SOUTHEAST EUROPE: STATE BORDERS, CROSS-BORDER RELATIONS, SPATIAL STRUCTURES

Zoltán Hajdú - Iván Illés - Zoltán Raffay (eds.)

▲ Pécs, 2007 ■ MTA RKK ●

SOUTHEAST-EUROPE: STATE BORDERS, CROSS-BORDER RELATIONS, SPATIAL STRUCTURES

Editors:

Zoltán Hajdú – Iván Illés – Zoltán Raffay

Centre for Regional Studies,
Hungarian Academy of Sciences

Pécs, 2007

Written in the framework of the ESTIA-SPOSE research project, published in Hungarian and English language in 200 copies

ISBN: 978 963 9052 65 9

Cover design: Zoltán Pál
Published by Dr. Gyula Horváth, Director General
Technical editor: Magdolna Ferencz
Maps and figures by Valéria Fonyódi
Printed by G&G Ltd., Pécs
Director General: Dr. János Gárván

CONTENT

INTRODUCTION

There were and still there are territories in the continent of Europe that are in the foreground of international political, scientific, economic etc. public interest from time to time and then the interest in them fades for a shorter or longer while. The Balkans Peninsula, "The Balkans" and Southeast-Europe have already been in the centre of the European public attention and power games several times.

By the right of the ancient Greek civilisation, the southern parts of the Balkans Peninsula can be taken as the cradle of the European culture. The history of the Roman and the Byzantine Empire started a peculiar process of "change of empire" in the region in the broader sense. The Republic of Venice as a super power "spread the enlightenment" in the Mediterranean areas of the Balkans Peninsula. The Ottoman Empire conquered the Balkans for centuries and accordingly had deep structural effects on the whole of the region.

Modernisation was a complicated process, a multi-player "game" from the beginning, where the Ottoman Empire, the desire of the oppressed small peoples for liberty and later the conflicts among them all played their parts, as did, last but not least, the super powers who treated the small nations almost as "toy dolls" during their rivalries. The definitely not positive consequence of all these common activities became the birth of a "hornet's nest" in the Balkans.

The 20th century reinforced in many respects the negative connotations of "The Balkans", among the peoples living in the peninsula few admitted their "Balkans" character or attached themselves to "The Balkans". International politics and political geography, however, still created a special notion (balkanisation), generalising the processes of the region.

Actually it was a dilemma from the beginning in the development of geographical science how to divide the volatile political units (states etc.), changing frequently and within short times, which stand the test of time, enjoy a public consensus and are acceptable for everybody. (Later it became a basic issue of regional science and the European macro-regional co-operation and planning process.) In the beginning the basis of the division was provided by the basins (catchment areas etc.) of the large rivers, but it turned out soon that the rivers were far to attractive for the "state border makers" of the actual powers, so no final solution acceptable for everybody could be reached by such a division.

From the early 19th century, both the significant development of physical geography leading to the more precise definition of concepts and the progress and increasing demands of school education led to the division of Europe into islands, peninsulas, basins and mountain ranges etc. (Even though there was consensus on the designation of the respective categories, the specification of the

designated macro-region was often debated.)

The "clear physical geographical" designation of the large European peninsulas intruding into the Mediterranean Sea, including the Balkans Peninsula, was first done by Zeune, who could do this with the pure intention of creating scientific spatial categories, without the "German power dominance" or "arrogance" typical of the later times. Nevertheless in the case of Balkans Peninsula the debate concerning the "neck" of the peninsula, i.e. the designation from the north almost immediately appeared (*Figure 1*).

Figure 1.

Delimitations of the Balkans Peninsula



Legend: 1: Sava–Danube line; 2: Trieste–Odessa line; 3: Carpathian and Balkans line

The designation is important from a mere physical geographical aspect too, because science working with a set of concepts is only able to analyse "meaningfully designated" units in a clearly defined conceptual system. (This is the

reason why the designation of the Balkans Peninsula is almost an "evergreen topic" within physical geography, although we have to add that the political processes and the changing spatial identities – just because of the varied national and international interests and involvement – have influenced physical geography and physical geographers as well.)

The approach of the "Sick Man of Europe", a constant attribute used for the Ottoman Empire was born in the rivalries of the super powers in the 19th century, and was used to express that the Ottoman Empire – especially in its European territories – was in a rather worrying condition, so the "cure", i.e. the deprivation and the division of the European territories could start.

The interest of the super powers and of the small nations that suffered from oppression for centuries were the same as regarded the fighting back and the "division" of the Ottoman power, the real problem was whose interests should be primarily taken into consideration "during the cure" and whose real or alleged allies (the role frequently changed in the beginning) should be given bigger and more valuable lands during the division.

The image of the "Dark Balkans", the "Hornet's Nest" was actually born in the 1878–1913 period, and it became an "an attributive and dominant approach" to the region. "The Balkans" became a synonym of underdevelopment, cruelty, treason, bloody revenge and corruption for the super powers.

The compromises of the super powers among themselves (Berlin Congress), the new rulers of the just liberated countries (who were often of foreign origin and did not always represent the interests of the local communities), the corrupted bureaucracy emerging in the capital cities and the administrative centres of the new states all contributed to the fact that the Balkans was considered inferior and was despised in the circle of the "ruling and intellectual elite of the civilised Europe".

The geographical and political concept of "Southeast-Europe" including the Balkans first appeared in the German geography and politics, also with the intention to "avoid" the name "Balkans", offending for several communities. The territory and boundaries of Southeast-Europe were instable and floated in the different historical periods.

The formal reason for the breakout of World War I was the unsettled dispute between the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Serbia, but it was actually nothing but a spark for the "explosives of the European powers", it was actually only an excuse for the formal start of the war.

In the period between the two World Wars, the countries of the peninsula were modernised in the economic sense in many respects, but the mutual historical traumas and the collective experiences of the two Balkans wars were still carried, in fact, strengthened by the peoples of the Balkans.

The Italian fascist system "set an eye on the region", but had serious failures

in Greece in 1940. The Nazi Germany joined the fights in the Balkans partly with the aim to assist its Italian ally. During the resistance against the invasion of super powers, in the nations of the region (especially the Yugoslav and the Greeks) a new form and content (and partly the myth) of heroism was born.

At the end of World War II – as so many times before – the region was in a complicated situation. The cold war era partly created a "clear situation" in the Balkans. The stability of the two world systems was first challenged by the non-committed politics of Yugoslavia and the special ways of Albania. Yugoslavia was in the centre of the "inter-state" struggle in almost the entire period, in the case of Albania the rivalry between the Soviet Union and China appeared.

On the western side the hostile Greek-Turk relations and the issue of Cyprus were the most problematic political issues. The allied system (NATO) and then the accession of Greece to the EEC (in 1981) more decreased than increased the tensions.

The easement process in the last phase of the cold war solved the "inter-system tensions in the Balkans Peninsula", whereas the death of the President of Yugoslavia, Tito in 1980 increased the uncertainties within the region. The process of the systemic change took place in the different ways and different methods in the ex-socialist countries of the region, but these changes necessarily impacted the capitalist countries of the region, as well.

In the collapse of Yugoslavia, external and internal processes, impacts and actors all played their parts. As regards the general conditions, the collapse of the former world order created the international political conditions for the strengthening of the internal secession processes and efforts, but the fact that these processes turned into a civil war was mostly the responsibility of the inner elites and the local actors. (Probably not one international factor of power was interested in the unfurling of such bloody processes in the region, shocking the whole of Europe.)

The European Union appeared in the crisis regions of the Balkans in the early 1990, first with humanitarian aids. The international community was involved both in the region as a whole and the respective states.

The first occasion when the international community intervened with armed forces into the bloody internal processes was in Bosnia and Herzegovina, which was followed by the air attacks on Serbia in 1999, which indicated the dedication of the international community to the protection of the Albans in Kosovo, followed by the international (UNO) control and administration of Kosovo.

The international community did not forget the Balkans in the time of the crises, either. The transport corridors of pan-European interest defined in Helsinki did not stop at the borders of the region.

The international community, especially the European Union did a lot for the economic and the political stabilisation of the region (after the military interven-

tions and the settlement or at least consolidation of the political situation). The INTERREG programme gradually approached the region. In addition to Greece and Italy, with the accession of Austria in 1995 altogether three countries were interested in building out and developing connections to Southeast-Europe.

With the accession of Slovenia, Hungary and Cyprus in 2004 and of Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 to the European Union, Southeast-Europe became a significant internal factor within the Union from all aspects. (We can say that the EU "surrounded" the inner areas of the centre of the crisis.)

The major part of Southeast-Europe integrated into the European planning, co-operation and "tendering" macro-region (CADSES), and co-operations of different type and content developed. In the framework of the ESTIA, and later the ESTIA-SPOSE research projects (*Figure 2*) a kind of basic research and planning co-operation evolved, concerning the whole of the region.

The volumes now published in Hungarian and English languages were not written as monographs and do not give a complete picture of the whole Balkans region (this will be done by the monograph to be published in Athens, providing a comprehensive summary of the whole research), or the role of Hungary in the research of the area. What the studies do is highlight some important segments of the special issues (important from the aspects of Hungary) of the Balkans.

Hungarian academics have been actively studying the Balkans Peninsula and Southeast-Europe for about a century and a half. The internal transformation processes of the region – as thoroughly documented by Zoltán Hajdú – have always had a considerable impact on the directions of the Hungarian researches.

The structural features of the countries of Southeast-Europe and the components in the transformation of the internal spatial structure are raised as issues of European significance in the essay of Iván Illés. The macro-regional processes and the development of the situation of the individual countries followed different development paths after the systemic change, too.

The development of the macro-regional transport connections has traditionally been important for Hungary. The essay written by Ferenc Erdősi gives an introduction to the transport processes of the region, together with the political correlations of these processes.

Gyula Horváth in his essay analyses the general determinations of the regional processes in East-Central Europe, drawing attention to the occasional differences as well. In this region, regionalism is a more complicated phenomenon than in the other parts of Europe.

Ilona Pál-Kovács gives in her study an overall view of the internal administrative reform tendencies of the Southeast-European countries. The political weight of public administration is significant in each of these countries. The situation is especially interesting in the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina.

Figure 2.

CADSES and ESTIA SPOSE research areas



New spatial categories have emerged (West Balkans), but the consolidation of the whole of the region and its placement in the European integration process is still to come. Zoltán Pámer deals in his study with the European Union integration processes (and often question marks) of the West Balkans.

The processes of the historical and the recent past, and the still unsolved situation of Kosovo make it necessary confront the issue whether the European Union is going to be able to "Europeanise" the region. If not, the unsettled tensions and processes in the Balkans will partly destabilise the southeast parts of the European Union.

The Editors

HUNGARIAN RESEARCHES ON THE SOUTHEAST-EUROPEAN SPACE (THE BALKANS): CONTINUITY, INTERRUPTION OR PERMANENT RE-START

Zoltán Hajdú

1. Introduction

The European spatial view and macro-regional spatial division have always raised very complicated theoretical, historical, and emotional and identity issues and we still "collide" into the chaotic relations of the different specifications. The most "simple" division by astronomical directions (north, east, south and west) and semidirections (northeast, southeast, southwest, northwest) is also one of the oldest specifications. (The further refinements of the geographical directions – East-Central Europe, East-Central Europe etc. – have already led to "spatial chaos" sometimes.)

It already depends on the geographical position of the respective country what astronomical directions they define compared to their location. It is evident thus that there are many "simple" geographical divisions of Europe in the different national spatial concepts and geographical sciences etc. All in all what we have is the "competition", the coexistence of relative definitions. ("Central Europe", featured in many geographical designations as a zone of origin or as an overlapping contact zone has led to further complications…)

The "single European approval and acknowledgement" of the designation of the astronomical directions has evolved in an extremely difficult way throughout history. We have to say that the German spatial view and specifications played the dominant role. One of the reasons for this might be the feeling of the Germans, i.e. that they occupy the central part of Europe, therefore their geographical specifications may be the "directions relative to the centre"; on the other hand, the German geography was among the first ones to deal with the regional division of Europe, accordingly the Germans were the first or among the first ones to name the different macro-regions.

For the Germans and the Austrians Southeast-Europe was a "simple" astronomical and geographical category in the beginning; later, before World War I – and even more so between the two world wars – it was "enriched" with a political content (*Beer–Seewann eds. 2004*). This concept of space has kept some

of its political relevance since then. (We still lack a completely uniform German designation of the macro-region; most accepted is the macro-region bordered by Slovenia, Hungary, Romania and Moldavia, researched by the "Südost-Institut" in Munich.)

The European designation of the physical geographical macro-regions goes back to the early 19th century, in which the issue of the designation of the Balkan Peninsula is of vital importance for this study. The designation of the Balkan Peninsula was disputed and disputable since 1808, when the German geographer Zeune described the three large peninsulas of Southern Europe (Pyrenean, Italian and Balkans) for the first time, because the Balkans has a very wide "neck" connecting it to the mainland of the continent, which means a possibility and a reason for disputes even in the purest physical geographical approach.

The designation and acceptance of the territorial and historical-territorial spatial communities is the most complicated issue. The "internal designation and identity" and the designation coming from the outside do not necessarily coincide – it is enough if we think of the territory of the "Balkans", which is extremely complicated, continuously changing in history and permanently reconsidered even nowadays. (Some accepted and still accept the concept of the "Balkans", others clearly and nervously deny the identity with the spatial community "humiliating" for them and definitely deny that they belong there or are part of the Balkans.)

The scientific research of Southeast Europe and the Balkans became interesting in the 19th century both for Europe and those actually living in the Balkans (the formerly existing extended researches on the antique Greece were a "Greek national affair" and did not cover the whole of the region). "Balkanology" appeared in several large-scale national (English, French, German, Italian, Russian, Austrian) researches in Europe. (In spatial researches the Germans and the Austrians were dominant.)

For the Hungarians and the Hungarian geography too the macro-regional view of Europe was problematic, including the definition of their own geographical position and the spatial community to identify themselves with. The geographical orientation of Hungary and the definition of its spatial community changed drastically in history. The Hungarian researches of Balkanology were inspired by the spatial community (19th century) and the economic interests of outstanding importance, on the one hand, and by the "proximity" of the macro-region, on the other hand.

The Hungarian researches on Southeast Europe (the Balkans) have different historical periods, which are largely defined by the changes in the influence of Hungary, and they also have a chronology by disciplines: the historical, geographical, cartographical, ethnographical, linguistic-cultural, ethnic, religious, economic, economic policy, spatial policy, military geographical, security poli-

tics etc. researches were active at different levels at different times. (Our brief analysis mostly deals with the researches connected to the spatial problems. Actually, the researches of all other disciplines could and should be introduced in separate chapters.)

2. Issues of the Hungarian researches on the Balkan Peninsula, Southeast Europe etc.

The most comprehensive definition of the historically changing structural relationship between Hungary and the Balkans is provided by the historian László Makkai, which might be the most useful definition to make us understand the problems of the researches on the Balkans: "For a millennium Hungary played the role of a lock and the gate between the Balkans and Western Europe. There were times when the small states of the Balkans found their political chances of existence under the wing of the strong Hungarian power, but there were no times when Hungary was a negligible factor in their lives. During the first five centuries of the Hungarian history it seemed many times that the Balkans will be Hungary, whereas in the second half of the millennium we saw that the Balkans penetrated deeply into the territory of Hungary" (*Makkai 1942, p. 71.*).

The modern Hungarian economic ambitions concerning the Balkans appeared in the first half of the 19th century, and became more extended in connection with the regulation of the Iron Gate and the lower reaches of the Danube River. István Széchenyi knew that the regulated Danube River could offer a dominant transport possibility for the large northern part of the Balkans. The railway constructions caused serious disputes between Hungary and the Balkans both as regarded the direction of the tracks and the quality and connections of the junctions. (In the second half of the 19th century the basic elements of the often conflicting regional policies at state level were actually defined in connection with the construction of the modern transport network.)

Parallel to the weakening of the Ottoman Empire, the competition of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy and Russia for the influence in the Balkans intensified in the first place. However, the Balkans were not the exclusive "hunting area" of these two powers (Italy, Germany, England and France also stated and asserted their own interests in the region), but these two powers felt that they had a mission in the Balkans.

The Hungarian researches on the Balkans – naturally, because of the historically experienced and often radically reformed political relations of Hungary to the Balkans – started with historical researches in the 18th century. Ethnography, linguistics and comparative history of literature gradually joined in the researches of the area, followed by the new Hungarian geographical science after

the 1830s (*Hajdú 2002*).

Already in the early Hungarian researches we encounter the issue of how to place and define the territory of the Balkans in the European structures of different type. The Balkans appeared as part of the Mediterranean Space, Southern Europe, Southeast Europe, Danubian Europe, Eastern Europe etc. In certain sciences (ethnography and geology) the Carpathian-Balkan area was a separate macro-region of Europe. The Hungarian researches, nevertheless, were largely dominated by the issue of the utilisation of the Danube River for transportation.

The Hungarian economic actors were very much interested both before and during Wold War I in the economic opportunities and the markets offered by the Balkans. The Ministry of Trade launched a series of publications in 1914, consisting of 14 volumes (called 'Balkans markets after the war'), with the objective of the preparation for the situation after the war and the deepening of the trading relations. The published volumes gave an extremely detailed introduction of the respective towns, regions and countries.

The Hungarian researches on the Balkans can be divided into several characteristic periods, depending on the development of the bilateral relations:

- The period prior to 1918 (when Hungary was present in the region as part of a large power but partly also as an independent economic factor), when the researches were largely influenced by the interests of the individual science disciplines, and later by some power and imperialistic efforts based on certain historical and legal grounds;
- The period between 1918 and 1944, when it was the adaptation to the circumstances caused by Wold War I and the tasks and opportunities coming from the new situation (the new Hungary was pushed out from the Balkans, it was not part of a large power any longer but a small state struggling for the existence and for territorial revisions) that determined the main directions and efforts of the researches;
- The short period of 1945–1948, when the possibilities of a democratic development were partly open in the region and the research of the possibilities of a long-term cooperation, the elaboration of federalist plans of different type started;
- From the summer of 1948 to the end of the state socialist period, when the research of the divided Balkans (socialist and capitalist) and of Yugoslavia took place separately, instead of studying the Balkans as a whole;
- And finally the period since 1990 to date, when the independent Hungarian researches revived but are also determined by international frameworks, especially as regards spatial planning and regional development (*Illés 2002*).

The researches on the Balkans also raised specific research organisational, in-

stitutional and partly educational issues in the different periods. In the early Balkans researches the universities, the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and the state-owned educational institutes all had their parts. The Hungarian Geographical Society and the Hungarian Foreign Policy Society played an important part in the researches at certain times. (The institutionalisation of the newly born and developing Hungarian Balkanistics was rather difficult.)

The Hungarian governments always expected considerable results from the researches, but only provided limited financial support for the researchers and the institutions. The real issue was what role the Hungarian state assigns to the Hungarian science in the foundation of the Balkans-politics. Historically the representatives of the Hungarian politics hardly used the findings of the Hungarian Balkans-researches, and they did not support in a wide circle the institutionalisation of these researches. (The characteristic features of the researches in the respective periods are only briefly described.)

3. Imperialistic power and science ambitions of the Hungarian Balkans-researches until 1918

The foreign trade interest and partly the capital export as a consequence of the Hungarian economic development after 1867, followed by the strengthening political efforts, evaluated the Balkans. The Hungarian economic elite recognised that the competition was less sharp in the Balkans and the Hungarian products were easier to market there. To justify this ambition, the historical reasons were also found and the civilisation mission appeared.

The Austro-Hungarian power ambitions (including considerable Hungarian interest assertion wills) turned towards the Balkans. After the Berlin Congress in 1878, following the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy became a large power possessing large territories in the Balkans and accordingly having vested interests in the region. By the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (in 1909) the Monarchy became a stakeholder in the Balkans in all respects – just in the most dangerous times (*Palotás 1972*).

The national awakening movements and the independence ambitions of the peoples of the Balkans were present from the second half of the 19th century in a constantly changing complex of the interests of the super powers. For the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy it was a permanent issue to what extent the birth and the politics of the new states were favourable or unfavourable for the Monarchy (*Niederhauser 1972*). The leadership of the Monarchy knew well that the new states could experience their greatness and formulate their "era of glory" to the detriment of either the Ottoman Empire or the Monarchy, only.

The Monarchy could not become a territorial colonising power in the traditional sense of the word; it was not interested in the annexation of new territories after the acquisition of Bosnia and Herzegovina, as the latter country itself caused many problems both at the international level and in the internal relations. The Monarchy was mostly interested in preventing any large power (especially Russia) from acquiring an influence (both spatially and politically) that could restrict the freedom of action of the Monarchy.

The modern Hungarian science at this time inevitably and necessarily unfurled in this power and political network, these dominant conditions and circumstances unavoidably influenced the Hungarian science. This is especially visible in the case of the newly born Hungarian political geography. The new Hungarian political geography was not only a product of the times in this respect but also had an influence on the development of the political processes with its analyses and the "definitions of its power ambitions".

The category of "imperialism" was given a definitely positive connotation in the contemporary Hungarian political geography, it meant that Hungary was competitive (at least in the territory of the Balkans) with the other large powers from economic and even more so from political aspects.

