher, the depth of “place-based” knowledge and specificities became less tailor-made.

At the same time, even though larger scale problems were identified, the actions designed to counteract these problems were typically different than the integrated interventions described above. From the perspective of the RELOCAL conceptual framework the actions focused more on the procedural, than on the distributive side of spatial injustices. In other words: instead of a balanced mix of soft and hard interventions, the typical modality of interventions in this cluster was soft. For example the proposed actions tried to address city-wide problematic issues through the following tools: introducing the method of participative budgeting (PL 21), establishing an expert Commission to research and map existing problems and to provide novel methods to address them (SE 30), establishing an innovation zone (EL 4), reforming the administrative framework of local governance (EL 5), and creating a new forum of local actors (FR 17).

Compared to the actions focusing on deprived urban neighborhoods, in this group of actions it was more common to build the actions around the existing institutional framework of the local governments. In other words, top-down approaches were more common, especially in those contexts, where the institutional framework of governance has been initially more centralized. However, in some cases, similarly to the previous cluster, the explicit aim of the intervention was to give more space for local NGOs, and especially to enhance cooperation between different stakeholders. In this sense, these projects implicitly attempted to catalyze a shift from local government focused models towards a more open-ended governance framework. From an analytical perspective this move is another manifestation how central governmental tasks are being outsourced, and how responsibilities are being redistributed along with the reshuffling of stakeholders taking part in development projects. A specific feature of this cluster is that many projects shed light on the changing role of experts and expertise, and we might argue that through these projects we can witness the rise of a “new technocracy in urban governance” (Raco and Savini, 2019, p. 3.).

One important insight was highlighted by a few case studies, namely that the desired increase in participation and cooperation was often hard to reach. In some cases, it was hindered by the fact that there was a “clear-cut gap between the more active citizens - which are networked quite well - and a non-active part of the citizenry” (DE 2). In other cases, the main problem was the dysfunctional ways of including civic actors (e.g. EL 5). And even if inclusion and the citizens’ activity were functional, often the mismatch between the scope of the problem and the scope of the action led to limited success of the actions. A cautious conclusion from these RELOCAL case studies can be that on this higher level it is extremely hard to catalyze meaningful participation through following the project logic of

interventions³. Optimistic comments in the cases studies were usually present when the actions seemed to be endorsed and taken over by the formal administrative units of the given territories with an outlook of long-term functioning (e.g. FI 11).

Transformative impacts were hardly reported, and besides the inhibiting factor of defining the “place” on a higher scale, we found three typical challenges.

1. The first is that with a broader focus the most problematic areas might be hard to reach. In other words: while aggregated statistical data could show progress in certain dimensions, a closer look on the most problematic areas could reveal that no real change was achieved there.
2. A second typical challenge is that the dominance of soft interventions, or even so the complete lack of hard investments might be less effective in the case of complex problems. Success in these instances hinges upon the wider institutional and policy landscape, and soft interventions can be meaningful only if they are embedded in a set of other measures. In short: attempts to achieve procedural justice without addressing the issue of distributive justice is probably a less effective way to counter injustices.
3. Third, echoing our finding in relation to actions targeting deprived urban neighborhoods, injustices rooted in large scale structural processes will never be completely erased without changing the roots of the problems. In the case of Stockholm (SE 30) it was claimed that “trying locally to fight processes that originate somewhere else ... is obviously hard or even impossible”. Thus in spite of a carefully planned institutional innovation financed by the action, “the great [societal] trends continue in the direction they were heading [before the action]”.

4.3 Actions targeting rural areas

There were 15 case studies where the definition of the locality was based on larger rural areas (DE 1, EL 3, EL 6, ES 10, FI 11, HU 13, HU 15, HU 16, NL 19, PL 23, PL 24, RO 26, SE 29, UK 31, UK 33). In this category the problematization of spatial injustice-related issues followed two main logics (which were usually intertwined to a certain extent). First, a typical problem of rural areas was defined through unfavorable socio-demographic processes, such as ageing, depopulation, brain-drain, social declassification. Second, another typical narrative is about the disadvantaged economic-institutional position of these areas, which results in the lack of access to SGI, in unemployment and structural problems of the local economy. Usually these problems result in outmigration from these areas, and since most of them are initially sparsely populated, their future role within the respective countries is also implicitly present in these acts of defining problems.