The Centre of Hungarian-Bosnian and Oriental Economy created by Kálmán Balkányi (attorney, author of economics, secretary of the National Hungarian Commerce Association in 1908) and Leó Lánczy (chairman of the Hungarian Commerce Bank of Pest, chairman of the Budapest Chambers of Commerce and Industry) actually represented the Hungarian interests in the narrower sphere of influence of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy in the Balkans and also in the wider region, financing significant researches and publications.

3.1. Prominent persons in the early Hungarian Balkans-researches

Several representatives of the modern Hungarian science considered the research of the Balkans as one of their main scientific activities. In the case of almost all researchers, the individual, private interest was linked to the wider social, political and scientific conditions and the stimuli of the environment. We do not have the space here to assess and analyse in detail the works of the respective persons, only the most important relevances of their works are highlighted.

Fülöp Félix Kánitz (Kanitz) (1829–1904) signed his name with his geographical, cartographical and ethnographical researches among the Hungarian Balkans researchers of international recognition and fame. He was even given the honourable title of "Columbus of the Balkans" by the German newspapers.

Kánitz, as the employee of the newspaper called "Illustrierte Zeitung" published in Leipzig, arrived at the Balkans in 1858 to provide his newspaper with

reports illustrated with prints. He was soon confronted with the fact how little Europe knew about the Balkan regions of the Ottoman Empire. The geographical, ethnographical, economic etc. information was deficient. Kánitz studied especially Serbia and the northern part of Bulgaria, introducing them to Europe with his publications (written in German language). Kánitz was the first Hungarian researcher of the Balkans who received recognition all over Europe.

Kánitz was active in several disciplines (cartography, geography, economics, history), his findings proved to be important for several disciplines. The works of Kánitz had a significant impact on the political, economic, diplomatic and military elite of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy. He enjoyed the financial support of Emperor and King Franz Joseph, which allowed him to continue and deepen his scientific researches. It is largely attributable to Kánitz that the interest of Europe and Hungary in the Balkans grew (*Fehér 1932*).

(Béni) Benjamin Kállay (1839–1903) met the problems of the Balkans, especially Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina as a historian and active politician (*Thallóczy 1909*). Kállay was a politician dealing with the issues of the East and an outstanding expert of the history of the Balkans.

As a chief consul of Beograd (1867–1875) he had a considerable activity in the research of an important part of the history of Serbia (1780–1815) (*Kállay 1877*). As a joint deputy minister of foreign affairs he had a broad outlook on the everyday political processes of the region, then as a joint minister of finance he actually became the civil governor of Bosnia and Herzegovina. In addition to the historical analysis of the internal relations of the Balkans he also paid a good deal of attention to studying the Balkans politics of Russia (*Kállay 1878*).

The historian Lajos Thallóczy (1856–1916) – who was also the civil governor of Serbia occupied by the Monarchy in 1915–1916 – was dubbed the "mobile Balkans institute" by his contemporaries, and in the period between the two world wars he was considered as the initiator of the modern Hungarian researches of the Balkans. Thallóczy achieved significant and original results especially in the research of the history of Bosnia, Croatia and Serbia. From 1914 until his death Thallóczy was an elected member of the Balkans Committee of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS).

Baron Ferenc Nopcsa, a geologist, ethnographer and geographer (1877–1933), was also awarded the title of "Columbus of the Balkans" by his contemporaries. He played an especially important part in the discovery of the geological structure of Albania and partly the whole of the Balkans. Nopcsa as a regular member of the HAS strongly advocated the organisation of the Hungarian Balkans researches and the building out of institutional frameworks for that. In 1916 he was a member in the Balkans Committee of the HAS. An important fact leading to his tragic suicide was the deepening of the personal rivalries more and more typical in the Hungarian sciences. Nopcsa as a geologist had a

significant impact even after his death on the procession of the Balkans image of the Hungarian geography, especially on the definition of the structure of the Balkans.

The most important representative of the imperialistic Hungarian political geography towards the Balkans was Rezső Havass (1852–1927). In 1913 the geographers of Hungary already saw Havass as the "enthusiastic and missionary champion of the Hungarian imperialism", with a positive connotation. Havass was more active in the private sector than in science, his considerable wealth allowed him to travel across the Balkans and Asia Minor several times.

3.2. Educational and scientific institutes and societies

Education (at all levels) plays an important part in shaping the "us" and "them" images of a community. It is not indifferent at all how the general, economic, commercial etc. issues of the Balkans – so important for our essay – appeared in the Hungarian national education. Scientific researches and publications – which usually reach a narrow audience – always shape the concepts and neighbour-image of a society more indirectly. The societies for the dissemination of knowledge played an important role in popularising the relationships to the Balkans.

3.2.1. Educational efforts

Before Wold War I the institutional network of education dealing with the Balkans (at least partly) gradually expanded:

- As a result of different local and national initiatives, in 1891 the government launched a one-year training on oriental trade within the frameworks of the Academy of Commerce. The course worked as a kind of training and retraining for the professional elite.
- A further development of the trainings was the establishment of the 2-year Hungarian Royal Academy of Commerce by the Ministry of Religion and Public Education (Vallás- és Közoktatásügyi Minisztérium, VKM) in 1999, with Budapest as the seat. Ignác Kunos (1860–1945), a professor of Turkology was appointed as the director of the Academy; he was a person dedicated to the research of the Balkans. The primary objective of the Academy was the promotion of the development of the oriental relations and the deepening of the commercial cooperation within the frameworks of training at college level. The Academy was basically a practice-oriented training institution, but the training needs necessarily required the deepening of the different scientific researches as well. In the

training syllabus a special attention was paid to the economics, monetary affairs, and customs affairs and customs administration in the Balkans countries. An organic part of the training was the lecturing of the economic geography of the Balkans, Asia Minor and the Near East. Special courses were held on the complicated internal relations of Bosnia and Herzegovina. Linguistic training enjoyed a special status within the syllabus. The most up-to-date linguistic (phonetics) laboratory of Hungary was set up, in order to secure the successful and high level language training. (The Academy worked until 1920 when it was integrated into the newly created Faculty of Economics.)

- The Fiume (the present Rijeka) Academy of Export was also established by a government decision. This organisation was active until 1919.
- In 1914 the further training base of the training of oriental trade was established in the Technical University of Budapest, in 1920 it was also integrated into the Faculty of Economics. The aim of the further training was to allow the graduates to continuously obtain information and update their skills.

The state primarily and selectively supported the establishment of training institutions before 1918, and the scientific researches were the necessary consequences of training in these training institutions. In almost each educational institution of practical objectives and character a sort of small research base was founded, within which some academics specialised on the research of the Balkans issues.

3.2.2. Academic ambitions, institutions and societies

Not only practice-oriented trainings but also academic research programmes were defined, academic workshops were also created for the study of the macro-region.

Within the organisation of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the ambitions for the establishment of the institutional frameworks of the oriental and Balkans researches was on the agenda many times before 1918. It was mainly Pál Teleki (1879–1941) who played an important role in keeping the issue on the agenda; his actual academic organisational efforts were very valuable.

In the "joint meeting" of 1913, the general secretary of the HAS, "partly with view to the latest large-scale political and economic changes in the east, proposes the setting up of an 'Oriental Committee'. The ex-ante report of the establishment of the Oriental Committee states that "... the Balkans War that has just ended has brought about a fundamental change in the eastern interest sphere of Hungary. The political, commercial, academic and economic circles are all

aware of the new circumstances, when the era of a new cultural development is starting after the expelling of the Turks and the establishment of the new Balkan states. In this cultural development the Hungarians should take their part, too. We have to abandon the dogma that we have an interest in the maintenance of the Ottoman Empire" (*Akadémiai Értesítő 1914, p. 127.*).

German science heavily focused on the region, carrying out pioneer researches in places where the important analyses could have been done by Hungarians, as well. Austria too considered the research of Dalmatia – a part of Austria – as an important task. (In 1896 the Vienna Academy defined the archaeological, linguistic, historical and ethnic research of the macro-region as its own task, and created the Balkans Committee.) In university education too the lecturing of the issues of the Balkans was in the foreground. Vienna became a real research and university training centre for the Yugoslav issues.

The first step they defined was to make the HAS translate and publish in Hungarian language the most important and most fundamental foreign historical, political and economics works on the Balkans, especially the main publications of the Balkans Institute working in Sarajevo.

In the winter of 1915 Pál Teleki – on behalf of the Balkans Committee of the HAS – worked out the concept for the creation of a "Balkans and Asia Minor Geographical Institute" (*Akadémiai Értesítő, 1916. pp. 149–153*). The main reason for the establishment of the new institute was the interest of the science, economy and society in the Balkans that had become more clear-cut and stronger than ever since the breakout of the war. As Teleki said, "The Hungarian society, our political leaders and our academic institutions too have to recognise that the maintenance of our mere existence requires our intensive penetration into the Balkans and the East".

The Hungarian Academy of Sciences – with its restricted financial means – continuously supported the academic researches and expeditions in the Balkans, and the dissemination of the findings of the scientific researches. The HAS approached the Balkans researches not so much with direct daily political objectives – although they were also present among the ambitions, especially in connection with the Balkans expedition – but more frequently with structural and national political targets.

The events of Wold War I turned the interest of the Hungarian public opinion, politics and partly also the academics towards the allied Turkey. The leaders of the Monarchy were aware of the decisive strategic importance of Turkey in the Balkans. The Hungarian public opinion felt sympathy for Turkey too.

Within more comprehensive goals, but with the primary objective of carrying out historical researches was the short-lived Hungarian Scientific Institute of Constantinople (1916–1919) founded. The Institute was established in 1916, it actually started its operation in January 1917, and practically ceased its activity

in September 1917, although the documents related to its liquidation date right until the beginning 1919.

The creation of the Hungarian Scientific Institute of Constantinople served academic, but during the world war necessarily also political and cultural political objectives. Its primary academic objective was the research of the Hungarian-Turkish historical relations and connections. The establishment of the Hungarian Scientific Institute of Constantinople was also promoted by the fact that several European countries had already established their own research institutes, usually with a larger number of staff.

The actual operation of the Hungarian Scientific Institute of Constantinople started in January 1917, under the leadership of Antal Hekler (1882–1940), an archaeologist, art historian, and the director of the Museum of Fine Arts. The selection of the five scholars proved to be difficult because of the war. The operation of the Institute was largely promoted by the fact that its account-keeping bank (Hungarian Bank and Commercial Inc.) had an own branch office in Constantinople, allowing the financial relations to remain fast and reliable despite the war circumstances.

The circumstances of the organisation of the Institute, the serious difficulties within the war conditions clearly indicate that the Hungarian ministry of education did not only organise, equip and operate the Institute for historical researches but also with the will to assert long-term political objectives, also, they wished to show their sympathy and support for the Turks in the given situation.

Because of the war conditions and the financial difficulties the Institute could not carry out its research activity in full capacity, nevertheless it played a fundamental role in the research and career orientation of some scholars, several of whom later became the researchers of the Hungarian-Turkish, Hungarian-Bulgarian etc. relations and the Balkans. The research findings born in the Institute were published in eight leaflets by the staff of the Institute (*Ujváry 1993*).

The modern Hungarian geography became an institutionalised science after the early 1860s. One of the first tasks of the Hungarian geography was the definition of the new image of Hungary, including the specification of the geographical location and the neighbourhood environment of the country. The Hungarian Geographical Society paid a special attention since its foundation to the discovery of the Balkans and the publication of works on the geographical problems of the Balkans. The periodical of the Society – the Geographical Bulletin ('Földrajzi Közlemények') – played a considerable role in the dissemination of information on the Balkans in a wider circle.

One of the founders of the Hungarian geographical science, János Hunfalvy (1820–1888) came to the conclusion when analysing the physical geographical conditions and the geographical location of Hungary that "the Hungarian empire is located in the south-eastern part of Europe..." (*Hunfalvy 1863, p. 53.*). Behind

this definition we can actually see the fact that the historical Hungary had been much bigger in territory than the Hungary of the time, featuring much more Balkans elements coming from its size and location. The definition of the macro-regional location of Hungary within Europe was also influenced by the fact that Hunfalvy accepted the spatial view of the German geography. In the background of the spatial definition we actually see the fact that Hunfalvy considered the historical Hungary as a power with competency in the Balkans.

Hunfalvy almost permanently dealt in his historical, geographical and ethnographical works with the issues of the Balkans as well, but it was not his objective to carry out primary researches in the region, he usually relied on German and French sources of literature (*Hunfalvy 1884*). For Hunfalvy too one of the dominant issues of the Balkans was the linguistic and religious diversity of the region. (In the Hungarian spatial view and scientific terminology the specification 'Balkan Peninsula' became widespread after Hunfalvy.)

The Geographical Bulletin published almost since its foundation news, essays and later studies on the Balkans. The Hungarian authors were mostly interested in the "Near Balkans" at the level of professional and political analyses. In addition to the "country case studies" (written by Bátky, Zs. on Bulgaria in 1915, Győrffy, I. in 1916 on Dobrugea, Kemény, Gy. on Serbia in 1916, Németh, J. on Serbia in 1915, Pécsi, A. on the Novibaraz Sandjak – 'sandjak' means a province under a pasha – in 1913), the Hungarian geographical researches relatively soon focused on the survey of the whole of the Balkans (Cholnoky, J. wrote in 1913 on the peoples of the whole of the Balkan Peninsula, Hézser, A. in 1916 on the transit routes of the Balkan Peninsula, Kogutowicz, K. in 1913 on the Balkan Peninsula as a whole, Milleker, R. in 1913 on the Serbian Adriatic-politics). The analyses of the Balkans – as we can see from the list above – were especially frequent in the times of the Balkans Wars. A common feature of the essays differing in character and scale is that the Hungarian geographers always looked at the Balkans on the basis of the Hungarian historical notions; also, they tried to explore the Hungarian interests during their studies.

Of the already mentioned "publication boom" unfurling during the war we should only emphasise that István Györffy summarised more consciously than any of his predecessors had done before the historical and political geographical correlations of the old Hungarian Balkans politics and the recent implications of this politics, as he saw them (*Györffy 1916*). Towards a large part of the Balkans the Hungarians represented the Roman Catholic Church; the Hungarian nation had mediated the European impacts for centuries. Györffy considered this mission realistic and desirable in the future too, and he saw that the Hungarian nation "does convey culture to the Serbs of which that they are in a bigger need than of Greater Serbia" (*Györffy 1916*, p. 37.).

Also due the to support of the Hungarian Geographers Society, during the war the Temesvár (Timişoara) Balkans Office was set up in Temesvár, whose primary task was the research of the Balkans and the extended analysis of the Hungarian–Balkans relations. Among the geographical publications of the office we should mention two essays by Ferenc Fodor, who was a teacher of a secondary school in Karánsebes (Caransebeş) at that time (*Fodor 1917/a, 1917/b*). Fodor started to intensively deal with the political geographical issues of the Balkans, motivated by Rezső Havass.

The importance of the two short works of Fodor is the strengthening of the already existing concept in the Hungarian geography, i.e. the continental – at that time mostly railway – traffic and the European integration of the Balkans lie in the hands of Hungary, consequently Hungary plays a key role for the present and the future of the Balkans.

Between 1916 and 1918 the necessity and possibility of setting up a Balkans Academy in Szeged, dealing with the complex spatial researches, was raised several times. Teleki continuously urged the establishment of the Academy; at certain times (in 1917) he even made negotiations on concrete personnel issues, he would have been happy to see e.g. Ferenc Fodor as a geographer among the members of the Academy. However, mainly for financial reasons, the institution could not be established.

This era was the most intensive period of the geographical researches and education of the Balkans in Hungary. In accordance with the social, economic and political expectations, the state itself played some role in the creation of education on the Balkans and also in the researches of the region, but other institutions also paid attention to the Balkans.

This period was from many aspects the most exciting, most complex and most fruitful era of the Hungarian Balkans researches. Due to the specific historical situation, the academic researches partly substituted the missing direct Hungarian–Balkans diplomatic relations, and also wished to promote the success of the Hungarian economy in the Balkans by the exploration of the business possibilities through the introduction of the macro-region.

4. Researches between the two world wars

The defeat in Wold War I and its social, economic, political, territorial etc. consequences resulted in a brand new situation in the macro-region, including Hungary as well. The Austro-Hungarian Monarchy ceased to exist, accordingly the illusions of Hungary as a co-super power vanished. In the peace treaties made around Paris the large part of the territory of the Balkans was rearranged. (The "Balkanisation", featuring the process of fragmentation, was relevant for Hun-

gary too in many respects.)

Hungary became independent of Austria, but the Trianon peace treaty not only detached Croatia from the historical Hungary (the majority of the Hungarian political elite approved of Croatia deciding itself whether to keep up the joint administration with Hungary or join the new Yugoslav state formation), but large parts of the Motherland were also annexed to the new Serb-Croat-Slovene Kingdom. In addition to the areas inhabited by Yugoslav ethnic groups, territories of pure Hungarian nationality were also detached from Hungary.

For Hungary the strongest Balkans state was Yugoslavia in the inter-war period, and the development of the Hungarian-Yugoslav relations determined the limited freedom of action for Hungary in the Balkans in the broader sense. Romania in most of the cases was considered by the Hungarian political elite as a Central European and not as a Balkans country.

Hungary was pushed out of the territory of the Balkans by the treaty of Trianon. Within the new country borders the first idea of starting Balkans researches was raised in Szeged (as the continuation of a previous concept), however, the institutionalisation was not successful then, either. In 1920 the University of Szeged habilitated Ferenc Fodor as a private lecturer of the subject "economic geography of Hungary and the Balkans".

After the end of Wold War I the Hungarian academics continuously emphasised the importance of continuing the researches on the Balkans. The starting point was the necessity of establishing the foreign affairs organisations of the sovereign Hungarian state, the new Hungarian foreign politics had to be founded. The Hungarian foreign politics had to turn towards the Balkans for several reasons in the new situation:

- this was required by the neighbourhood politics;
- Vienna was no longer involved in the research and management of the processes in the Balkans, in the best case Budapest had a chance to take over this role;
- this was the shortest way for Hungary to get to the sea.

In 1922 the Foreign Policy Review ('Külügyi Szemle' in Hungarian) published a special volume on the Balkans, the essays of which focused, within the new circumstances, on almost all aspects of the internal issues of the Balkans and the possible constituents of the relations between Hungary and the new Balkans. In addition to broad historical analyses, geographer Zoltán Kerekes recommended the setting up of a Hungarian Balkans Committee, with an "inter-society" character. Kerekes saw that in the new economic and political situation Vienna ceased to be the centre of the Balkans researches. The Serbs consciously moved the Balkans Institute of Sarajevo to Beograd, with the aim of transforming it into an institution of national character.

The territory of competence of the Hungarian Balkans Committee had to be

the whole Balkan Peninsula in the opinion of Kerekes. The comprehensive study of the historical, economic and social relations of Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia, Romania and Turkey could greatly contribute to the scientific foundation of the Hungarian foreign politics.

From 1929 on the issues of the Eastern European Institute, the Balkans Institute, the East-Central European Research Institute, the Institute of Minority Research etc. were raised several times. The recommendations were published in daily newspapers on the one hand, and in scientific periodicals, on the other (*Gál ed. 1942, pp. 12–26.*). The reasons for the failure of the initiatives included both the lack of money and the lack of consensus regarding the objectives and functions of the institutes. Every person making such suggestions was aware of the fact that the name of the institute in itself expressed a certain identity or spatial community with the macro-region.

In 1934 István Gál published the periodical called "Apollo" (in ten volumes until 1939), whose analyses focused on the Danubian and the Balkans issues. This periodical was one of the most important sources and documents of the Hungarian Balkans researches of the times.

Gyula Kunszery, in the debate on "where we live" in the newspaper called "Magyar Nemzet" ('Hungarian Nation') defined more clearly than anyone else before him that the public opinion and the science of Western Europe "classified Hungary simply among the Balkan states, i.e. to the Balkans Europe, abandoning all former Central Europe theories" (*Ring ed. Vol. I., p. 525.*). According to the author it was unacceptable for Hungary that the Balkans was moved a few hundred kilometres northwards.

Between the two world wars several Hungarian institutions were engaged in researches on the Balkans. Within the institutional frameworks of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the Oriental Committee went on functioning between the two world wars, but its activity became more restricted compared to what it had been like before. The Oriental Committee clearly operated as an interdisciplinary committee in this period.

The HAS had the firm belief already before Wold War II that for Hungary, coming from the geographical position of the country, the all-inclusive research and the discovery of the Balkans was of special importance. The HAS recognised that the former, mostly physical geographical researches should be supplemented by researches in new disciplines as well. The exploration of the commercial, economic, settlement historical, religious, fine arts etc. structures connected to the Balkans and the inter-institutional relationship building were very important.

The most important contemporary Balkans research workshop grew up in the environment of Pál Teleki, although Teleki himself cannot be considered as a "full-time" researcher of the Balkans. Teleki had an influence on the issues of the

political geographical researches of the Balkans partly through the different institutions under his leadership (Institute of Political Science, Faculty of Economics) and partly through his former students working in these and other institutions.