The role of structural factors in producing these disadvantaged rural regions is also implicitly present in these case studies. Some of these areas have geographical features contributing to their peripheral or marginal position. However, geography alone never explains the production of injustices alone. A more typical common factor is how these predominantly agrarian territories lost their economic significance first through industrialization, then through de-industrialization and neoliberal austerity. In other words, most of the problems in this category stem from the fact that urban-rural relations within Europe

³ However, there are well known counterexamples, like the method of citizens’ assemblies.

have been restructured in the previous decades. Thus, similarly to predominantly urban areas and deprived urban neighborhoods, the crucial role of broader historical and structural processes are present here either. It can be also recognized in the frames of reference presented in the case study: local stakeholders often compare their position vis-à-vis nearby urbanized territories, and the implicit claim is that the population of disadvantaged, or sparsely populated rural regions should have similar chances for well-being in life.

Typically, investments include both soft and hard measures. Hard measures can be the development of physical infrastructure (e.g. broadband network) or the development of public places. In LEADER projects, which is a typical EU-funded investment tool for this category, there is also a locally distributed pot of financial resources targeting local stakeholders (NGOs or small enterprises). Soft measures are often interventions to enhance communication between local stakeholders, and the support of processes resulting in long-term, sustainable local strategies. In this sense the actions in this category mix the approaches of distributive and procedural justice, but generally procedural justice is more in the foreground.

In the case of LEADER actions (HU 16, RO 26, UK 31), there is a specific process described in several case studies. As a result of reforming the national frameworks of territorial governance, there is a shift in more recent waves of LEADER projects in the characteristics of the main beneficiaries. Typically, there was more money available in the 2014-2020 period for business-oriented entities through a more top-down process. This finding is in line with the findings of the second chapter describing the general European shift from socially sensitive investments toward investments supporting economic growth (cf. Mendez 2013; Vaughn-Williams 2015). For example, as a Romanian case (RO 26) shows, the complex problems resulting from the dismantlement of the mining industry and the collapse of the related socio-economic infrastructure cannot be solved by such small-scale and poorly funded projects left on the shoulders of some experimental non-governmental institutional structures.

Finally, we also found evidence that “being disadvantaged” in this category is also not a universally shared experience by all the local inhabitants. In one of the case studies a local dweller expressed that “I have chosen to live here and move from Stockholm, because I see the benefits” (SE 29). In another case (DE 1) the authors of the case study emphasized that “even interviewees that recognized structural disparities between urban and rural areas refrained from labelling the region as disadvantaged ... instead, they emphasized positive aspects of living in rural areas” and that “interviewees do not feel forced to live on the countryside”. These insights raise the broader questions of the possible future of these rural areas in the light that there are important differences in perception by local inhabitants. It seems that some rural areas can be characterized both as disadvantaged places with vulnerable social groups, and places chosen by households aiming to find refuge from contemporary urban habitats.

5. Conclusions

This report has highlighted specificities of spatial injustice conceptualized as varieties of challenges to people's wellbeing in different types of localities. In order to summarize and compare findings related to RELOCAL's central research question about the effectiveness of place-based interventions to tackle spatial injustice, the report analyzed the qualitative and narrative data of the 33 case studies and the 11 national reports. In this vein, the report highlights typical patterns and trends that are connected to the perceptions of the local stakeholders, and to higher level structural processes that provide the framework of perceiving and (re-)producing localities.