The Academy of Oriental Trade was melted in 1920 into the newly organised Faculty of Economics. In 1926 Teleki founded the Oriental Institute, with four regional divisions: 1) Balkans, 2) Middle East, 3) Russia and 4) Far East. The Balkans group conducted researches on Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania and Serbia. The difference emphasised by Teleki was that the Academy of Oriental Trade admitted students with finished secondary school education, whereas the Oriental Institute recruited its members from the students in the upper years of the university.

The director of the institute was Pál Teleki (who held lectures on the economic and political geographical problems of the Middle-East in the first place); the deputy director was Ferenc Fodor (with presentations on the economic geography of the Balkans). The institute actually offered language, and partly economic and political training. The aim of the training was the comprehensive introduction of the Balkans and the Middle East. The institute worked as an organic unit of the Faculty, it did not have a library of its own.

In the institute the best researches of the respective issues held presentations. Pál Teleki was a lecturer of political geography, Ferenc Fodor a teacher of economic geography. László Kádár explained the closedown of the Oriental Institute in 1931 with the fact that the East was so hermetically closed from Hungary by the Little Entente that the further researches at the Faculty became meaningless.

At the establishment of the József Nádor University of Technical and Economic Sciences in 1934 the Oriental Institute was re-organised as an interfaculty institution.

The Institute of Political Science, especially under the leadership of Teleki and later his student, András Rónai, carried out a very conscious political geographical research activity concerning the neighbouring states. In the institute there were experts responsible for each of the neighbour countries.

After the re-annexation of the Délvidék (South Hungary) in 1941 Hungary joined Wold War II in the broader sense too (until then Hungary was only engaged in the Soviet front), also, the issues of the Balkans were closer to the country again. In the autumn of 1942 in Újvidék (Novi Sad) the two-year College of Oriental Trade was founded as an important institution of the future oriental trade of Hungary. The College defined itself as a successor of the Academy of Oriental Trade both as regarded its training and the broader objectives.

Within the college the independent Balkans Institute was created (in 1942), led by László Kádár (the first such organisational unit in the history of the Hungarian science), with the goal of lecturing specific information on the Balkans

(*Kádár 1945*). The Balkans Institute carried out a conscious library building activity, which resulted in the gathering of the richest collection of maps of the Balkans and the biggest collection of articles concerning the history, geography, statistical data etc. of the countries of the region.

The re-annexation of Újvidék considerably weakened the Balkans ambitions of Szeged and Pécs, as everybody expected Újvidék to become the real centre of the Hungarian Balkans researches, as soon as the situation stabilised.

The Hungarian Foreign Policy Society initiated the creation of a "Balkans Committee" that was finally set up in March 1941. The Balkans Committee, in accordance with the programme approved upon its foundation, was mostly involved in academic researches, with special emphasis on the survey of geographical, especially political geographical processes. In addition to the researches, the programme of the institute attributed a special importance to the dissemination of the scientific information.

At the creation of the Committee the necessity of the establishment of the Balkans Institute was raised again. According to the concept worked out, the objectives of the Institute included

- professional collection of the data concerning the peoples and the social, cultural, economic etc. relations of the Balkan states, processing and dissemination of the data, publication of Balkans bibliographies in Hungary and abroad;
- the establishment of a special library of books and periodicals, collection of newspaper articles and of maps;
- presentations;
- publication of studies on the issues of the Balkans;
- integration of the Foreign Policy Review into the survey of the Balkans;
- organisation of study tours;
- relationship building to the academic life of the Balkans;
- promotion of the learning of the languages of the Balkans; and
- increase of the interest of the Hungarians in the Balkans.

The Balkans Committee of the Hungarian Foreign Policy Society became more and more involved in daily politics and propaganda after the outbreak of the war events. The "Balkans Leaflets" issued by the Committee could have developed into an independent scientific periodical on the Balkans, but it could not finally become a really important academic forum, because of the difficulties caused by the war. The Balkans Committee organised a series of comprehensive lectures in the autumn of 1941 and the spring of 1942 in Budapest and the university cities of the countryside. The Balkans may never have been so frequently presented to the Hungarian public opinion before.

During the world war was the volume summarising the long-term Balkans-

related tasks of the Hungarian science published (*Gál ed. 1942*). Its primary statement is that "The Hungarian intellectual life, especially the academic sector has done so much for the discovery of the Balkans as no other nation has" (*Gál ed.* 1942, p. 3.). The Hungarian historical science actually entered – very early – the international scientific arena by its Balkans researches. The Hungarian academics primarily studied the Balkans because of vital national issues, but the change of the political courses evidently influenced the possibilities and frameworks of the researches.

The authors of essays of the book tried to look at the characteristics of the respective areas in their entirety (comparative literature research, historical and ethnographic research, study of the respective countries etc.) and defined the universal necessity of the Hungarian Balkans researches. László Gáldi e.g. suggested the setting up of a Collegium Hungaricum in the Balkans, as they only way to secure the possibilities of regular researches.

The majority of the Hungarian intellectuals knew in 1942 that the Balkans would play an important role in Hungary's life in the future too, irrespective of the outcome of the world war. They knew that Balkans would be appreciated both in the economic and the political sense in the European politics.

In the spring of 1943 the Balkans Committee prepared a Balkans material designed for a national exhibition. The government saw that the material collected could cause foreign political problems and difficulties and did not agree upon the organisation of the exhibition.

Among the researchers of the Hungarian geography, Pál Zoltán Szabó regularly dealt with the issues of the Balkans, the Croatian-Hungarian relations and the mission of the some Hungarian cities (Pécs and Szeged) in the Balkans. The Balkans was important for Szabó because of its geopolitical and geo-strategic position: "The Balkan Peninsula does act as a bridge of Europe to the rich world of the Middle East, a key to the Eastern basin of the Mediterranean Sea and a gateway to the Black Sea. The increasing importance of the Balkans lies just in the fact that it is involved in the power sphere of three continents: Europe, Asia and Africa" (*Szabó 1942, p. 1.*).

The opinion of Szabó about Szeged was that the transport geographical location of the city marked it for missions in the Balkans. Historically Szeged was a competitor of Beograd, and the latter only left Szeged behind both in population and in function after it became a capital city. Szeged was a real gateway of a large part of the Balkans towards Central Europe.

Szabó said that Pécs too had a mission in the Balkans; its primary cooperation area was the Croatian region, later the independent Croatia. The Balkans mission of Kolozsvár (Cluj-Napoca) was to maintain the Romanian relations, which function remained after the city was re-annexed to Hungary in 1940.

Szabó, summarising the findings of his political geographical studies con-

cerning the Balkans, edited the geopolitical system of the power lines of the Balkans. The most important geopolitical line of power lay between Zagreb and Istanbul, dividing the peninsula into two parts of different character and interests. The northern part was actually interested in Central Europe, whereas the southern areas had Mediterranean character (*Szabó 1943*).

The often and in many places published base of the approach of Szabó was that the issues of the two regions were closely related, their connections and interrelations were inevitable. For this reason he urged the setting up of a Research Institute of South Hungary in Pécs, whose important task would have been the research of the geographical, historical, language, ethnographic etc. relations between the Carpathian Basin and the Balkans.

In 1942 Szabó outlined in detail the concept of the South Hungarian Institute and of the South Hungarian Association supporting the Institute (*Szabó 1942*). The South Hungarian Institute located in Pécs would have worked, according to Szabó's ideas, as an institute of historical and political geographical researches. Its research area would have included the Carpathian Basin and the whole of the Balkans. The South Hungarian Institute could also have served the long-term strategic foundation of the Hungarian foreign politics.

The Transdanubian Research Institute established in 1943 was not a Balkans research institute in its name, nevertheless some of its researchers continuously dealt with Balkans researches and often emphasised the importance of such researches. Szabó's main field of interest after the foundation of the Institute was the historical and political geographical research of the Hungarian-Croatian relations.

Szabó proved in an essay of basic research character how extremely complicated the territorial issues of Slavonia and Croatia were historically (*Szabó 1945*). The territory and spatial content of both Slavonia and Croatia changed very many times and significantly. As regards the Balkans, the most interesting and most peculiar period – from Hungarian view – was the second half of 14th century when these two great powers actually divided the territory of the Balkans between themselves.

5. Balkans researches in 1945–1948

After the lost Wold War II the Hungarian–Balkans relations were in a new situation again. The new Hungarian government (both the temporary one in Debrecen and the permanent one created in Budapest after the elections) tried to improve the relations to Yugoslavia (despite the massacre of thousands of Hungarian population in Voivodina by the Yugoslav partisans). Several concepts expected that the strengthening of the Yugoslav relation could counterbalance the

influence of the Soviets.

Hungary had to reconsider and redefine its own spatial position in several different political spaces. (The concept of Central Europe, because of its German and Nazi connotations, was not very popular at that time.) The following spatial community ambitions appeared: Danube-Valley, Southeast Europe, Central-East Europe and Eastern Europe. The search for the spatial community relations was influenced both by the impacts of the past and the presence and future seeking of Hungary occupied by the Soviets.

The federalist concepts made in the Balkans after 1945, and the concrete political efforts of Tito for the federalisation of Yugoslavia had an influence on the Hungarian political and academic elite, but they looked at the Balkans with precautions. They did not and could not see whether it was the Soviet Union standing behind these ambitions or the efforts had some anti-Soviet character.

As a consequence of the war defeat, the necessity of the preparation for the peace talks was raised again. The preparation started in several workshops. The political and academic relations should be treated separately for the period before February 1947, the signing of the peace treaty and the years afterwards. In this short period several institutions and organisations were involved in Balkans researches again.

The "Danubian Working Community" was founded as a friendship society at the Christmas of 1945, and then it became official during the preparation for the peace talks. In the workshop called "Dunatáj" (Danube Region), edited by Elemér Radisics, a large number of the staff of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office participated, several researchers, including András Rónai represented the Pál Teleki Research Institute; also, some half a dozen officers from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs took part in the job.

The Hungarian academic and political literature primarily focused on the macro-regional frameworks of the Danube Region (Hungary, Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Romania) (*Radisics ed. 1946*), but the positioning of Hungary in Eastern Europe and Southeast Europe also appeared.

The specification of the "Danube Region" (the centre of the European continent is the Danube Region, i.e. the Carpathian Basin and its surroundings) was almost identical functionally and spatially with the designation of Central Europe by András Rónai (a great deal of the maps of the book are the same as the maps in the Atlas of Central Europe). The book analysed every single aspect of the states in the "Danubian Balkans" within the region (Bulgaria, Yugoslavia and Romania).

Other workshops were thinking in other new spatial community formations. Southeast Europe appeared in the spirit of historical coexistence after the world war, but the spatial category had other elements too: "In Southeast Europe the key role of Hungary is debated by almost all neighbour states. However, it can-

not be denied that the centre is the area that is surrounded by the other areas as a ring" (*Elekes ed. 1947, p. 16.*).

In accordance with the changing inter-state relationships, the possibilities of academic researches fundamentally changed, too. In the new situation the researches redefined Hungary's geographical and political situation: "Hungary, coming from its geographical position, is a Danubian state, thus a transit country in military and transport sense: its pre-Christian culture, however, links Hungary to the East. With its geographical and ethnographical situation and its western Christian culture Hungary lies on the frontier of East and West" (*Gál ed. 1947, p. 241.*).

The research of the Balkans and of the relationships between the Balkans peoples and Hungary became part of the relationship system of a larger geographical unit – Eastern Europe (*Gál ed. 1947*). At this time the communist take-over had not happened yet in Hungary, but the political transition already affected the researches in a new way. The space of relationships in question was wider than the zone of the Soviet occupation.

In the new situation the essays analysing the historical, literature, cultural relationships all emphasised the positive effects of the historically experienced coexistence, the enrichment of each other's culture in the Hungarian-Russian relation, and in the relations of Hungary to the other countries (Romania, Austria, Bulgaria, Serbia, Croatia, Slovenia, Albania, Turkey and Greece).

After Wold War II a series of different friendship societies were founded (Hungarian-Yugoslav Society, Hungarian-Bulgarian Society etc.), whose objective was the deepening of the cooperation between the nations.

In 1946-47 the plan of the Balkans confederation and common customs area was on the arena of the large-scale politics. At Tito's visit to Budapest in December 1947 the negotiations were on the integration possibilities of Hungary. In January 1948, however, the Soviet leadership harshly rejected the possibility of the Balkans federation supported by Tito and Dimitrov, labelling it as a formation without well-established concepts.

From the beginning of 1948 – in accordance with the Soviet concepts – the Hungarian-Yugoslav bilateral relations significantly worsened, but the complete parting from each other was yet to come. The possibilities of the economic cooperation worsened, too. The consequences of the political turn appeared in the academic researches with some delay, but the change was inevitable in the scientific life, too.

The Hungarian Foreign Policy Society re-founded the Balkans Committee on 7 November 1945 (the Yugoslav military mission protested against the label "Committee" so it was changed to "Society"), and restarted its activity by gaining the support of a part of the Hungarian intellectual, economic and political elite. The Chairman of the Committee was Pál Auer, a representative of the na-

tional assembly and the Hungarian ambassador in Paris at that time. The seat of the Committee was in the building of the Parliament.

The general guidelines were "modernised" in accordance with the expectations in the new situation. The space of competence of the Committee was Hungary, the Balkans and the Middle East. Hungarian and French remained the official languages. The most important objective of the Committee was the promotion of the cultural and economic relations between Hungary and the Balkans, and the Middle East by the promotion of the societal relations.

The Balkans Committee wished to clarify that after the end of the world war, as a result of the crisis of the German industry and economy, new possibilities opened up for Hungary in the whole territory of the Balkans, and these new potentials (in navigation, heavy industry, commerce) should be consciously used. The conscious deepening of the economic relations was promoted both at national and regional level.

Pál Zoltán Szabó, the director of the Transdanubian Research Institute turned to the Balkans Committee in a letter on 10 November 1945, with a proposal of deepening the relationships between the two institutions. Szabó saw that the Transdanubian Research Institute was basically a Balkans research institute: "In the concept of the establishment of the foreign relationships of my institute, taking up the relations with our Balkans neighbours is in the first place." The Transdanubian Research Institute wished to have significant tasks in the research of the Balkans, and not only because of scientific considerations but also in order to promote the good neighbourhood relations among the nations.

In May 1947 the Society created the very short-lived Balkans Institute, with a very small staff. The start of the operation of the Balkans Institute was considerably supported by the University of Technical and Economic Sciences. The Ministry of Religion and Public Education provided three officer- and one deputy officer status for the operation of the Institute. The director of the Institute was György Baross, a senior counsellor at the Ministry in full time, his secretary was Sándor Kürthy. László Rásonyi was responsible for the Turkish, László Fésős for the Romanian and Albanian issues.

In a short time the Balkans Institute collected a special library consisting of some 2,000 volumes. A part of the books was bought, but institutions specialised on the Balkans of other countries also sent books and the embassies in Budapest also procured books for the Institute.

In 1947 the Balkans Institute accepted the legal continuity with the former series of publication of the Balkans Committee. The Institute took responsibility and published three series: the Balkans Leaflets, containing shorter materials of primarily promotional and propaganda character; the Balkans Library that published longer works; and finally the Balkans Books, only the first volume of which could finally be published, written by Tibor Mendöl.

In the spring of 1947 a series of events lasting for more than two months was announced and successfully implemented, called the "Formation of the present Balkans". In the framework of the series Prime Minister Ferenc Nagy held a presentation called "Hungary and the Balkans". Besides the politicians, academics working in different disciplines – Tibor Mendöl, Péter Váczy, Lajos Fekete, László Hadrovics, László Makkai, György Györffy, László Gáldi etc. – held presentations in their respective fields.

After his presentations held in the spring of 1947 Tibor Mendöl published in 1948 the first modern Hungarian geographical monograph dealing with the Balkans, covering almost the total spectrum of the issues of the region (*Mendöl 1948*). The starting point of Mendöl was that the Hungarians knew little about the Balkans, despite the fact that they had always been neighbours to it. He rejected the pejorative connotation of the "Balkans character", saying that the peoples in the macro-region should mutually get rid of their prejudices. The Balkans was the cradle of European civilisation and was only detoured from the path of development by the Ottoman conquer and occupation.

For Mendöl the Balkans was an entity of physical, historical, social, economic and political geography. For him, the "peninsula of approximately 500 thousand square kilometres" was a formation complicated from all aspects.

In the spring of 1984 the Institute organised again a series of presentations of national character and importance, called "Economic relations of Hungary and the Balkans". The presentations covered practically all sectors of the economy. The presentations of the series were held by András Rónai, Béla Markoz, Jenő Koppányi, Gábor Balás, Iván Zlatareff, László Tánczos, László Rásonyi, László Fésős, Róbert Hardi, János Márton, Pál Péter etc. The lecturers were university teachers or represented the economic and financial elite of Hungary.

The presentations suggested that Hungary was more developed than the majority of the Balkan states, allowing the country to have definitely good competitive positions in the Balkan areas. In 1948 the change of the political environment became clear, but the lecturers forecast a possibility for the conscious and continuous building of the relations even within the circumstances of the penetrating planned economy approach.

It was especially the Hungarian heavy industry that saw good opportunities in building out relations to the Balkans. The leaders of the Hungarian steel industry considered the Balkans as a limitless market for the Hungarian steel industry products, as the steel production of the Balkans with its 60 million population as a whole was less than that of Hungary, a country of only 8 million people (*Tánczos 1948, p. 3.*). Albania, Bulgaria and Greece were considered as countries of special importance when building out the relationships, as these countries did not have iron and steel industry of their own at all at that time. (Ambitious economic cooperation plans were defined.)

In the summer of 1948 the COMINFO (Information Office of the Communist Parties) disapproved of the internal and foreign politics of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, which brought an overnight end to the development of the Hungarian-Yugoslav relationships, including the institutionalised Balkans researches. The announcement in the scientific periodical of the Hungarian Workers' Party eliminated the possibility of academic research and publications, only anti-Tito and anti-Yugoslav political pamphlets were published.

By the autumn of 1948 the Balkans Institute was in a critical situation in all respects. The Institute ran out of its financial resources, politically its positions were made impossible by the Yugoslav crisis. At the end of December 1948, the Ministry of Public Education wished to settle the situation of the Institute by integrating it, maintaining its sovereignty, into the Research Institute of Eastern Europe, and allowed the continuity of the academic activities. (The reform of the Academy in 1949 resulted in fundamental changes, and it was impossible to maintain the Institute in its former position.)

The College of Oriental Trade in Novi Sad fled to Budapest because of the war in the autumn of 1944. The Balkans Committee bombarded the competent authorities with memorials to settle the situation of the College and urged the re-start of the lecturing and the researches. In January 1946 the Balkans Committee organised a national conference on the destiny of the College of Oriental Trade in Novi Sad and on the lecturing and research of the Balkans in the future. As a potential new seat of the college, both Szeged and Pécs were raised, as was Budapest. Győr also wished to acquire the college, they city would even have made financial contributions for this purpose, whereas the National Council of Public Education favoured and supported Miskolc.

The operation of the college would not have taken place within the old frameworks; it was defined as a "Balkans College" in its new role. The college would have carried out all researches, collections and processing of materials in connection with the Balkans, also, the former activities would have been maintained. (The Magyar Közlöny – 'Official Bulletin' – published on 10 February 1946 already announced the decision within the organisational rules of the Institute of Oriental Studies of the József Nádor University of Technical and Economic Sciences.) The establishment of the Hungarian University of Economic Sciences was provided by Act LVII of 1948. Paragraph 7 of the Act specified the "liquidation of the Institute of Oriental Studies". In 1948 the state administration did not consider the maintenance of independent oriental and Balkans researches necessary at university level.

6. "Floating" of the Balkans research in the state socialist era

In the new bipolar world the Balkans itself became divided for Hungary, into three clearly distinct units in the beginning:

- from the summer of 1948 the Hungarian-Yugoslav relation became hostile in all respects, primarily as a consequence of the worsening of the Soviet-Yugoslav relations. The publications on Yugoslavia were actually not academic analyses but political satires for years;
- the judgement of the countries taking over the socialist system (Albania, Bulgaria and Romania) was, in accordance with the expectation, favourable in all respects in the Hungarian political and academic literature;
- the evaluation of Greece and Turkey was especially negative in the beginning of the period, which even worsened after 1952 when these two countries joined the NATO.

The dominant feature of the whole state socialist period, especially until the late 1960s, is that the Balkan Peninsula as an organic geographical unit usually appeared in the physical geographical literature, only. The "separating character" of the political division was dominant. The times of the divided Europe and the divided Balkans did not particularly favour the researches of the macro-region.

The Hungarian-Yugoslav relationship gradually improved from the early 1960s, although Yugoslavia never became a "decent socialist country" at the level of the political evaluations. At the same time, the Albanian-Hungarian and the Romanian-Hungarian relationships worsened. The actual judgement of the respective countries always depended on the topical political situations.

In the late 1960s, at the analysis of the regional geography of Europe, the Balkan Peninsula clearly appeared as a physical geographical unit, but in social and economic sense it was not considered a "spatial community", the analyses of the individual South European countries were made separately (*Marosi–Sárfalvi eds. 1968*). The analyses of these countries made it clear that only Albania, Bulgaria, Greece, Yugoslavia and the European part of Turkey made the "hidden Balkans", Romania was not listed among the Balkans countries.

It was the historians again who broke the silence in the Balkans researches. The small monograph written by Emil Niederhauser (Forrongó félsziget – 'A peninsula in an uproar') opened up new possibilities not only for the historical but also the geographical researches (*Niederhauser 1972*). It was not the individual countries but the totality of the "geographical peninsula" that appeared at the level of analysis. In 1975 Niederhauser and István Fried clearly indicated the necessity of the deepening of the researches of the special Balkans issues.

The researches of the economic history of the macro-region were actually

extended (*Berend–Ránki 1979, 1987*), and the issue of the Balkans at the designation of the historical regions of Europe appeared as a "partial issue".

The "official literature on the respective countries" of the state socialist period is relatively rich; the complex processing of the issues of each Balkan state was done. The literature on the economy, commerce and tourism of the countries of the Balkans is rich, but there were hardly any analyses that treated the macro-region as a single formation.

With the accession of Greece to the EEC (1981) the European integration appeared in the southern part of the region, so the researches and development policy approaches concerning the EEC dealt with several issues of the geographical Balkans. From the second half of the 1980s the European Economic Community was given a more positive connotation in the Hungarian publicity, as opposed to the formerly negative judgement.

7. Great challenges after the systemic change

Following the death of Tito in 1980, both the international and the Hungarian political and academic interest in Yugoslavia increased. The biggest question for everybody was how Yugoslavia would be able to develop in the new situation.

The systemic changes starting in 1988-1989 took place in a relatively short time but differently in the region. The systemic change resulted in tensions and struggles in each country, but it was even coupled with a civil war in the Yugoslav region after the disintegration of the federation.

After 1991 the Hungarian researches paid a special attention to the analysis of the Yugoslav issue and the Yugoslav region, the rest of the Balkans was given less attention than Yugoslavia. The study of the region appeared in several institutions (József Attila University, Eötvös Lóránd University, Janus Pannonius University etc.).

In the Institute of History of the Janus Pannonius University in Pécs, the "Balkanistics Group" was established in 1988, led by János Hóvári, within the frameworks of which the comprehensive historical research of the Balkans started again, together with the education of the issues of the macro-region. The researchers of the group organised in March 1992 the conference called "Prevalent ideologies in the Balkans", which included 25 presentations.

In the Institute of Geography of the University of Pécs, the Balkans-related historical and political geographical researches started in the late 1990s, followed later by university courses at different levels. In November 2000 the East Mediterranean and Balkan Studies Group organised a conference called "The political geographical issues of the transforming Balkans", which became a ma-

jor forum of the academics studying the Balkans. Almost all universities and colleges of Hungary turned out to have "full-time" Balkans researchers who dealt with the analysis of the issues of the Balkans either systematically or as a hobby.

The East Mediterranean and Balkans Studies Group re-started in 2002 the periodical called "Balkans Leaflets". In 2005 the possibility was born for the launching of a special further training major called "Balkanistics" (multidisciplinary science).

Within the frameworks of the Central European University (CEU), connected to the democracy studies and the programme of the building of an open society, the researches on the Balkans were extended, partly with Hungarian and partly using foreign contributions (www.seep.ceu.hu/balkans/), a comprehensive research and expert network was created. The "Balkan Academic News" it its own electronic mailing network has built out connections to some 1,300 researchers and administrative actors etc. in the Balkans.

Within the frameworks of the Teleki Institute, versatile but dominantly foreign politics oriented researches (minority issues, country case studies) were carried out, with the goal to establish the Hungarian Balkans-policy (www.telekintezet.hu).

At the Faculty of Arts of the Károli Gáspár University of the Reformed Church the training of Balkanistics started as a special course, led by Ernő Raffay. The training deals with the Balkans in a complex approach, with the dominance of the issues of history, culture history and religious history.

The security policy researches (especially the public ones) became organic parts of the Balkans researches at the end of the 1980s. By this we do not only mean the traditional military geographical and cartographical works but security policy approaches of complex character. The Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University and the Centre for Strategic and Defence Research turned to the study of the Balkans not only in the times of the Yugoslav crisis but also afterwards (www.zmne.hu).

The Geographical Research Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences has long traditions of Balkans researches. In the 1980s mainly ethnic minority and religious geography analyses on the Balkans were made in the Institute. Károly Kocsis was the editor of an atlas that introduced the region to the audience in a more comprehensive way than ever before (*Kocsis ed. 2005*).

The Research Institute of World Economy of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences has defined the research programme called "Eastern and Southeast-Europe: economic development and integration possibilities" as a primary research programme (www.vki.hu). The large eastern region, including the special Southeast-European processes, has a basic economic influence on Hungary.

In October 2005 a kind of positive turn took place in the institutionalised

Hungarian Balkans researches: within the Research Centre for Social Studies of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, the Centre for Balkans Studies was established. The announced programme of the Institute is wide-ranging, in fact, very ambitious, featuring demands for applied researches, practice-oriented development efforts and basic research concepts at the same time. The Centre considers the region bordered by Croatia, Serbia and Romania as a space of its research competence, so Hungary is in a sort of "observer and mediator" position in the area.

With the leadership of Ferenc Glatz, the Centre started the organisation of a series of academic presentations (www.balkancenter.hu). The conferences organised until the summer of 2006 introduced the region with the complexity typical of the 1947-1948 period of the Hungarian Balkans researches.

The Hungarian research institutes and researchers have also joined researches of international organisation and leadership (*Illés 2002*). It was partly the international research programmes (VISION PLANET, ESTIA, ESTIA-SPOSE etc.) which have made it clear for everybody that Hungary is involved and interested in several macro-regional spatial structures of the European Union, among which one of the most important and direct is Southeast-Europe. The European level transport corridors approved in 2007 will make Hungary a significant gateway of Southeast-Europe after their completion.

8. Summary

The Hungarian Balkans researches have always approached both the whole of the peninsula and its internal issues linked to the concrete economic, social, political, power and historical situation, and mostly in a political dimension. The social and political expectations have always been strong, but the Hungarian state has made hardly any financial contribution to the expenses of the Balkans researches.

The Hungarian Balkans researches have been defined and carried out partly as theoretical and partly as practice-oriented studies. The proportions within the researches have varied across disciplines; geography has usually carried out researches of applied character, serving practical objectives.

The state played a considerable role before World War I in the creation of the higher education of commerce and export, and it even financed some researches connected to the training activity. Training at this time primarily served relatively narrow professional elite.

The Balkans-related researches developed in accordance with the actual situation of the appearing and changing Hungarian political geography. In the researches of political geography, the effort to define the presumed interests of

the Hungarian state, the Hungarian economy and the Hungarian society in the Balkans have always been present.

The three dominant periods of the Balkans researches of the Hungarian political geography were actually defined by the historical turns and the changes of the state borders. The political geographical researches thus adapted to a large extent to the historically changing conditions and financial possibilities.

After the systemic change the study of the Yugoslav crisis became dominant, the necessity of researches covering the whole of the Balkans was only gradually expressed. From October 2005 the Balkans researches have had new institutional and publicity conditions.

References

A keleti szomszéd országok közgazdasági viszonyainak előzetes tanulmányozására kiküldött bizottság jelentése. Budapest, 1881, Földművelésügyi-, Ipari és Kereskedelmi Minisztérium.

A konstantinápolyi magyar tudományos intézetnek szervezeti szabályzata. Budapest, 1916, Athenaeum.

Angyal E. 1974: A nemzeti ébredés kora. (Fejezetek a magyar-délszláv művelődési kapcsolatok történetéből.) Pécs, MTA RKK DTI Könyvtára. Kézirat.

Asbóth J. 1887: Bosznia és a Hercegovina I. Budapest, Pallas Irodalmi és Nyomdai Rt.

Ádám M. 1977: Dunai Konföderáció vagy kisantant. – Történelmi Szemle, No. 3–4. pp. 440–487.

Bajza J. 1934: Egy év délszláv külpolitikája. – Magyar Szemle, Vol. XXI., No. 1. (81), pp. 167–177.

Balanyi Gy. 1920: A Balkán-probléma fejlődése a párisi kongresszustól a világháború kitöréséig, 1856–1914. Budapest. Franklin ny.

Balkányi B. 1916: A dunai út fejlesztése és keleti gazdasági érdekeink. Budapest, A Magyar- Bosnyák és Keleti Gazdasági Központ kiadványa. Új sorozat, No. 5.

Beer, M – Seewann, G. (Eds.) 2004: Südostforschung im Schatten des Dritten Reiches. (Institutionen–Inhalte–Personen.) Südosteuropaische Arbeiten, No. 119. München, R. Oldenbourg Verlag.

Berend T. I – Ránki Gy. 1976: Kelet-Közép-Európa gazdasági fejlődése a 19.-20. században. Budapest.

Berend T. I – Ránki Gy. 1987: Európa gazdasága a 19. században. Budapest, Gondolat.

Boldizsár I. 1946: Megbűnhődte már e nép... (Röpirat a magyar békéről és közös hazánkról a Dunavölgyéről.) Budapest.

Bornemissza G. 1943: Magyarország ipara és a Balkán. Budapest.

Cholnoky J. 1911: A tartós államalakulásokról–Magyar Figyelő, 1. pp. 71–76.

Cholnoky J. 1913: Modern földrajzi törekvések – Magyar Figyelő, 3. pp. 345–350.

Cholnoky J. 1914: Magyarország természetes déli határa – Magyar Figyelő, 4. pp. 432–437.

Cholnoky J. 1917: A Magyar-medence kapcsolata a Balkánnal – Turán, Vol. V. pp. 76–85.
Cholnoky J. (1937): Európa. A Föld és élete. Budapest, Franklin-Társulat.
Csiszár B. 1937/a: A dunai együttműködés kísérletei. (A Tardieu tervtől a Hodzsa tervig.)–Apollo, Vol. III. No. 1. (Volume VI.) pp. 50–57.
Csiszár B. 1937/b: A Balkán-külpolitika új útjai. – Apollo, Vol. III. No. 2. Volume VI. pp. 153–162.
Elekes D. (Ed.) 1947: A mai Magyarország. (A második világháború és a párizsi békeszerződés következményei). Budapest, Hungária Lloyd.
Fall E. 1940: The situation in South-Eastern Europe. – Danubian Review, May, pp. 1–5.
Fehér G. 1932: Kanitz Fülöp Félix, a „Balkán Kolombusa" élete és munkássága, 1829–1904. Budapest, Franklin ny. A Magyar Földrajzi Társaság Könyvtára.
Fehér G. – Göllner A. 1942: Magyarok és bolgárok. Budapest, Officina.
Fodor F. 1917/a: A Délvidék és a Balkán közlekedési kapcsolata. Temesvár, Hunyadi nyomda. A Temesvári Balkán Iroda Kiadványai, No. 1.
Fodor F. 1917/b: Temesvár és Szeged földrajzi helyzete és balkáni hivatása. Temesvár, Hunyadi nyomda. A Temesvári Balkán Iroda Kiadványai, No. 4.
Fodor F. 1937: A magyar–jugoszláv közeledés gazdaságföldrajzi alapjai. – Katolikus Szemle, Vol. LI. No. 3. pp. 139–151.
Fráter J. 1974: A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia állandó bizottságai, 1854–1949. Budapest, MTA.
Fried I. 1975: A magyar balkanisztika kutatások–hagyományok és problémák. – Helikon, No. 2. pp. 169–178.
Gál I. (Ed.) 1942: Magyarország és a Balkán. (A magyar tudomány feladatai Délkeleteurópában). A Magyar Külügy Társaság Balkán Bizottsága. Balkán Könyvtár No. 1.
Gál I. (Ed.) 1947: Magyarország és Keleteurópa. (A magyarság kapcsolatai a szomszédnépekkel). Budapest, Officina.
G. J. 1939: A Dunamedence évszázados geo- és etnopolitikai helyzete. – Az Ország Útja, No. 3., pp. 167–176.
Geszti L. 1944: A magyar állam déli határváltozásairól. In: TEMESY GY. ed. Földrajzi Zsebkönyv, Budapest, Magyar Földrajzi Társaság, pp. 87–94.
Gratz G. 1928: Európa balkanizálódása. – Magyar Szemle, Május, pp. 1–6.
Gunda B. 1979: Ethnographica Carpatho-Balcanica. Budapest.
Györffy I. 1916: Magyarország régi balkáni birtokai. – Földrajzi Közlemények, Vol. XLIV. No. 1. pp. 19–37.
György A. 1881: A Föld és népei. Föld és népismereti kézikönyv III. Európa. (Földrajzi és népismereti leírása.) Budapest, Mehner Vilmos.
György J. 1910: A dunai és a balkáni államok szövetsége. (Tanulmány a dunai és balkáni országok szövetségének földrajzi, gazdasági, néprajzi, történeti, gazdaságpolitikai és állampolitikai feltételeiről.) Kolozsvár, Előre ny.
Hajdú Z. – Pap N. – Tóth J. (Eds.) 2001: Az átalakuló Balkán politikai földrajzi kérdései. (II. Magyar politikai földrajzi konferencia.) Pécs, PTE TTK Földrajzi Intézet, Kelet-Mediterrán és Balkán Tanulmányok Központja.

Hajdú Z. 2002: Az intézményes Balkán-kutatás kialakulásának és fejlődésének problémái Magyarországon 1948-ig, különös tekintettel a földrajzi kutatásokra. Pécs, PTE TTK FI K-MBTK, Balkán Füzetek, No.1.
Haltenberger M. 1937: A készülő európai közép-államszövetség földrajzi alapjai. – Külügyi Szemle, No. 3. pp. 267–273.
Havass R. 1889: Dalmácia visszacsatolása a Magyar Birodalomhoz. Budapest, Preszburg nyomda.
Havass R. 1902: Magyar impérializmus. Budapest, Separatum, Budapesti Hírlap.
Havass R. 1906: Dalmácia. Budapest, Divald, Stephaneum nyomda.
Havass R. 1911: Irodalmi munkái (Könyvek, tanulmányok, értekezések, cikkek, könyvismertetések, és egyéb művek, 1878–1911. Budapest, Műszaki nyomda.
Havass R. 1912: Magyar gazdasági és hatalmi törekvések a tengeren. Budapest, Fritz nyomda.
Havass R. 1913: Magyarország és a Balkán. (Szerbia, Bulgária, Románia.) Gazdaságpolitikai tanulmány. Budapest, Fritz nyomda.
Hézser A. 1916: A Balkán-félsziget közlekedő útjai. – Földrajzi Közlemények, Vol. XLIV. No. 6. pp. 594–606.
Hopp L. 1967: A balkáni országok népi-történeti hagyományai a XVIII. századi magyar írók műveiben. – Helikon, No. 1. pp. 90–101.
Horváth J. 1917: Balkán történeti tanulmányok. Nagyvárad.
Horváth J. 1921: A balkáni kérdés utolsó fázisa 1895–1920. (Tanulmány a 20. század diplomáciai történelméből.) Budapest, Magyar Külügyi Társaság. Külügy Könyvtár, No. 2.
Hunfalvy J. 1863: A Magyar Birodalom természeti viszonyainak leírása I. Pest, Emich Gusztáv.
Hunfalvy J. 1884: Egyetemes földrajz, különös tekintettel a néprajzi viszonyokra. I. kötet. Dél-Európa. Budapest, Athenaeum.
Illés I. 2002: Közép- és Délkelet-Európa az ezredfordulón. (Átalakulás, integrációk, régiók.) Budapest-Pécs, Dialóg Campus Kiadó.
Illés J. 1943: Magyar jog a Balkánon. Budapest, Balkán-Füzetek, No. 11.
Imrédy K. 1943: Hazánk és a Balkán vasúti összeköttetése. Balkán-füzetek, No. 10. Budapest, Magyar Külügyi Társaság Balkán Bizottsága.
Kalmár G. 1942: Magyar geopolitika. Budapest, Stádium.
Kalmár G. 1932: Magyar hazánk és népei. (Magyarország leírása.) Budapest, Szent István Társulat.
Kanitz, F. F. 1875–1879: Donau-Bulgarien und der Balkan. Historisch-geographisch-ethnographische Reisestudien aus den Jahren 1860–1875. Vol. 1–3. Leipzig, Fries.
Kanitz, F. F. 1904–1914: Das Königreich Serbien und das Serbvolk von der Römerzeit bis zu Gegenwart. Vol. 1–3. Leipzig, Mayer.
Kádár L. 1945: Az újvidéki Keleti Kereskedelmi Főiskola és földrajzi tanszéke. In: TEMESY GY. (Ed.) Földrajzi Zsebkönyv, Budapest, Magyar Földrajzi Társaság, pp. 186–195.
Kázmér E. 1937: A belgrádi Balkán Intézet. – Apollo, Vol. III. No. 2. (Volume VII.) pp. 163–167.

Kereskedelmünk a Balkán-országokkal. A Balkán-statisztika tanulságai. Budapest, 1916. Márkus ny. A Magyar-Bosnyák és Keleti Gazdasági Központ kiadványai, No. 2. Új sorozat.
Kemény Gy. 1916: Szerbia. (Gazdaság-földrajzi ismertetés). – Földrajzi Közlemények, Vol. XLIV. No. 2. pp. 64–108.
Keleti K. 1885: A Balkán-félsziget némely országai- és tartományainak közgazdasági viszonyai. Budapest, Pesti ny.
Klebelsberg K. 1927: Beszédei, cikkei és törvénytervezetei, 1916–1926. Budapest, Athenaeum.
Kocsis K. (Ed.) 2005: Délkelet-Európa térképekben. Budapest, MTA FKI, Kossuth Kiadó.
Közlemény a Kommunista Pártok Tájékoztató Irodájának értekezletéről. – Társadalmi Szemle, 1948, Vol. 3. No. 6. pp. 393–399.
Kunszery Gy. 1940: Balkán-Európa. In: RING É. ed. 1986, Vol. I. pp. 525–527.
Kürthy S. 1947: Stabilizáció és közös tervgazdálkodás a délkeleteurópai államokban. – Közgazdasági Szemle, No. 5–12. pp. 314–328.
Lánczy Leó, a bank elnökének ünneplése az Intézet kötelékébe történt belépésének 25–ik évfordulója alkalmából, 1882–1907. Budapest, Pesti Magyar Kereskedelmi Bank.
Lengyel G. 1916: Balkán. (Szerbek, muzulmánok és más balkániak.) Budapest, A Nyugat kiadása. A Nyugat folyóirat könyvei, No. 3.
Lukács L. 1948: A belgrádi Duna-konferencia és a dunai kérdés. – Társadalmi Szemle, No. 8–9. pp. 600–608.
Lukinich I. 1942: A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia és a Balkán. In: GÁL L. ed. 1942: pp. 69–71.
Makkai L. 1942: A magyar Balkán-kutatás szervezési kérdési. In: GÁL I. (Ed.) 1942. pp. 71–78.
Marosi S. – Sárfalvi B. (Eds.) 1968: Európa, I–II. Budapest, Gondolat.
Márffy-Mantuano, R, 1906: Ködkép vagy valóság a Balkánon. Politicai tanulmány. Budapest, Révai-Salamon ny.
Mendöl T. 1948: A Balkán földrajza. Budapest, Balkán Intézet, Balkán Könyvek.
Mérei Gy. 1965: Föderációs tervek Délkelet-Európában és a Habsburg-monarchia, 1848–1918. Budapest.
Nagy M. M. 2001: A Balkán problémája a magyar földrajzi szakirodalomban. In: Hajdú Z. – Pap N. – Tóth J. (Eds.) II. Magyar politikai földrajzi konferencia. Pécs, PTE TTK Földrajzi Intézet KMBTK, pp. 18–32.
Németh J. 1913/a: A balkáni államok mezőgazdasági termelési és forgalmi viszonyai. Budapest, Magyar Gazdaszövetség.
Németh J. 1913/b: Közgazdasági helyzetünk a Balkánon a háború előtt és után– Közgazdasági Szemle, Vol. 37. pp. 438–461.
Németh J. 1917: A szerbek anthropogeografiai tanulmányai a Balkánon. Budapest, A Magyar Földrajzi Társaság Gazdaságföldrajzi Szakosztályának Kiadványai, No. I.
Németh J. 1918: Szerbia egyetemes leírása. (A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Keleti Bizottságának megbízásából.) Budapest, Hornyánszky nyomda.
Niederhauser E. 1972: Forrongó félsziget. (A Balkán a XIX.-XX. században.) Budapest, Kossuth Könyvkiadó.