Key findings

The report has identified that place-based actions aiming to tackle challenges to spatial injustice and wellbeing are embedded in the heterogeneous institutional environment of RELOCAL states that can accommodate the logic of place-based interventions in different ways. The success of place-based actions to tackle instances of spatial injustice depended on the way place-based logics were accommodated in the domestic policy field and it was shaped by the interplay between the dynamics of austerity-driven institutional processes and the institutional environment of the domestic state.

Based on national reports, this comparative report identified three processes of institutional change in the aftermath of the global economic crisis that influenced the implementation of place-based interventions:

- (1) varying dynamics of austerity-driven state withdrawal and welfare retrenchment accompanied by
- (2) selective decentralization ranging from downloading responsibilities to the local level to outsourcing services or policy coordination to non-state actors, such as NGOs, charity organizations, public/private companies;
- (3) varying temporality of fiscal centralization and disciplining of lower state levels. National reports and case studies also gave account of the presence of a plethora of state and non-state actors in the field of territorial development and welfare who are engaged in policy processes in a variety of ways, reflecting overarching trends in contemporary territorial governance (all national cases). The key finding of the analysis of national reports is that post-crisis institutional reforms – state withdrawal, selective decentralization and fiscal centralization – did not take a uniform, unilinear institutional pathway in RELOCAL countries and their impact on place-based interventions depended on their interaction with the overall institutional environment of each state. In some countries the overall institutional framework was more supportive of and accommodating towards place-based actions. In these countries fiscal centralization was only temporary, and the overall multi-level approach of the institutional framework supported localities from the top to mobilize resources from below. In others, bureaucratic and centralized fiscal policies provided insufficient financial, professional and institutional resources for the local level, while selectively downloaded or outsourced policy coordination to lower state levels or non-state actors.

The report identified three scalar fields where RELOCAL place-based actions intended to tackle spatial injustice: (I) deprived urban neighbourhoods, (II) functional urban areas and (III) rural areas. These categories are different from the ones used by D 6.4. comparative report since this report departed from the perceptions of local stakeholders. In the three categories of localities challenges to people's wellbeing were also conceptualized from the perspective of stakeholders' perceptions of spatial injustice. Four types of challenges to spatial injustice were identified across case studies (1) access to public services and need

for appropriate governance structures to support it (2) employment possibilities (3) demographic changes and spatial isolation of rural areas (4) stigmatization and other labelling process. In deprived urban neighbourhoods, stigmatization and segregation, housing and (youth) unemployment appeared to be the main challenges (cf. structural renewal and counteracting stigmatization clusters in D 6.4./3.2.). As a common meta-trend, the production of disadvantaged neighborhoods is connected to larger structural shifts, most importantly to de-industrialization and to economic restructuring. In functional urban areas, spatial injustice manifested in issues of unemployment, or, in some other cases in the high rates of in-work poverty, access to public services, lack of cooperation between administrative entities, lack of cohesion, aging, economic hardships (cf. structural renewal and improving governance processes and isolation clusters in D 6.4./3.2.). In rural areas the most frequent challenges to the wellbeing of local people were demographic processes, such as ageing, outmigration and depopulation, brain-drain and the disadvantaged economic-institutional position of these areas resulting in the lack of access to SGI, in unemployment and structural problems of the local economy (cf. Isolation, improving the governance process, structural renewal clusters of (D 6.4./3.2)).

Preliminary lessons

One of the first lessons of the comparison of RELOCAL case studies is that even the impact of the smallest neighborhood-level urban interventions depends on larger scale institutional and structural factors. Features of state structures – governance modes and public policy priorities – can hijack place-based initiatives to deliver policy objectives of national governments rather than furthering objectives on social cohesion.

Another important lesson is that as the scale of intervention broadens, the depth of place-based knowledge becomes thinner, hence it becomes more difficult to catalyze meaningful participation and bottom-up action. This might explain the reason for more top-down approaches in functional urban areas.

In the case of soft interventions, the success of place-based initiatives depends on the wider institutional landscape, i.e. the effectiveness of soft interventions depends on their embeddedness in a set of other measures that concern distributive justice.

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