Niederhauser E. 1975: Keletközép-Európa-kutatás és balkanisztika. – Helikon, No. 2. pp. 159–161.
Nopcsa F. 1907: A katolikus Észak-Albánia. Budapest, Klny a Földrajzi Közleményekből.
Nopcsa F. 1911: A legsötétebb Európa. (Vándorlások Albániában.) Budapest, Utazások Könyvtára, No. 3.
Nötel R. 1947: A közép- és délkelet-európai államok beruházási és termelési tervei. – Magyar-Szovjet Közgazdasági Szemle, No. 6. pp. 19–26.
Nyáry I. 1943: A Balkán hadseregeinek fejlődése. Budapest.
Olajos L. 1948: Kossuth terve a dunai népek együttműködéséről, és a mai helyzet. – Híd, No. 3. pp. 99–107.
Paikert A. 1922: A turáni eszme. Budapest, A Turáni Társaság kiadványa.
Palotás E. 1972: A Balkán-kérdés az osztrák magyar és az orosz diplomáciában a XIX. század végén. Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó.
Passuth L. 1939: A Balkán határai. – Apollo, Vol. IV. (Volume IX.) No. 3–4. pp. 154–160.
Pálóczi Horváth Gy. 1941: Balkán a viharban. Budapest, Cserépfalvi, Pápai ny. (Így látjuk mi, No. 1.)
Pusztai J. 1947: Balkán Intézet Budapesten. Budapest, Magyar Balkán Társaság. Balkáni Füzetek, No. 16.
Radisics E. (Ed.) 1946: A Dunatáj I. (Történelmi, gazdasági és földrajzi adatok a Dunatáj államainak életéből). Budapest, Gergely Rt. kiadása.
Ránki Gy. 1981: Gazdaság és külpolitika. A nagyhatalmak harca a délkelet-európai gazdasági hegemóniáért (1919–1939). Budapest.
Réthy D. 1889: Magyarország a Balkán piacain. Statisztikai tanulmány. Budapest, Hornyánszky ny.
Ring É. (Ed.) 1986: Helyünk Európában, I–II. (Nézetek és koncepciók a 20. századi Magyarországon.) Budapest, Magvető Könyvkiadó.
Romsics I. 1998: Nemzet, nemzetiség és állam. (Kelet-Közép- és Délkelet-Európában a 19. és 20. században.) Budapest, Napvilág Kiadó.
Rónai A. 1937: A dunai megegyezés lehetőségei. – Apollo, Vol. III. No. 2. (Volume VII.) pp. 127–130.
Rónai A. (Ed.) 1945: Közép Európa atlasz. Budapest-Balatonfüred, Államtudományi Intézet.
Rónai A. 1945: Hol van Középeurópa. – Temesy Gy. (Ed.) Földrajzi Zsebkönyv, pp. 175–185. Budapest, Magyar Földrajzi Társaság.
Rónai A. 1989: Térképezett történelem. Budapest, Magvető Könyvkiadó.
Rubinek GY. 1909: A Balkán kereskedelmi szerződésekről. Budapest, Országos Magyar Gazdasági Egyesület.
Rubinek Gy. 1913: Hogy állunk a Balkánon? Budapest, Stephaneum ny.
Sallai J. 1995: Magyarország történelmi határai a térképeken. Budapest, Püski Kiadó.
Strausz A. 1883: A bosnyák föld és népe I–II. Budapest, Athenaeum.
Strausz A. 1888: A Balkán félsziget I. (Macedonia, Észak-Albánia és Montenegro.) Budapest, Márki Samu.

Strausz A. 1913: Az új Balkán-félsziget és a Török Birodalom. (Politikai, gazdasági tanulmány.) Budapest, Kilián ny.
Szabó P. Z. 1942/a: Délvidéki Intézet. In. Gál I. (Ed.) 1942, pp. 105–108.
Szabó P.. Z. 1942/b: Szeged és a Balkán. – Délvidéki Szemle, 1. évf., 8. sz., pp. 305–309.
Szabó P. Z. 1943: A Balkánfélsziget földrajzi erővonalai és Magyarország. In: Temesy Gy. (Ed.) Földrajzi Zsebkönyv, Budapest, Magyar Földrajzi Társaság, pp. 142–150.
Szabó P. Z. 1945: Horvátország és mai részei a magyar történelemben. In: Temesy Gy. (Ed.) Földrajzi Zsebkönyv. Budapest, Magyar Földrajzi Társaság, pp. 210–233.
Szabó Z. 1937: A Vaskapun túl. (Balkáni útikönyv.) Budapest, Stephaneum ny.
Szamota I. 1891: Régi utazások Magyarországon és a Balkán-félszigeten, 1054–1717. Budapest, Olcsó Könyvtár.
Szilágyi I. 2004: A magyar külpolitika és a délszláv térség. In: GAZDAG F. – KISS J. L. (Eds.): Magyar külpolitika a 20. században. Budapest, Zrínyi Kiadó, pp. 261–283.
Szűcs J. 1981: Vázlat Európa három történelmi régiójáról. – Történelmi Szemle, No. 3. pp. 313–359.
Tasnády Kubacska A. 1945: Franz Baron Nopcsa. Budapest. Magyar Természettudományi Múzeum.
Tánczos L. 1948: A magyar nehézipar és a Balkán. Budapest, Balkán Intézet. Balkán Könyvtár, No. 5.
Teleki P. – Cholnoky J. 1916: Memorandum a Magyar Földrajzi Társaság Keleti Bizottságának felállítása tárgyában. – Földrajzi Közlemények, Vol. XLIV. No. 2. pp. 109–113.
Teleki P. 1917: Táj és faj. – Turán, Vol. 5. No. 1. pp. 17–30.
Teleki P. – Csiki E. (Eds.) 1923–1940: A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Balkán-kutatásainak eredményei. I–III kötet. Budapest, MTA.
Thallóczy L. 1902: Bosznia mint történelmi színtér. – Földrajzi Közlemények, Vol. XXX. No. 5. pp. 213–238.
Thallóczy L. 1909: Kállay Béni tiszt. tag emlékezete. – Akadémiai Értesítő, Vol. XX. pp. 307–337.
Thim J. 1942: Magyarság és a balkáni konföderációk. – Külügyi Szemle, No. 1. pp. 46–53.
Ujváry G. 1993: Magyar állami ösztöndíjasok külföldön, 1867–1944. – Levéltári Szemle, Vol. XLIII. No. 3. pp. 14–26.
Urbán J. (Ed.) 1944: A M. Kir. Keleti Kereskedelmi Főiskola Évkönyve az 1943–44. Tanévről. Újvidék, A M. Kir. Keleti Kereskedelmi Főiskola kiadása.
VARGA L. 1948: Magyarország és a Balkán vasúti vonatkozású kapcsolatai. Budapest, Balkán Intézet, Balkán Könyvtár No. 4.), Radó ny.
Vaszary B. 1914: A Balkán félsziget államai. Veszprém, Fodor ny.
Váli F. 1948: Magyar-török gazdasági kapcsolatok. Budapest, Magyar Balkán-Társaság. Balkán-könyvtár, No. 3.
Várady Gy. 1971: Déli szomszédunk Jugoszlávia. Budapest, Kossuth Könyvkiadó.
Vincze F. 1929: Kereskedelmi szakoktatás. In: Közgazdasági Enciklopédia, Budapest, Athenaeum, Vol. IV. c. 349–362.

Vision Planet. Strategies for Integrated Spatial Development of the Central European, Danubian and Adriatic Area. Background Report. Bonn, 2000.
Vision Planet. Strategies for Integrated Spatial Development of the Central European, Danubian and Adriatic Area. Guidelines and Policy Proposals. Bonn, 2000.
Vita S. 1943: Balkáni kérdések. – Hitel, No. 5. pp. 290–302.
Zeidler GY. 2001: A revíziós gondolat. Budapest, Osiris.
Zeidler GY. 2002: A Magyar Külügyi Társaság és folyóirata a Külügyi Szemle (1920–1944). – Külügyi Szemle, Vol. I. No. 1. 151–176. pp.
Zoltán Z. ed. 1973: Huszonöt éves a marxista közgazdászképzés. Budapest, Marx Károly Közgazdaságtudományi Egyetem.

TRANSFORMATION OF THE SPATIAL STRUCTURE IN SOUTHEAST EUROPE

Iván Illés

1. Introduction

One of the most decisive features of the history of the Balkans countries is the fact that all the countries in this region – since they gained their sovereignty – have been a secondary conflict and collision zone of the super powers, and they were rather limited in their own freedom of action.

Approaching the issue from the opposite direction, we can see that the politics of the Balkans countries has always been influenced by which super power they expected certain supports from in order to fulfil their ambitions, and where they could find opportunities in the situations created by conflicts of the super powers, opportunities that met their own expectations. This is important from the aspect of regional development, as the development policies of these countries – from the development of the transport network to urban developments and the improvement of the administrative systems – have been determined to a large extent by the adaptation to the super powers.

The development and transformation of the regional development policy in the Balkans countries can be divided into three main periods. The first is the era from the birth of these countries to World War II; the second is from 1945 to the systemic changes; the third is the period from the systemic change (around 1990) to date.

These were very much different political periods, but there were some elements in regional policy, spatial development efforts and policies that link in some way the whole period in question and have been typical of the regional policies of these countries in all times. I chose four elements that are characteristics primarily of the first period, but some features can be seen in the other two eras as well.

The first one is the construction of the capital cities into European level big cities as the primary ambition. The second is the creation of the access to the sea, and port constructions. The third is the creation of the spatial and municipal conditions for a homogeneous nation state. Finally, there is the effort for the creation of an integrated state territory within the areas of different size, set by the changing boundaries.

The present capital cities of the Balkans were small towns of 15–20 thousand population in the first half of the 19th century. In most cases they were not even the biggest towns of their countries. Different political ambitions determined where the capital city was designated. The elites of the respective countries lived in these towns, so it is not by chance that a large proportion of the available resources were used in these settlements. This feature is not alien to the situation of Hungary in the same historical period, either. The governments, after the birth of the sovereign states, rather neglected the countryside, agriculture and the village people for a long time. Two governments were exception from this: one is the Bulgarian government led by Alexander Stamboliyski, the other is the Romanian government of Juliu Maniu. The latter did not function long enough to have a considerable impact.

Table 1 demonstrates the development of the population of the Southeast-European big cities. In 1800, Thessaly was the biggest city of the region (apart from Istanbul). Athens had 12 thousand inhabitants, only, as opposed to the 70 thousand of Thessaly. Budapest had 50 thousand, Bucharest 32 thousand, Beograd 25 thousand dwellers at this time. In Greece, Athens was far from being the largest city; several other cities were considerably bigger. In Bulgaria there were three cities at that time – Varna, Shumen and Rousse – that were bigger than Sophia. In the territory of the present Serbia, Subotica (Szabadka) was the town with the biggest population at the very end of the 19th century.

Table 1.

Population growth in the major cities of Southeast-Europe, 1800-2000, thousand people

City	Year									
	1800	1825	1850	1875	1900	1925	1950	1975	1990	2000
Athens	12	23	39	48	111	350	1,300	2,540	3,150	3,300
Budapest	50	117	187	435	991	980	1,725	2,034	2,017	1,812
Bucharest	32	80	120	222	283	600	1,100	1,589	2,037	2,009
Beograd	25	20	15	28	69	226	470	920	1,169	1,717
Sophia					108	287	660	967	1,141	1,100
Thessaly	70	85	100	174	210	278	557	749	1,187	

By 2000, Athens was far the biggest city of the region. Bucharest had more inhabitants than Budapest, and Beograd also approached the number of population in the Hungarian capital city by the last years. In the first period it was definitely Budapest that showed the most dynamic development and population growth, but in the second half of the 20th century the population in the other big cities increased considerably faster (*Figure 3*).

Figure 3.

Number of population in the big cities of Southeast-Europe



The second characteristic, the access to the sea and the development of the ports was a dominant ambition of each country. As regards the Black Sea, the construction of the ports started already under the Turkish government, before the birth of the sovereign states and the acquisition of the coastal areas. The Danubian (in Turkish, Tuna) Vilayet, including Dobrugea and North Bulgaria, was used as a sort of sample region by the Ottoman Empire in order to demonstrate its capacity to launch and support economic development. The Ottoman Empire built the first railway between Kostendje (the present Constanța) and Cernavodă, at a time when Romania did not have railway at all. The Turks built the railway lines between Varna and Rousse, and Varna and Cernavodă, which were further developed by the later national government, e.g. from Cernavodă to Bucharest. These ports and the access to the sea had a dominant importance from that time on in the economic development of the respective countries. Romania managed the overwhelming share of its foreign trade and economic relations with the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy before the acquisition of Dobrugea, but the access to the sea completely changed the structure of the Romanian foreign trade: Romania exported the major part of its crops, cereals and other products (e.g. crude oil) to Great Britain. Bulgaria had similar ambitions, in fact, during the Balkan wars Serbia had an ambition to have a sea access

across the territory of Albania, for which the ideology was created. The Balkans countries have an inclination anyway to see their present territory as a space where the current ethnic structures existed all through the history. Several works and propaganda materials were made that tried to demonstrate the Romanians, Bulgarians as ancient sailing nations that of course have a natural right to the possession of these territories.

The third such feature is the effort for the creation of the homogeneous and single nation state, including its spatial consequences. All of these countries had significant numbers of ethnic minorities. Even more important may be the almost omnipresent and considerable ethnic and religious differences in the composition of the urban and the rural population. Not last, the development of the capital cities was a means for the creation of the ethnically homogeneous nation states. These countries wished to build out capital cities in whose ethnic composition the nation whose name the country bears is dominant. There were other efforts made to marginalise the other ethnic groups, as well. Such measures were the land reforms in Bulgaria and Serbia. Many times even much more violent tools (evacuation and outcast) were applied by the Balkans states in order to change their ethnic compositions.

The fourth common trait was the effort to create a single nation state within changing border; the political conditions of the Balkans peninsula radically changed in the 19th and 20th century. In the early 19th century the whole territory was part of the Ottoman Empire. The territories of the nation states were gradually born, gaining further areas mostly from the Ottoman Empire but occasionally from one another, too. The only border section that did not change during the 20th century is the Danubian border between Romania and Bulgaria (but some pieces border sections changed even here). Between the foundation of the sovereign states and 1938, the territory of Romania increased to 2.6-fold, Bulgaria to 1.8-fold, Greece to 2.7-fold, the original Serbia within the Yugoslav state to 6.7-fold. This evidently brought about fundamental territorial changes, by the unification of areas that had belonged to different empires and had different transport an also varied economic orientations. This was a major challenge for all countries. In this approach, the Balkans countries actually encountered the issue of regional development sooner than the Western European states. How did they manage to solve this issue? Different concepts were made, but the solution and the implementation were much slower and problematic, and have not been fully completed to date.

The second period of regional development in these states is the decades between 1945 and 1990. Each goal and objective that had been defined before World War II remained valid and was continued in this era, naturally within changed conditions. The adaptation to the politics of the super powers and the use of the opportunities that they offered continued. The cold war for example

started with England passing the obligations of the support and maintenance of Greece to the United States, and from that time on it was the Western supports given in the framework and spirit of the cold war that determined the future development of Greece. Yugoslavia manoeuvred with its non-committed politics between the East and the West, which brought a considerable economic profit for the country for decades. Romania also tried this policy later, with less success. Bulgaria tried to have access to extra resources and extra opportunities by a maximum loyalty to the Soviet Union. Finally, Albania tried to improve its situation with changing (Yugoslav, Soviet, Chinese) political orientations, until it ran out patrons because of its rigid doctrine-politics by the eighties.

The development of the capital cities still had a priority, but at a definitely slower pace than in the previous era. In fact, in the 1950s some restrictions were introduced in all of these countries in order to stop overgrowth, ranging from the prohibition of immigration to the prohibition of the location of industrial plants and in many other forms.

The development of the sea access still enjoyed a priority. The objectives of the creation of homogeneous nation states were still valid, as well. Evacuations and exchanges of population still occurred in this period, although not in the same volume as in Central Europe, in the Polish, Czech and German territories. However, Germans, Hungarians, Albans, Bulgarians and Turks were still liable to such measures in this period.

At the same time, new opportunities appeared in regional development policy. One was the industrialisation of the backward areas, the other the effort for the equalisation of the development level and the living conditions. The third new feature was the kind of regional lobbying that remained the only field of individual political ambitions for the politicians, i.e. the appearance of the articulation of different regional interests.

As regards industrialisation and urbanisation, unbelievable changes took place in the economic structure of these countries. *Table 2* demonstrates that in 1930 a total of 70–80–90% of the population of these countries worked in agriculture, which decreased to typically 30 to 40% by 1980 (with the exception of Albania). It meant a 20–30–40% change at the cost of agriculture and for the favour of the other sectors. This resulted in a huge transition of the social structure in these countries.

By and large the same can be seen in *Table 3*, demonstrating the data or urbanisation (both in quantitative and qualitative terms). In 1949–1966, the average annual growth rate of the urban population was 4-5% in most countries. It means that the number of urban population doubled within 15 years. Compared to this, the 1.6% growth of urban population in Hungary – that we considered as a very dynamic change at that time – was a very moderate pace of growth. This comparison might help to indicate the extraordinary pace of urbanisation in the

Balkans countries.

Table 2

The share of agricultural population in the Balkans countries, 1931-1980

Country	Agricultural population in 1930, in per cent	Agricultural population in 1980, in per cent	Change, in per cent
Albania	90	60.3	- 29.7
Bulgaria	74	33.3	- 40.7
Greece	60	37.2	- 22.8
Yugoslavia	77	37.4	- 39.6
Romania	71	47.2	- 23.8

Table 3

The volume of the migration to cities in 1949–1980

Country	Number (in thousand)	Share (in per cent)	Number (in thousand)	Share (in per cent) of	Average annual growth rate
	of urban population, 1949		of urban population, 1980		
Albania	233	18.0	620	33.2	5.0
Bulgaria	1,735	24.7	3,823	45.8	4.2
Greece	2,797	16.2	6,045	31.0	4.6
Yugoslavia	3,427	36.6	4,531	44.0	1.6
Romania	3,720	23.4	7,305	36.0	3.8

Evidently the development of infrastructure could hardly keep up with this extremely rapid urbanisation. The spatial separation of workplaces and places of residence considerably increased, together with one more thing, defined by a Yugoslav researcher: the ruralisation of the cities. It means that people who had not abandoned rural lifestyle moved to the cities, bringing several features of the rural life with them into the prefabricated concrete block flats of the large housing estates, which resulted in a very special and bizarre way of life in several Balkans states.

The next issue is the equalisation efforts. There was actually a real convergence both among the respective countries and among the regions within the countries. This equalisation process had two sources. One factor was the fact that industry became the dominant branch of the economy in all regions, due to the industrialisation of extremely rapid pace (but of extensive nature). An equalisation took place in the employment structure; the share of industrial earners grew everywhere. On the other hand, there was another factor: isolation from the Western world, autarchy, and not last the measures of the Western

world that did not allow the import of advanced technology to there countries. The Western countries introduced an embargo and the so-called "COCOM" list against the states of East and Central Europe, as a result of which the leading regions and countries of Central-East Europe gradually fell behind in the world-wide technical and economic development, their technical level "approached" that of the Balkans countries. *Figure 4* demonstrates the development of the export per capita and the integration into the world economy in the Central and Southeast European countries in the 1929–1998 period, taking the export per capita of Austria as 100%. In Czechoslovakia e.g. the export per capita was higher until the 1950s than in Austria. Later, by the end of the period in question "equalisation" had taken place, but at the lowest possible level (*Figure 4*). This is true both for the development across the respective countries and for the regions within them.

Figure 4.
Export per capita in the Southeast-European countries, in per cent of the export per capita in Austria, 1929–1998



As regards territorial lobbying, this is a special feature of this era. All these

countries had single-party states, more or less dictatorial systems, where any deviation from the mainstream of the politics – especially if one had a leading position – was impossible. Where were politicians able to fulfil their ambitions? Territorial lobbying was the legal possibility that could be used in this respect. In a sense it was an important thing, as all resources came from the centre, the possibilities of development were provided by the centres of the states. For most politicians the only way of independent policy-making was to try to get as much resources as possible for their regions, cities etc.

This specific feature, interestingly, was perhaps one of the main elements in the birth of a kind of regional identity. In the former periods the rural, agricultural population of the Balkans had a sort of identity – if they had any – of their own villages, only. They did not have any identity of the different administrative units of the Ottoman Empire above the municipal level (Kaza, Sandjak, Vilayet), they were a totally alien sphere for them. It was after 1945 when a sort of territorial identity emerged. It was especially true for Yugoslavia, where in several of the federal republics (e.g. Macedonia) national identity was born in this period.

The last period is the one since the systemic change to date. The first half of this period is characterised by a general decline, followed by a moderate growth later. Until 2003 not one country – with the exception of Greece and Albania – was able to reach their 1989 GDP level. Of course the problems of systemic change were different across the various countries, coming from the given political circumstances and initial situations. The drama of Yugoslavia was an individual case; however, each and every country was affected both economically and politically by the events going on in the former Yugoslavia.

The charts below show the development of the GDP in the Balkans countries. Greece was the only country not affected by the systemic change and showing a relatively stable development. In all other countries a considerable fall, a significant decrease of GDP took place after 1989. The first chart shows the figures of Hungary, Bulgaria and Croatia. The decline of Croatia was more serious, but they were able to catch up relatively soon and surpassed the growth rate of Bulgaria in the total of the 1989–2003 period.

The second chart features the figures for Albania, Romania, Serbia-Montenegro and Macedonia. Albania was the only country to considerably exceed the 1989 level. We have to add, however, that this is not a significant achievement, as the country had reached such a low level by 1989 – due to its politics in the previous decades –, the surpassing of which is not much of a miracle. Romania and Macedonia are at approximately the same level as they were in 1989. Finally there is Serbia-Montenegro that has still not reached 50% of their 1989 GDP (*Figure 5*). This is the real tragedy in the history of a country.

Figure 5.

Development of the GDP in the Balkans countries, 1989–2003



The new phenomena in spatial development in this period is the general decrease of the population, including the urban population, the disintegration of the former foreign and internal trade relations and their spatial consequences, and the dramatic increase of the spatial disparities. Finally the regional policy of the European Union and some of its effects can be seen in this period.

As regards the demographic processes, as opposed to the extremely dynamic population growth of the previous period, the population considerably decreased in all countries, except Greece and three Yugoslav member states. The most dramatic decline took place in Bulgaria and Romania. According to UNO forecasts, in the 2005–2030 period the population of each county will decrease, mostly because of the low level of natural increase. The population decrease is mainly due to the low birth rates, but migrations are important in this respect, too. The Voivodina region is in a peculiar situation. Between 1991 and 2001, in every district and region of Serbia and Montenegro the number of population significantly decreased. The only exception was three districts in Voivodina: South Bácska, Middle Bácska and Srem, featuring a considerable population increase. On the other hand, natural increase was the lowest here. After the Balkans wars the Voivodina region became the main destination of the settling down of the refugees. This reached a volume that resulted in the biggest population increase in the whole of Serbia and Montenegro. This process evidently turned the ethnic composition of the Voivodina region upside down.

Table 4 demonstrates the growth of population in the respective countries. Even in Albania, where the natural increase is extremely high, a decline of population took place in 1990–2005, mostly due to emigration from the country. We all remember television news from this period, showing ships with tens of thousands of Albanians trying to reach Italy. Nevertheless a further increase can be expected here in the future.

The decrease of the population has reached a dramatic level in Bulgaria: from 1990 to 2005 the number of population fell by one million, from 8.7 million to 7.7 million, and will go on falling to 6.2 million by 2030. It means a loss of two and half million people from the 8.7 million total population! We have to add that the UNO forecasts try to moderate the demographic and migration processes that might occur in this country, so the decrease of the population might even be bigger.

The situation of Romania is very much similar; the number of population fell from 23 million in 1990 to 21.7 million by 2005, i.e. the loss of population exceeded one million people. A 3.5 million population decrease is forecasted for this country for the 1990–2030 period. The most dramatic is the case of the Ukraine, where the number of population may decrease by 17 million, from 52 million in 1990 to 35 million by 2030.

Table 4.

Change in the number of population until 2030, 1000 persons (UNO forecast)

Country	Year					
	1990	1995	2000	2005	2015	2030
Albania	3,289	31,303	3,062	3,130	3,325	3,512
Bosnia-Herzegovina	4,308	3,420	3,847	3,907	3,893	3,639
Bulgaria	8,718	8,279	7,797	7,726	7,156	6,243
Greece	10,160	10,657	10,975	11,120	11,233	11,119
Croatia	4,517	4,669	4,505	4,551	4,454	4,161
Macedonia	1,909	1,963	1,967	1,967	1,942	1,842
Hungary	10,365	10,329	10,226	10,098	9,802	9,221
Moldova	4,364	4,339	4,275	4,206	4,114	3,856
Romania	23,207	22,681	22,117	2,171	20,871	19,285
Serbia-Montenegro	10,156	10,548	10,545	10,503	10,416	10,114
Slovenia	1,926	1,964	1,967	1,967	1,942	1,842
Ukraine	51,891	51,513	49,116	46,481	41,849	35,052

As opposed to the incredibly fast population growth in the previous decades, even the narrower public administrative territories of the big cities will have a population loss in most places. Column 2 in *Table 5* shows the highest number of population to date and the time when it was reached, the next column contains the present population of the same administrative territories.

Table 5.

Decrease of the number of population in the narrower city territories

City	Highest number of population (in thousand) and its year	Present number of population (in thousand)
Athens	885 (1981)	789
Budapest	2,076 (1987)	1,739
Bucharest	2,394 (1990)	1,996
Sarajevo	448 (1981)	434
Skopje	563 (1991)	443
Sophia	1,142 (1996)	1,099
Thessaly	407 (1981)	385
Zagreb	707 (1991)	629

Two capital cities, Beograd and Tirana are not featured in the table. The number of population did not increase officially in Beograd, but there are some 150–200 thousand refugees in the city unofficially, who came from Croatia, Bosnia and Kosovo. Behind the concentration of the refugees in the capital city

there is the evident belief that it is the capital city where they can best articulate their interest and claims. Refugees, as they do not have registered places of residence, are not enumerated in the official population censuses, but in reality they increase to total number of population.

As regards Tirana, in the time of the dictatorship a considerable part of the intellectuals and those with higher qualifications were evacuated from the cities, similarly to the Chinese model, for an ideological brainwashing, mostly to the mountainous parts of the country. Those who returned to the capital city after the systemic change, found their flats occupied by other people. They built themselves all kinds of shelters from tin and other "construction materials" in the public places of Tirana.

2. Economic relations of the Southeast European countries

An important determinant of the situation of the countries is their external relationships. The COMECON co-operation in the last decade before the systemic change became rather one-sided, reduced to the relationships to the Soviet Union. Those countries that had very intensive relationships to the Soviet Union were most seriously shocked by the loss of these, which is especially true for Bulgaria. The effects of the financial and debt crisis were the most serious in Romania and Bulgaria. In Romania the situation was the worst not so much after but before 1990, when the Ceausescu-regime forced Romania in 1980–1990 to repay their debts to the last cent. It is a very bad politics to be indebted, but to pay a whole debt back is even worse. This meant that Romania reached the systemic change with a bankrupt economy and with very low living standards.

The disintegration of Yugoslavia had serious effects on trade, too. The prosperity of Slovenia had been due not last to the fact that as the most advanced part of Yugoslavia, it had produced goods that were in great demand in the other member republics. The small republic with two million inhabitants had a market of more than 22 million, a market monopolised in a certain sense. The effects of the disintegration of Yugoslavia could temporarily be felt in Slovenia too, but the country managed to re-orientate its trade to other countries. Other effects of the disintegration affected Macedonia. In the time of the united Yugoslavia, a large part of the development resources was targeted at Macedonia, in the form of development benefits from the more developed regions. With the term used then, a series of "political" factories were established, without any sound economic background, only serving the purpose of job creation and industrialisation in the Macedon area. In these factories, we have to add, mostly Slav Macedons were employed, and they were entitled to have state flats, too. Albanians were mostly excluded from this. They tried to create their own better

living by working abroad. After the systemic change the situation turned to the opposite in a sense. The political factories ceased to exist, the conditions of the pre-fabricated block houses deteriorated, they were not even heated at the time of the economic crisis – meanwhile the Albans lived in relatively much better conditions, in their own-built detached houses and from the revenues that they had earned abroad. This was one of the sources of the ethnic conflicts later.

The disintegration of Bosnia-Herzegovina had serious effects, too. The relations between the Croatian-Muslim federation and the Republic of Serbia ceased to exist for a long time, despite the fact that a large part of the industry had been built out integrating the raw materials produced in the Republic of Serbia and the processing pants, e.g. in aluminium industry, in the Federation. Among the Serbs, the number of agricultural earners was much higher, they had a limited amount of agricultural land left, while on the other – Bosnian and Croatian – side the urban citizens had no choice but to move the villages and pursue agricultural activity.

Finally, the Balkans war and the embargo had serious negative consequences for the neighbouring countries too, eliminating the shipments across Yugoslavia, resulting in an over 2000 kilometre bypass in the transport of goods from e.g. Bulgaria to Western Europe.

The next feature of the spatial development of the new era is the increase of the spatial disparities. When isolation ceased to exist and the effects of the world market became much more direct, the equalisation that had taken place across the regions and the provinces was gone in a year or two. A considerable territorial differentiation started within the respective countries, depending on the scale to which market mechanism prevailed and even more on the volume of international capital invested in these regions. These phenomena first touched the Central European countries, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, but they have gradually appeared in the Balkans countries since then, as well. Typical of the development of the Balkans countries was the rise of one region or two, and these regions carried the whole of the economic growth.

Table 6 shows how many per cent of the total GDP growth the regions of the capital cities were producing in a certain period, i.e. in 1995–2001. In Hungary the Central Hungarian Region (Budapest and Pest County) produced 58% of the GDP growth. In Bulgaria and Romania, where this figure exceeds 100%, the income production of all regions other than the capital city regions decreased, and the growth of the capital city regions should have counterbalanced this. In Bulgaria the region around Sophia produced 151% of the growth, while the same figure for Bucharest in Romania was 278%.

The effects of the regional policy of the European Union have been more indirect in the Balkans countries so far, as they have only been eligible for pre-accession aids. A precondition for this was the creation of a kind of regionalism.

In all countries the planning regions were created, but nowhere within the frameworks of an administrative reform. An interesting example is Bulgaria that actually had large administrative units around 1990 that would have met the requirements of the European Union. These nine macro-regions, however, were transformed into 28 smaller regions, receding this way from the requirements of the EU. In the new programming period of 2007–2013, only Romania and Bulgaria were eligible for pre-accession funds assistance, but they became EU members in January 2007, so their situation more "unfortunate" in the sense that they joined the Union in a programming period whose supports were determined at a time when they were not members yet, consequently they were not able to articulate their interests.

Table 6.

Share of the capital city regions from GDP growth in Central and Southeast Europe, 1995–2001

Country	Capital city region	Share of the capital city region from the growth of national GDP
Bulgaria	Yugozapaden	151%
Czech Republic	Praha	65%
Hungary	Közép-Magyarország	58%
Poland	Mazowieckie	35%
Romania	Bucuresti	278%
Slovakia	Bratislavsky	38%

As regards their own spatial development policies, they can be said to follow the strategy of the poor for the time being. The Balkans states are not in the position to be able to offer investment supports financed by the central budget, so they choose the other option: instant benefits at the cost of the future, i.e. they offer the businesses settling down tax and other benefit allowances for the future. It means that they abandon future revenues, which might be a more expensive solution in the long run than the supports provided now. However, poor countries hardly have any other choice.

DEVELOPMENT DIRECTIONS AND IMPACT OF TRANS-EUROPEAN TRANSPORT AXES ON THE SPATIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BALKANS

Ferenc Erdősi

I. Transport geographical situation/location and permeability of the Balkans

The Balkans these days is both

- a geographical/economic periphery and
- an intercontinental oriental link.

The *permeability of the Balkans* is the function of the availability of the transport corridors, influenced by orographic and political conditions:

- most of the Balkans is not "transport-friendly", because of the very unfavourable orographic conditions. The situation is exacerbated by the
- socio-economic underdevelopment and the heterogeneity of spatial interests, and the number of conflicts. All these are responsible for the typically bad transport endowments of the Balkans.

In World War II, the unfavourable road conditions of the Balkans – a subfront of the military operations – was assessed differently by the enemies:

- *"No other front has caused a bigger loss, compared to its size, in tanks and vehicles than the hardly accessible Balkans"* (Guderian, German general);
- *"Hannibal was able to cross the Alps with this elephants, so the Balkans cannot be an obstacle for our Shermans"* (Churchill).

2. The historical role of the Balkans region in the European transport system

The Balkans has the following potential roles in the European transport network system:

- as a *hub* it is insignificant – both in land and air transport;
- as a **gateway** it has a tertiary importance – Fiume/Koper, Thessaly and Constanța –, due to

    - the narrow hinterland/catchment area and
    - the overwhelming dominance of the mega-ports of the North Sea range (Le Havre–Antwerp–Rotterdam–Amsterdam–Bremen–Hamburg);
- as a **transit territory** it is of significant importance in the Europe–Asia Minor–Middle East relation, but basically restricted to one single (Northwest-southeast) corridor, supplemented by other north-south and northwest-southeast corridors of secondary importance from the Carpathian Basin. The transit role has both
    - political/military and
    - economic significance.

The *historical transit role developed under the influence of external power/economic interests*:

- in the *Roman Empire* a south Balkans East–West corridor (Via Appia – Adria –), "Via Egnatia" evolved, whereas
- in the *Ottoman Empire* the Balkans was
    - a transit route in the 16th and 17th centuries towards the Carpathian Basin, the axis of which was the Istanbul–Nis–Beograd military road;
    - on the other hand, the Saloniki–K. Mitrovica (Sarajevo) railway line towards the westernmost Ottoman province, Bosnia played a military supply/logistics function in the last third of the 19th century. However, this railway line was not fully completed;
- the *British* and *German* trans-Eurasian railway concepts were closer in their directions to the Plans of the Ottoman Empire. The Eastern Balkans became more and more important for Germany, from a geo-strategic consideration (belated "Drang nach Osten": railway to Baghdad);
- the Canal of Suez made the region very important for the British imperial politics. After the Berlin Congress, the
    - Beograd–Nis–Sophis–Istanbul and the
    - Nis–Skopje–Saloniki railways were built (*Figure 6*);
- Russia needed badly a direct railway line to the inner, south Slav areas of the Balkans in order to realise its Pan-Slavic politics, but its economic power before World War I did not allow the implementation of such a railway line.
- In Yugoslavia between the two World Wars (in the synthetic state), the Northwest–Southeast international transit axis was given an internal cohesion strengthening function.

- In the 1940s and 1950s the political division of the Balkans prevailed, which resulted in the fact that transit traffic ceased to operate in these decades.
- In the 1970s the plan of a North–West TEM (Trans-European Motorway) was born, initiated by the "soft dictatorships" (Poland and Hungary), which included the speedway constructions in Yugoslavia (*Figure 7).*

Figure 6.

Main transport routes crossing the Balkans



Legend: I/a – international lines serving the interests of the Ottoman Empire (multinational lines also serving Southeast-European interests); I/b – (inner Balkans) lines definitely to serve the interests of the Ottoman Empire; II. lines running towards the Aegean Sea, attracted by the Suez Canal; II/1. historical Pontus route of marginal importance (with a potential significance in the time of mechanised transport); II/2 – Isker–Struma axis; II/3 – Morava–Vardar axis; III. – lines mainly serving the interests of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy; III/4 – Bosna–Neretva axis; III/5 – Una railway; III/6 – Lika railway; II/I7 – Budapest–Zagreb–Ogulin–Fiume railway; III/8 – Vienna–Ljubljana–Trieste railway; IV.– Beograd–Bar railway serving Yugoslav (Serbian and Montenegrian) interests

Figure 7.

TEM – the motorway network of the Balkans, 1991

3. The TEN/PEN/TINA networks as one of the main pillars of the Community policy

The *transport network of Europe in the modern times* developed under the influence of the national interests, the segregation attempts, as an aggregate of national networks bound together, in which no pan-European interests were taken into consideration, and which was characterised by the lack of interoperability and compatibility.

3.1. EC/EU: contradiction of the single European market needing an interoperable infrastructure system and the non-harmonised transport systems

The creation of a more effective Europe, a Europe more competitive on the global market requires the increase of

- permeability and interoperability (tasks of the cohesion policy);
- sustainability (the need for a state-of-the-art energy and environmental policy); and
- a more balanced regional development (a tasks of regional policy).

In order to create a competitive, coherent and more balanced Europe, the sustainable and environment friendly development of the linear infrastructure, the basic road network is needed.

3.2. Trans-European Networks (TENs) as the European scale integrated system of linear infrastructure (national trunk line networks)

The main aspects of development in the case of the TENs are as follows:

- the developments should be carried out in a single system, as regards planning and operation;
- the principle of subsidiarity should be applied;
- the focus should be placed on the corridors linking countries and capital cities;
- the large-capacity environment friendly means of transport (electrified railways, sea and inland navigation) should enjoy a priority.

3.3. Pan-European Networks (PENs) and TINA networks in the eastern half of Europe

The following main steps of the development of these networks are worth mentioning:

- 1994: the 9 Cretan corridors are defined;
- 1997: 10 Helsinki main corridors and a number of side-corridors are designated. After the war operations in the Balkans coming to an end, the network was supplemented by corridors No. X. and Vc., crossing the Balkans from Northwest-Southeast and North-South direction, respectively.

The main characteristics of the 10 corridors are the following:

- the destinations of four main (and several side-) land corridors running from a distance (V., IV., IX. and X.) are Baltic Sea ports;

- the lower reaches of the Danube River as an inland navigation axis create a connection to the Black Sea – all these relationships contribute to the dependency on Western and Central Europe;
- on the other hand, only one South Balkans corridor (corridor VIII.) has both its origin and destination within the Balkans (*Figure 8).*

Figure 8.

Transport corridors in the Balkans



Legend: 1 – land corridors; 2 – Trans-Balkans routes of outstanding importance; 3 – Danubian waterway; 4 – non-corridor motorways; 5 – M9 as part of the New Silk Road

Most of the corridors reach the Balkans in a radial direction running out of Budapest – which actually means that the roads from Southeast Europe to Western Europe run through the Carpathian Basin (Hungary), then the radial corridors are further divided in the Balkans, or, jointly with other corridors running here from different directions they make junctions in the Balkans capitals,

junctions of lesser importance in some major economic centres.

The *financing of the TEN is the responsibility of the respective countries*, the EU only pays 2-4% of the costs in the non-member states. The new member states might expect EU support to 40-60% of the expenses from the Cohesion Fund up or from the Structural Funds, however, the mixed (PPP) solution of financing also involving the private capital is strongly supported. The total of the investments related to the construction of the corridors cannot exceed 1.5% of the GDP of the respective countries.

The PEN corridors are theoretically equal in their status, however, a disproportionately large part of their total budget (30%) was planned to be spent on corridor IV alone (the Berlin–Istanbul corridor). The reason for this is the extreme *geopolitical* significance of this corridor for the European Union, as it has exceptional roles in the spatial relations and carries traffic of strategic importance:

- it connects the NATO/EU area to the geographically isolated NATO member Turkey and the NATO and EU member Greece;
- it runs towards the European starting point of the trans-Eurasian New Silk Road;
- it creates a connection between Germany and Turkey, the latter with an outstanding significance in the labour supply of Germany.

The most problematic corridor is Corridor IX., starting in Helsinki and reaching Romania through Russia and Ukraine–Moldavia. Corridor Vc. (Budapest–Ploče) seems to have been "forgotten for some time" as well, because, contrary to the original intentions, it does not have a "navel cord" Western Europe function for Bosnia and Herzegovina.

4. The slow pace of the construction of the corridors and the strategic alternatives lying in the developing network

In the 2003 list of the most important projects of TENs (Quick Start Project), the plans with relevance for the Balkans are only segments that do not make an integrated network. Such segments are

- the motorway of Igoumenitsa–Thessaly–Istanbul/Patras–Athens–Sophia–Budapest/Bucharest–Constanța (the deadline for the completion of which is the end of 2007);
- the Athens–Sophia–[Budapest–Vienna–Prague–Nuremburg–Dresden] railway axis;
- the "sea motorways", i.e. the lines of ships carrying trucks (without concrete directions);

– the significant improvement of the navigability of the Danube River, mostly by dredging and thereby deepening the riverbed.

The PEN documents calculate with the conversion of the total length of the railways into electrified and mostly two-lane tracks capable of carrying large axial pressure and the development of the trunk roads into speedways (mostly motorways) until 2010. The present technical levels of the corridors are rather different (relatively best built out are Xa./Xb., as well as the final section of IVa., however, hardly anything has been built so far from corridors VIII. and IX.). On the whole, the *level of preparation in the total corridor network of the Balkans is not more than 30-40%.* Their completion to the deadline is more than questionable.

A considerable difference can be seen between the practice of the Balkans countries and the EU transport policy directives, as regards the development proportions of railways and motorways. The Union, keen on the environmental aspects, prefers the development of the electrified railways and the waterways, whereas the Southeast European countries, referring to their very much underdeveloped road system compared to Western Europe and their concomitant economic losses, focus on the construction of motorways and speedways, and actually link their large-scale railway development to the availability of European Union resources. While it is just the technical conditions of the railways that show the biggest underdevelopment among the corridors, motorways are being constructed that are not parts of the corridors (e.g. the North Transylvanian motorway or the motorway along the Dalmatian seacoast right to Greece).

The Balkans network was constructed in a structure so that the strategic alternatives within the network should allow in all circumstances the transport link to the EU core areas. In times of peace, the ideal way of keeping in touch is along the corridors of South-North or Southeast-Northwest direction across the Central and North Balkans. The extremely costly construction of the high-speed railway in Greece is integrated into this version (*Figure 9*), but it is an anachronistic investment for the time being, as its continuation across the Southern Slav areas and Hungary to the existing German network will take a time that is impossible to predict, so it can only serve internal traffic in isolation for a long time *In times of unrest* threatening with war conflicts, the corridors of East-West direction, bypassing the Southern Slav region (*Figure 10*) are appreciated, connecting Western European traffic across Italy in the South and Hungary in the North. (In the years of the 1990s, the times of the civil war, the goods transport between Turkey and Greece and between Turkey and Western Europe was dominantly manageable by the inclusion of [ferry] ships running out from Western Greek ports and heading to South Italian or North Adriatic ports. Although the majority of this freight transport has been put back on the Vardar–Morava land corridor, the combined sea transport has remained significant.)

Figure 9.

Strategic alternatives lying in the network (1)

Legend: A) In times of peace: Northwest–Southeast and North–South transit across the Central and Northern Balkans; an anachronistic high-speed railway in Greece

Figure 10.

Strategic alternatives lying in the network (2)



Legend: B) In times of unrest an East–West transit across the South Balkans: rivalry between the northern, Bulgarian–Macedon–Alban "Via Egnatia" (Corridor VIII.) and the southern, Greek "Egnatia Odos"

5. The spatial and settlement development effects of the corridors and their impacts on the spatial structure

The spatial and settlement development effects of the corridors are contradictory. They hugely improve the international transport conditions among the capital cities (in capacity, quality and speed), attracting this way the economic (producing, commercial and logistics) businesses and locations, ultimately capital and trained young labour force. This is how land stripes, contact zones along the motorways, outstanding in GDP production appear, as do *centres with large energy* at the encounters/junctions of corridors, showing and outstandingly high performance. On the other hand, the corridors have a strong drainage effect

which now can be felt at a long distance, thus they *accelerate the emptying and deterioration of the far-away peripheral areas*, ultimately *contributing* this way *to the increase in the spatial disparities*. The differentiation processes of such origin worked against the objectives of regional policy, striving for a more balanced development, even in Western Europe – and they may cause an even more serious tension in the universally handicapped Balkans, a region without an organic civic development, where the wildest form of capitalism and the concomitant laws of the jungle result in extreme social disparities and conditions at all regional levels, anyway. The "tunnel" effect is strengthened by the fact that the *infrastructure development is basically no more than the construction of corridors* (motorways in the first place), leaving hardly anything for the development of the by-roads, although already *Menenius Agrippa* mentioned in his tale the inevitability of the functional harmony between the limbs and the trunk, including the stomach. The transport policy reading of the classic tale is as follows: the traffic of the trunk roads mostly comes from the by-roads, i.e. if the feeding system is gone, so is the system they feed. This is why a development policy is needed in the future that places emphasis on the construction of modern by-roads and partly railway side line networks, in fact, on measures aiming at the slowing down of the distant traffic, e.g. the strengthening of the local economy and society and the foundation of development on local sources.

The *establishment of the corridors has various impacts on the economic development and the demographic conditions of the large spaces*, due to the differences in the density of the networks, the intensity of the traffic and the qualitative differences of the connections that the corridors create. The most extended areas far away from the corridors can be found in the Croatian, Bosnian and Serbian mountainous areas of the West and the Central Balkans, and in Transylvania. All suggest that – in peace conditions – the most dynamic corridor will be the Northwest-Southeast one, already linking the relatively more developed agglomerations (of Ljubljana, Zagreb, Beograd, Sophia and Istanbul). Although the intensity of the traffic (on the annual average) is just below this corridor on the twin corridor (V. and Vb.) running from Northeast and ending at the port of the North Adriatic, its corridor only exerts its impact on a limited part of the Balkans, due to its shortness.

To sum it up, the *corridor network will not be able for a long time to change the basic characteristics of the Balkans* that emerged centuries ago; however, as time passes and the other corridors are completed, and the economic/cultural relations within the Balkans as well as towards the eastern Slavic countries become much stronger than presently, the corridor network will become more balanced functionally. The main beneficiaries of the completion of the network may be Bosnia and Herzegovina, Romania and Bulgaria.

These days the Drava River–Adriatic Sea section of *Corridor Vc.* running to

Ploče in Croatia, via Osijek and Sarajevo, is completely missing. This corridor was integrated into the PEN network in Helsinki to create a link for the isolated Bosnia and Herzegovina to Western Europe, across Croatia and Hungary. Experiences show, however, that the hundreds of thousands of guest workers (and the twice as many family members) employed in the German speaking countries prefer the Northwest (Zagreb–Ljubljana) direction to Hungary, not to mention the Bosnian and Herzegovinan travellers regularly visiting Western Europe for business or other purposes. However, if Hungary does not only gain a leading position in economic power but also becomes a major logistics centre of East-Central Europe, Corridor Vc. might be able to fulfil the role that it is meant to.

6. Competition of the destinations of the corridors

In addition to the strong competition, due the high stakes, among the Adriatic ports for the attraction of the southbound corridors (in which competition even the port of Bar in Montenegro is taking part by its railway towards Beograd), it is just as *important for the Black Sea ports which corridors are constructed first and which will become the European origin and gateway of the trans-Eurasian New Silk Road.* (The famous Hungarian politician, Lajos Kossuth suggested more than a century and a half ago: "To the sea, Hungarians!" – however, the choice of the location was only settled after fierce debates, when Fiume surpassed Constanța in the competition for the sea port. Nevertheless the Hungarian foreign trade is still forced now, in the 21st century, to use the port of the faraway Constanța to an extent more than desirable to get to the world, due to the weak permeability capacity of the Croatian railways and the deficiencies of the port of Fiume.) The city having the best chance to make the European gateway of the trans-Eurasian main railway line, instead of the Bulgarian sea ports, is Constanța. This version would mean for Hungary that the Hungarian transversal speedway No 9., via Szekszárd and Kaposvár to the West Transdanubian region, joining corridor IVa. from Constanța via Bucharest and Szeged, would make in the future a part of the intercontinental corridor to Western Europe and farther to the Iberian Peninsula (*Figure 10)* – so "Hungary wants Constanța"!

The *transport value of the ports at the destination of the corridors have been mostly influenced by their economic and transport geographical location so far*, i.e. the development level of their hinterlands (what capacity the hinterland is able to generate for foreign trading traffic on sea), their distance from the main areas generating the traffic and the land connections to these main traffic-generating regions. The North Adriatic ports, closer to the highly developed Alpine regions, the Western regions of the Carpathian Basin with their more dynamic economy and to the Czech Republic, have a considerably higher share of

more valuable container goods and international transit goods than the Black Sea ports that predominantly handle mass products. *In the future*, however, the *inland sea ports are expected to lose some of their significance*, caused by at least two reasons.

One of these reasons is the *globalisation and transformation of the logistical macro-regional system of the sea trade* serving the Chinese goods dumping in an ever increasing proportion (round the world, hub and spoke), which appreciates the open-sea ports of south Italy, South Greece (Crete) and the Malta sea port with transhipment junction role, all providing the closest link to the waterway between the Suez Canal and the Strait of Gibraltar.

The other factor is the problematic permeability of the *Strait of Bosporus*. Although this sea strait (together with the Dardanelles) is an international waterway (the multilateral agreement made in Montreaux in 1936 allows the free transport of both commercial and military ships in peace times for any country), Turkey has already prohibited the night transport of large oil tankers, referring to the protection of the inhabitants and the environment of the Istanbul agglomeration with a ten-million population. This made, however, the daytime ship traffic across the Bosporus too busy, many times ship have to wait until they can anchor in the ports, traffic has palpably slowed down. The reaction of the oil industry around the Caucasus/Caspian Sea region – with an increasing dominance of American companies – was to construct a pipeline system bypassing the Turkish sea straits [Baku–Ceyan; Bourgas–Vlorë; Bourgas – Alexandrupoli, Kiyiköy–Ganos] (*Figure 11*).

Figure 11.

Permeability of the Bosporus Strait? Bypassing oil pipe lines



THE DILEMMAS OF CREATING REGIONS IN EASTERN AND CENTRAL EUROPE

Gyula Horváth

1. Introduction

Regionalism, the regional decentralisation of power and the distribution of labour among the different forms of local government have found themselves in the crossfire of debate in the unitary states of Eastern and Central Europe. The change of the political system, the process of connecting to the globalising European economy, the construction of a local governmental structure using the concepts of civic democracy, all shed new light on the mutual connections of central and regional local power, the harmonisation of settlement independence and meso-level public administration functions. In almost all of the former socialist countries the central issue became that of the economic, political and functional transformation of the basic levels of local government. The earlier sub-national levels disappeared (as in the successor states of the old Czechoslovakia), their functions decreased to a large extent (as in Hungary), changed (as in Poland), or, alternatively, new regional meso-levels were created (as in Croatia) or are being created (as in Slovenia).

The construction of regions in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe became one of the important debate topics for preparation for EU membership. However, the application of EU structural policy relates to appropriate size in terms of the population potential of sub-national development units and their economic capacities, in view of the concepts of economies of scale, and so, during the preparation of the EU pre-accession programmes, planning-statistical regions had to be created in all countries. From a formal point of view, solving this task did not create any particular problem. The government of each country listed the regional public administration units as meso-level development regions, and, on the basis of EU recommendations, the formal organisational structures (regional development councils, development directorates and agencies) were also created.

In parallel with the creation of the organisational framework of an EU-compatible development policy, there started, in most countries, an intensive debate on issues of content. In these debates, numerous issues (which had earlier received less attention among the topics relating to the change of regime) were raised: What functions should the development regions have? How can

they become public administration units serving the decentralisation of the centralised state system? What resources should they have to fulfil the development programmes? Which city in the region should become the regional centre?

EU accession opened up a Pandora's Box in the countries of Eastern and Central Europe. The fundamental issue of how unitarily structured states can be set on a decentralised path became the centre of debate. This present study searches for an explanation of the reasons for the difficulties of Eastern and Central Europe in regional construction; it summarises the administrative and political development pre-requisites of the transition to a regional outline of the possible advantages of a regional institutional system in the creation of the Cohesion Policy ensuring a decrease in regional differences.

2. The formal change in regional administration

The new nation-states in Eastern and Central Europe established in the aftermath of World War I had to face – from the point of view of their future regional development – two difficulties. One of the issues to be addressed was how to create a unified structure for those (new) parts of the country which earlier had been developed in different economic areas, in order to link their infrastructural systems. The other was to create a new system of regional organisation of central government power. The heavily centralised state powers created their own regional bodies partly on their former administration basis, but completing those tasks needed to create the new, unified state territory was most effectively assisted by the low number of administrative units involved. Following World War II (WWII), the Soviet-style regional administration was organised differently – now based upon different power considerations. The Communist states, in accordance with their political interests, heavily changed the countries' regional administration on several occasions, sometimes organising smaller regional units and sometimes larger. Hungary can be considered as an exception to this, in that, in the 20th century (apart from some under-populated counties being integrated) the number of sub-national units in the country has not changed (*Table 7*).

In Eastern and Central Europe a hierarchical planning organisational system – with a fairly powerful central planning office at the top in each country – had previously been the decisive organisational form of regional development. Regional development based on central large-scale investment and state social policy did not require a multi-participant institutional system operating in horizontal co-operation, and the state's interest in redistribution, together with the central will, were carried out most effectively by vertically subordinated organisations. This philosophy of state organisation also defined the regional administra-

tion system.

Table 7.

Changes in the number of regional administrative units in Eastern and Central European countries

Country	Pre-WW II	1950s	1960s	1970s	1980s	2005
Bulgaria	9	13	28	28	9	28^{1999}
Czech Republic	2	13	8	8	8	14^{2001}
Hungary	25	20	20	20	20	20
Poland	14	22	22	49	49	16^{1999}
Romania	9	18	18	40	41	42
Slovakia	2	6	4	4	4	8^{1996}

Source: The author's own chart

Although public administration under socialism did not differ significantly from that of the developed democracies in respect of form and certain operational concepts, it produced an unusual administrative organisation – despite the dominant organisational concept of the (so-called) "democratic centralism' and the omnipotence of the Communist Party. The local organs of power to a very large extent (and especially in the first three decades of extensive industrialisation and settlement development) imposed the central will by "diktat", ignoring any kind of potential advantage which a region might have in development terms. However, as the strongly centralised state system in countries such as Poland and Hungary gradually softened, local initiatives were given greater opportunities, and, due to this, in these countries in the '80s, civic values in respect of settlement development – such as improvements in services and private house construction – made their appearance.

Following the change of regime, the organisational framework of Eastern and Central European states underwent important conceptual changes. A local government structure has replaced the hierarchical, executive council system, and the related legislation has created the constitutional basis for a decentralised exercise of power. By now, in fact, local authorities have been equipped with constitutional guarantees of their organisational and decision-making independence, and very significant changes have been introduced into local government financing. In formal terms, public administration in Romania and Hungary has remained unchanged, although in Bulgaria the previous multi-county system was restored. At the same time, both the Czech Republic and Slovakia (as in the period between 1949 and 1960) created counties relatively small in size. Only Poland established large-size "voivodships" and here the reform of the coun-

try's public administration has been an important milestone in the process of preparing for EU Accession.

The other country to be devoted to regionalisation is Hungary. Hungarian meso-level units – if we look retrospectively over several centuries – partly because of their actual size and partly because of their greatly weakened positions after the change of regime (a counter-reaction to the political role which they played in the planned economy) – are simply not competent to undertake large-scale development tasks. In the 20th century, several attempts to modernise public administration in this strongly uni-centred country were made, but, one after the other, all of the plans failed, due to their rejection by central government and to a lack of agreement among the regional political elites. In 2006 the government – within the framework of the general reform of public administration – submitted a legislative programme to Parliament for the reorganisation of regional administration. The Parliamentary Opposition, however, did not support the legislative programme. (To amend the Hungarian Local Government Act, a two-thirds majority in Parliament is required, but the government coalition parties fall well short of this).

It is, therefore, quite evident that the question of the public administration units (meso-level) positioned between central government and the settlements will continue to be an open issue – and extremely important from the point of view of regional policy. It is, in fact, a general phenomenon in Eastern and Central Europe that these levels – as a reaction to the negative role which they mainly played under the previous system and their extremely strong political and redistributive functions – have very few local administration rights.

In recent decades, important differences can be seen between Western and Eastern Europe in the operation of the regional administration system and its changes of function. In the EU member states – after the Single European Act was ratified – the role of the sub-national level became more important – partly since it resulted in the extension of the new general organisational concept of the European Communities – that is, subsidiarity, (following the amendment of the original concept). On the other hand, the level below that of central government was also handed a key role from the (Common European) Regional Policy point of view. The new structural and supportive policy laid down – as a basic concept – cooperation with the local regional authority (these having weak structures and deteriorating economies) and coordination between regional and national economic development strategies.

The realisation of the market economy, the structural reorganisation of the economy, relatively quickly made it clear that regional tensions cannot be reduced, regional political aims (as set out in most of the countries) cannot be fulfilled and regional programmes cannot be elaborated without a radical reform of the functions of the regional meso-levels. Consequently, it was no accident that

the review of meso-level functions evoked in each country the issue of the institutionalisation of regionalisation, the creation of a low number of regional units – similar in size and armed with similar rights as the regional meso-levels in the West European regional and decentralised states. The unitary states of Europe, consequent upon the globalisation and internationalisation of the economy and the increased sophistication of European integration, can relatively soon move towards a new order of state structure. The factors supporting the further development and re-thinking of meso-level public administration in Eastern and Central Europe are:

a. the phenomena of disintegration experienced in the local government sphere indicate that the links between legal and specific interest issues are lacking, with the consequence that the notion of the model as working exclusively and voluntarily on a "bottom-up" basis seems to be both misleading and unrealistic;
b. due to the (basically, single-level) system of local government, regional development responsibilities are left uncontrolled, and attempts are made to plug this gap by the, now de-concentrated, state organs, with one part of the (de-concentrated) administration penetrating into the vacuum left at meso-level, but undertaking tasks foreign to the organisation and with its segmented structure resulting in a hiatus in the process of co-ordination and information, as well as in the reconciliation of interests;
c. the disintegration of local government and the dysfunction of de-concentrated public administration gave new life to central governmental trials, and in regional public administration units a model with state and local government in competition with each other began to appear;
d. the tendency towards nationalisation at meso-level is, of course, in direct opposition to the EU's integration process, but this contradiction can be resolved by the creation of a local government meso-level;
e. an important future responsibility for regional public administration can be to represent and defend the concept of interregional cooperation against the organs of central government, and it should be remembered that "the Europe of the Regions" – as one of the key concepts of European integration – can be conceived of only with the cooperation of regional units of relatively similar competencies and complexity.

3. The development statistical regions

A pre-requisite for Eastern and Central European countries to join the EU or to benefit from support from the Structural Funds was the creation of large regions (NUTS 2 units): on this basis the most effective development concepts, and the

programmes serving their realisation, could best be drawn up. The 206 NUTS 2 regions established in the 15 member states of the EU are very different from the point of view of their public law and administration situation – and their physical size and population numbers. Basically, we are looking at units nationally determined, in which, at the same time as the NUTS 2 system of each country should meet common requirements, they operate as statistical (calculating, analysing, planning, programming, coordinating) and development (support policy, decentralising) units. In the 10 associated East European countries the number of meso-level administration units at the end of 1999 was 357, and it was clear that the EU's support policy could not supervise such a high number of regional units. In consequence, it became essential to create larger regional development and statistical units.

Defining boundaries within the NUTS system is, from the EU's point of view, an internal affair – which means that, apart from size, there are no absolute EU requirements in terms of the creation of the regions: the decision lies within the scope of national governments. However, on the basis of experience with creating regions, the various concepts and likely impacts can be expressed in a way which makes the definition of the region relatively straightforward:

- a prehistory of regional cooperation and, hence, the chances of regional cohesion;
- relative size status from the point of view of the national regional structure;
- relative spatial homogeneity in terms of the basic aims of regional policy;
- an effective internal structure (centre, sub-centres, skills and the ability to cooperate etc.) of a region and the observance of public administration borders;
- the existing (or demanded) "geo-political" similarity of the units united in a region and the degree of identity of the definitive, long-term, international orientations;
- the costs of creating and operating the regions (decision-preparing, decision-making and professional administrative background institutions, organising the information, planning, managing and monitoring activities, the institutional system of decentralised financing etc), the economies of scale from a functional point of view;
- the existence of a multi-functional, major urban regional centre.

The NUTS 2 regions are listed in the Regional Development Acts or Government Decrees of each country. However, the Regional Development Act adopted in Hungary in 1996 was quite cautious, indicating merely that the counties could create regions in order to carry out common tasks. It did not, however, define the development regions of the country; and this imprecise regula-

tion had, as a consequence, the fact that counties joined together widely differing regions purely for fund-raising purposes – and there were counties which participated in three or four regional alliances. However, the Amendment to the Act in 1999 defined seven (7) development statistical regions and separated the counties into regions. In fact, a Government Decree listing, in an itemised form, the theoretical concepts defining development regions was created only in Bulgaria (*Geshev 2000*). The Bulgarian Government defined the aspects of the creation of the regions in 1999 as follows:

- the number of regions should be relatively low and they should be defined on the basis of their size and natural resource potential; their economic and social capacities should be able to undertake large-scale programmes;
- the regions should not be too large to be manageable, and the number of counties comprising a region should be optimal in order to be able to organise their cooperation;
- there should be a common development problem in the region which could be felt in any point of the region and which motivates the regional development actors to cooperate;
- natural geographical units and historical traditions should be taken into consideration;
- the region should have a relatively developed urban network and several growth-poles;
- the planning region should comprise complete public administration units.

In the other countries, and after long debate, a compromise decision was reached in terms of the creation of NUTS 2 regions, and these (more or less) matched the above basic concepts. As regards size, they parallel very closely the average of the older EU member states (*Table 8*). Individual countries, however, did not come to define their central regions in the same way. In Bulgaria, Poland, Hungary and Romania, for example, the capitals, together with their surrounding "Greater" regions, made up one NUTS 2 unit, whilst, in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the capitals alone constitute one single region. Since there is also visible in Eastern and Central Europe that general pattern of spatial economy in which the larger region surrounding a country's most developed growth pole can show weaker performance (a consequence of the "filtering-down" effect), this solution generated strong debate in Hungary. The overall performance of the Central Hungary Region (due to Budapest's high GDP per capita) is as much as 98% of the average of the EU 15 and cannot, therefore, be included in the target group for convergence. Support, therefore, will be more modest. (Budapest itself produces 125% of the EU average, whilst the region's

remaining unit, Pest County, produced just 53% in 2003.) Similar problems can be noted in the other three countries also.

Table 8.

The most significant data of NUTS 2 units in Eastern and Central Europe

Country	NUTS 2 Regions		
	Number	Average area ('000 km ^{2})	Average population ('000s)
Bulgaria	6	18.5	1,407
Czech Republic	8	9.9	1,290
Hungary	7	13.3	1,463
Poland	16	19.5	2,411
Romania	8	29.8	2,851
Slovakia	4	12.2	1,319
Total	49	14.7	1,910
Total EU15	206	15.3	1,830

Source: The author's own calculations on the basis of Regions. Statistical Yearbook 2004.

At the time when the development-statistical regions in Eastern and Central Europe were being laid out, those ethno-cultural factors used in the organisation of West-European regions were not applied. In Romania, the three counties comprising the historical Székely territory were incorporated into the Central Region, in which half of the Hungarian population living in Romania (730 thousand people) lives. The three counties together could themselves have made up a separate development region with their population of 1.1 million people, but in this case the proportion of Hungarians in the population of the region would have been 59.2 per cent. Romanian governmental pressures and political factors blocked the Székely territory from becoming an independent region, and a region with a population of 2.6 million was created – in which Hungarians make up less than one third. The debates surrounding the creation of an individual Székely Region have simply fuelled today's ethnic conflicts in Romania (*Horváth 2003*).

In Slovakia, the neglect of ethno-cultural factors was already detectable during the establishment of the new regional administrative system. The overwhelming majority of the Hungarian population live in the southern areas of the country bordering on Hungary. However, the borders of the new counties were drawn in such a way that large areas inhabited by Slovaks were attached to clus-

ters of Hungarians, with the result that in none of the counties of Slovakia could the Hungarian population be the majority.

The organisational system of the development-statistical regions was introduced in each country on the basis of a scheme recommended by the European Union. Under this, development councils and development agencies operate in the regions, and these organisations are managed by the central regional development body. Their responsibilities are essentially restricted to simple coordination, to accumulating projects and to assembling development plans. Their operative bodies, the development agencies or directorates, work with from 20 to 40 people, and their competency lies within a narrow framework. It can be seen as a general problem for member states that those favoured under the programmes were the central state administration bodies. In the central bodies of regional development, staff numbers were increased to several hundreds, whilst in the regions only a fraction of this number was possible. The weak position of the regions is also indicated by the fact that, in the programming period 2004-2006, only 17-30 per cent of EU support was devoted to regional operative programmes.

Since the regulations defining the composition of regions said nothing about regional centres (a task which, in any case, should not be handled within the framework of spatial development regulation) in most countries conflicts amongst cities and towns have broken out in individual regions for the privilege of becoming home to particular regional development institutions.

4. The dilemma of the regional centres

Those larger towns or cities can be called regional centres which, on the basis of their size and geographical location, fulfil the role of administrative, industrial and transport centre of a large area which is home to between one and three million inhabitants. These stand out from their surroundings and enjoy a higher proportion of the resources of their region than would be justified by their population.

Due to the influence of urban development processes, the regional centres of Western Europe built up their position over centuries, and their functional accumulation of wealth and growth of resources are closely connected with their region. In their development, the restructuring of the economy and the quality change in their transport and service sectors also played a major role. The settling and gradual expansion of the leading positions of central and local government administration, naturally, played their part also, in that more favourable conditions were created in these cities to enable them to accept the new economic growth-driving forces – although, in the development of their perform-

ance capacity, administrative factors can only be seen as secondary resources. Their dynamism was basically generated by the role of industry and services affecting both their regional and their wider markets. It is, therefore, no accident that, when the institutionalisation of regionalism – in particular countries in different development phases – led to changes in public administration, the choice of headquarters for a region seemed quite obvious in each West European country: the largest city, the richest in functional terms, the most outstanding in economic potential became the centre of public administration for the region.

In many countries the decentralising trends of national regional policies, and especially the growth-pole concepts, played an important role in the development of the regional centres. The essence of the use of the growth-pole strategy was that those innovations given regional development support were directed only to a limited number of locations (mainly as a part of the planned concept targeting the modification of the regional spatial structure), attempting to support economic activity to raise the level of welfare within the region. The creation of the growth-pole was, first of all, motivated by complex industrial development, by the dominant new (or modernised) economic sectors and developed services. Using the principles of the French spatial economics school in economic policy resulted in an essential strengthening of connections in the economic space among companies and sectors.

Similar strategies were also followed in West European countries. The programmes serving the structural strengthening of the major urban centres – albeit after some time – reached beyond the urban administration borders, and more and more attention was drawn towards the urban regions. The starting point for this concept was the activation of the growth-pole. In the background to this, two quite different theories can be detected. One of these is rooted in the recognition that development in the regional economy has a "cause and effect" connection – as a result of the extension of concentration and polarisation. To support this, there was an array of historical experiences. A later theory asserted that investments which found their way to a limited number of centres, and with a relative degree of concentration, in fact do generate effective development. The other theory essentially approached the planned growth-pole from a sectoral point of view, holding that the development of the region was linked to the large-company sector and starting with the premise that this sector is the one which initiates the development of the connecting industrial sectors within the pole and/or motivates the spill-over of growth within its sphere. However, in using the growth-pole concept, it is clear that the experience acquired during several decades will contain many contradictions.

Paralleling the clear results achieved in the development of those major urban centres which are treated as poles, the consequences in terms of the effect as experienced on regional transformation are less favourable. It is not in every

country that growth-poles have been developed as the driving forces of regional development, and especially in those countries where the spatial-political, politico-economic and the political strategies involved in public administration could not be framed within a unified system, the results of the use of this paradigm are spoken of with some scepticism. The elaboration and fulfilment of their (incomplete) policies were not embedded in a unified decentralised concept, but appeared as separate, disjointed steps or attempts to reform, and they were ineffective – especially since the under-performance of the synergies produced some undesired results.

5. Regional centre – the leading city

As a consequence of the multi-coloured administrative structure of European countries, we can speak of regional centres in a variety of ways. In countries with a federalised and regionalised system, the public administration centres work at the meso-level as real regional centres, whereas, in decentralised, unitary countries the centres of the NUTS 2 units have more limited (planning and organising) functions.

In the development of regional centres in each country many identical and numerous specific factors played a role. However, the general trend seems clear, in that, in the great majority of European regions, the largest town or city is the centre of the region. However, as a result of European urbanisation development processes, the density of the large cities in the countries across the continent differs, and the proportion of the population living in towns or cities with more than 100,000 inhabitants varies from country to country. From 8-34% of the population of the EU 15 member states live in cities with populations above 100,000. (In defining the population proportions we did not take the population of capital cities into account.)

In terms of the number of towns or cities, Germany heads the ranking list. Germany, in fact, has 83 towns exceeding this 100,000 figure; then comes the UK with 65, Spain (55), Italy (49) and France (35). Regarding the proportion of the national population which this represents, the order is: Spain, Germany, Italy, Sweden and the Netherlands (*Figure 12*).

The picture is more intricate if we look at the populations of the regional centres. A total of 150 out of the 343 towns or cities which comprised the "big city" network of the earlier EU 15 have region-related functions. The number of regional centres in the federalised and regionalised countries (Spain, Germany, Italy, Belgium, France and Austria) is 64, whilst in the countries which do not have public administration regions but which have managed to build up relatively well-established regional institutional systems (the UK and Portugal), the

number of regional centres is 18. In the other countries the criteria defining regional centres are less relevant. Despite this, we can see the establishing of deconcentrated state offices and region-related institutions (universities, conference centres, specific health institutions, technology parks etc). This also happened even in the unitary Scandinavian states – first of all in 17 major cities.

Figure 12.

Number of towns or cities with over 100,000 inhabitants in selected European countries (excluding the capital) and their proportion of the national population, 2004



Source: Author's own construction based on data from National Statistical Yearbooks

The differences in size detected in the "big city" network are also coupled with different structural specifications. In Spain, with its expansive big city network, there are 22 cities with a population exceeding 200,000, and there the spatial spread shows great disparities. There are regions with large populations (for example, Andalusia, Catalonia, Valencia and the Basque Region) in which 6 to 8 major cities can be found, one half or one third of them having a population of over 200,000. In the under-developed regions, however, there is only one big city heading the urban hierarchy. For example, the headquarters of the Aragon region, Zaragoza, with a population of 645,000, is followed by the county seat (Huesca), which has a mere 48,000 inhabitants. In such cases, des-

ignating the administrative centre of a region presented no problem. It is also the case that in Spain the general West European pattern applies, in that the regional centres are the biggest towns of the region. The Basque Region can be considered as an exception to the rule, since the capital of the region, the old Basque Free Royal City of Vitoria-Gasteiz (at 226,000 inhabitants) is smaller in population terms than the actual economic and financial centre of the region, Bilbao (with its 353,000 inhabitants). At the same time, however, the Basque Parliament and Government, and numerous other institutions of the region, established their centre in Bilbao.

In the other country of the Iberian peninsula, Portugal, we find a totally different situation: the city network of the country is extremely polarised. One pole is represented by the two major agglomeration belts (Lisbon and Porto) which comprise over half of the country's total population. At the foot of the town or city hierarchy there are 42 small towns with 10-20,000 inhabitants. The 13 medium-size towns, with 40-50,000 inhabitants, are concentrated along the coast, and altogether, only one town (Braga) has a population a little over 100,000, although, on the basis of the number of the population of the urban belts, the city of Coimbra in the centre of Portugal is considered by Portuguese statistics as a settlement of more than 100,000 inhabitants. One of the reasons for the slowness of the Portuguese regional organisation process is a lack of the functionally rich regional centres.

Austria is the archetypal example of the third type of large urban area structures. In Austria the centres of the regions – the Länder – (excluding the capital city) can be split into three groups. To one of these belong the big cities (Graz with 235,000 inhabitants, Linz with 185,000, Salzburg with 145,000 and Innsbruck with 115,000). In the second group two middle-sized towns (Klagenfurt with 91,000 inhabitants and St. Polten with 49,000) feature, whilst the third group has two members – the capital of the Vorarlberg (Bregenz, with 25,000 inhabitants) and the capital of the Burgenland (Eisenstadt, with 12,000). The Austrian medium-sized city-network is quite weak: the country altogether has only a few towns in the 40-60,000 population bracket. In the process of selecting the regional centres, these cities with their historically important spatial organisation functions did not need to compete with rivals.

Table 9 shows the range in terms of size of the regional centres of the EU member states with NUTS 2-level public administration units. The data clearly support our earlier statement to the effect that, in each country the largest cities are the regional centres.

For an explanation of Germany's specific situation, we have to go back to the Four-Power Control Policy which followed World War II. In the case of two German provinces (Länder) the allied powers did not wish to give provincial capital status and functions to those cities which had played a leading role in the

earlier Third Reich. For this reason, Wiesbaden (with 274,000 inhabitants in 2004) became the provincial capital of Hesse, rather than Frankfurt – which currently has a population of 643,000. Likewise, North Rhine-Westphalia does not have Cologne (with the highest population in 2004 of 966,000) as its centre, but the smaller Düsseldorf (572,000).

Table 9.
Situation in selected European countries regarding size of regional centre, 2004

Country	Regional centres		Total number of regional centres
	Largest town	Not the largest town	
Austria	9	–	9
Belgium	3	–	3
United Kingdom[1]	10	1	11
France	22	–	33
Germany	11	4	15
Italy	20	–	20
Spain	16	1	17

Note: Centres of Regional Government Offices.
Source: Author's own construction.

After re-unification, in two of the five new East German Länder it was not the largest city which became the provincial centre. There are very minor differences in size between the capital of Saxony (Sachsen) which is Dresden (484,000 inhabitants) and Leipzig, which is slightly larger at 497,000 – as with the capital of Saxony-Anhalt (Sachsen-Anhalt), which is Magdeburg (227,000) and Halle (240,000). In the UK, Scotland provides the only example of this anomaly, in that the historical capital of the country, Edinburgh, with 484,000 inhabitants has a lower population than Glasgow, which, as the economic and financial centre, has the largest population of 577,000.

The big city network in Eastern and Central Europe – except for Romania and Poland – is thin (*Figure 13*). In the whole area, 97 towns or cities are above 100,000 in population terms, and two-thirds of these are found in Poland and Romania.

Slovakia has, apart from the capital, a total of one major city (*Figure 14*). In these two countries the number of regions is much lower than the number of cities but the largest of the latter are evenly distributed over the whole area and can be become potential regional centres. For this reason, therefore, designating a regional centre could be much more convenient. In most of the Eastern and Central European countries the debates over the designation of regional centres

became more intensive as the EU accession process progressed. In Poland, after the introduction of the new "voivodship" public administration, the leading major cities became the centres of the new regions. The only exception is the Kujawsko-Pomorske voivodship where the regional centre is not Bydgoszcz, the industrial centre with 368,000 inhabitants, but Torun, with its historical traditions and a population of 208,000.

Figure 13.

Towns in Eastern and Central Europe with over 100,000 inhabitants, 2004



Source: Author's own construction.

Figure 14.

Number of towns or cities with over 100,000 inhabitants in Eastern and Central European countries (excluding the capital) and their proportion of national population, 2004



Source: Author's own construction based on data from National Statistical Yearbooks

In the other countries the competition among towns or cities goes on almost exclusively in respect of the setting-up of the labour organisations of the development agencies and of changing the number of the NUTS 2 regions. The latter is especially at the centre of debate in Romania. Several cities with traditionally strong regional organising functions in the country, such as Arad, Nagyvárad (Oradea), Nagyszeben (Sibiu), and Marosvásárhely (Targa-Mures) lost their potential regional centre role. These demand a change of the national regional system. The dissatisfaction in the counties belonging to the planning-statistical regions is shown by the fact that the headquarters of the regional development councils in several cases in Romania were set up in smaller county centres. There were also examples of neglect of the role of the leading cities in Bulgaria. As a result of the public administration reform undertaken in the '70s, in which, instead of small spatial units, six large "oblasts" were created, the leading major city was replaced, and a smaller-sized town in the geographical centre of the region became the regional centre.

6. Is Eastern and Central Europe unitary or decentralised?

Should it be thought desirable to give an important future role to the meso-level units in regional policy in Eastern and Central Europe, this would clearly bring the current meso-level system into sharp focus. Both the size and economic potential of the counties in their current form are too small for them to become the basic units of decentralised regional policy, and it is to be expected that, in the future, regionalism will become stronger in more and more countries, and that this will lend weight to the re-defining of the distribution of labour between centre and provinces. There will be a serious opportunity to establish inter-regional cooperation operating on the basis of economic conformity and to increase cohesion in Eastern and Central Europe – but, even then, only if the tasks now accumulating (a genuine regional decentralisation of power and the creation of a regional development strategy conforming to the market economy) could be carried out, would it be possible that regionalism in its West European meaning could take root in this area. Today the driving forces of growth are concentrated in the core areas of individual countries, something which indicates, over the long term, the maintenance of the differences between the national regional units – or even their increase (*Table 10*).

Table 10.
The weight of capital cities in Eastern and Central Europe, 2004, as percentage of national total

Areas	Sofia [2002]	Prague	Budapest	Warsaw	Bratislava	Bucharest [2002]
GDP	24.6	24.5	35.0	n.a.	24.2	16.5
Industrial output	15.9	13.0	17.6	11.8	37.3	17.0
Foreign capital investment	49.9	25.7	56.5	33.0	71.2	46.7
University student numbers	43.3	31.4	49.2	16.7	83.0	32.4
R&D employees	72.7	48.0	55.8	30.0	40.2	39.0

Source: Author's own construction based on National Statistical Yearbooks

The changes occurring during the last decade indicate that the political scope of activity within regional policy at the beginning of the new century – over and above the self-determination of economic development – are defined by two

major factors: the first of these is the EU's organisational, operational and financial reform together with Eastern enlargement, whilst the second (to no small extent influenced by the first) is the establishment of a new distribution of labour within government in the nation states – in other words, decentralisation.

Decentralisation – as proved most clearly by the processes of previous decades – is now regarded in Europe as a perfectly normal phenomenon. In 1950 a quarter of the population of the continent lived in federalised or regionalised states, a figure which, by the mid-90s had risen to 60%. By the end of the first decade of the following century – without taking into account the successor states of the former Soviet Union – more than three-quarters of the population of Europe will live in countries where influencing the factors of economic growth, it will not be the state but rather, the sub-national level which will play the defining role. This quantitative change – according to our current knowledge – will be the result of the creation of new regional administration in two countries with a high population – the United Kingdom and Poland.

The basic interest of the nation-state in the future will be to try to use its power to determine economic policy within its borders to counterbalance the effects of external pressure from globalisation and integration – by increasing the ability of the regions to defend their interests in a regulated fashion. It is already the case that the traditional regional development practice of Keynesian economic policy cannot be used successfully in the new paradigm, and the state's regional policy will be substituted by the region's own policy. This paradigm exchange, however, cannot occur automatically, the interests of the regions being developed to different levels. In the institutionalisation of regionalism important differences are to be seen. The poorest regions can hope for improvement through outside (national and international) help, as in the past, their motivations depending more on traditional support systems than on what might be gained through the autonomy (in its wider sense) of a "Europe of the Regions". The devoted fans of regional decentralisation come from the group of developed regions which will clearly be the beneficiaries of the Single Market and of the Economic and Monetary Union. It is not by chance that, today, Europe's most efficient regional cooperation network (not even connected territorially) comprises: Baden-Württemberg, Lombardy, Rhône-Alpes, and Catalonia, who created a co-operation under the name "Europe's Four Engines" (*Amin-Tomaney 1995; Spath 1991).*

The general spread of regionalism, however, still faces large barriers, and national governments will continue in the future to play an important role in the connections between the regions and the EU Commission. The poorest regions of Europe can realise their interests least of all in the integration decisions, as the poor countries anyway have fewer representatives in the EU bodies. The competition policy of the EU also reinforces the effects of centralisation, and

community regional policy is less capable of counterbalancing the differences emanating from varying competitive abilities. Federal Germany is the best example of this; the regional regionalism and the decrease of spatial differences can also be matched at central government level.

In parallel with the irreversible deepening of European integration, the key positions of the national government are still retained, at least in three areas. One of the most important tasks of the state is to regulate capitalism in public companies, and industrial development, even in the future, cannot be imagined without effective national financial systems, as the safest starting point for corporate strategies will be the domestic market and the regulation environment also. The other important central government task remains the coordination of national innovation and technical development programmes. Finally, as the third national level priority can be considered to be the labour market and industry-political tasks, success in fulfilling these two latter national functions, however, depends on how effective a part can sub-national public administration play in fulfilling numerous partial tasks. Consequently, regionalisation is at the same time a prerequisite for the successful operation of the nation-state, since macro-political aims cannot be fulfilled without thoughtful human resources, educational training and enterprise development; nor can well-balanced market competition be imagined without the cooperation of the social partners. The solution of these, however, is the most optimal at the level of the regions (*Keating-Loughlin 1997*).

In Eastern and Central Europe today the future of the division of power between state and region still seems uncertain. The prospects for decentralisation depend on the success of economic efficiency and the results of the "top-to-bottom" managed change of regime, but the pre-conditions at regional level for setting up power are unfavourable. In the former planned economies, the organisational framework deriving from strong centralisation has remained, even if the substance of central power has changed a great deal. Even in the most favourable cases, the process of decentralisation can be expected to be a long one. At the late 1990s Poland – and perhaps Hungary – seemed to be able to build up the political and institutional framework for the practice of decentralised power by the time of EU Accession.

Three possible ways of decentralisation can be envisaged in Eastern and Central Europe, and each of these differs from the others in terms of the extent and quality of the division of power. The choice of way, naturally not an arbitrary one, the historical traditions of an individual country, the nature of the economic transformation, the establishment of institutions of the market economy, political power relations and the degree of sophistication of the spatial structure all influence the decline of power concentration. The pressure to decentralise which falls on the central state administration is obviously stronger in

those countries where the dynamic, regional major urban centres (for example, in Poland) wish to initiate their autonomous development, their structuring into the European regional division of labour, with the help of the (possibly, most liberalised) utilisation of their internal resources and post-industrial development factors. On the other hand, the legitimisation of bottom-up initiatives meets greater resistance in those countries (for example, in Hungary) where the central regions have a dominant, even a strengthening, position in the factors of production increasing competitiveness. Although the example of these two countries is a good one in demonstrating that the existence of regional centres capable of being made effective is no more than a potential advantage, the "suction effect" towards decentralisation originating from the political legitimacy of Hungarian regional local authorities and the legal regulation of regional development can somehow counterbalance the lack of strong regional centres of appropriate European size.

In the first possible decentralisation model, the division of labour between central and regional bodies is organised under clear, precise rules, and the development tasks for which the two types of body are responsible differ simply in respect of which regional unit these tasks affect. To solve these problems, regional authorities even have their own income resources and have wide-ranging rights in respect of planning, and the developments of local authorities which are part of their own circle can be subsidised from these (regional) funds. Depending on the economic development level of the region, "own" and "shared" income can be supplemented by transfers from central government funds. This strategy provides the most comprehensive form of decentralisation, and, in the long-term, this is the most effective solution. However, to create this, numerous – political, constitutional, public administrational and economic – preconditions are necessary, and, even today, the progress of regional self-government in Eastern and Central Europe does not seem a realistic prospect. Further differentiation in the region will also derive from the fact that Poland and, hopefully, Hungary will take steps along the road to regionalism.

The gist of the second decentralisation strategy model is that only certain functions (planning, development, executive, authorisation and financing) are transferred from the centre to the regions, with the remaining regional, political tasks continuing within the competency of the central government. The expansion of the redistribution of power depends on the tasks which are to be decentralised, the institutional system which is to take them over and the tools which will be at the disposal of the regions. This version is the best in the short-term for those countries with a unitary system, since the preparations for transferring power need less effort, as there is no need for a complete transformation of the public administration system, since the actual influence of the central bodies does not change (which is the most important consideration), and, as the man-

agement of regional development through de-concentrated state organisation will be more complex, perhaps their efficiency will increase.

In the third option, the new division of responsibility between central and regional organs is based upon their handling of specific, occasional tasks. They create a common managing body for developing the peripheral, lagging regions, and the state provides part of its financial resources to this decision-making forum, whilst the execution of the development programmes is delegated to the spatial units. This version represents the weakest version of decentralisation, but, since there is no need to change the established power structure, it is not surprising that most Eastern and Central European countries have started to elaborate their spatial development programmes on this basis. Central governments consider this solution as the easiest way to solve the problem: they do not need to put their hands into a hornet's nest and the vertical and horizontal power relations remain untouched.

7. Conclusions

The region is considered to be a spatial unit serving the sustainable growth of the economy and the modernisation of the spatial structure, with independent financial resources, fulfilling autonomous development policy and equipped with local government rights. On the basis of this term – whose factors naturally developed differently in the different periods of European development – regions have not so far existed in Eastern and Central Europe, despite the fact that some geographers (on the basis of the indisputable results obtained by geographic science in regional research) assert that we do possess some well-defined, natural regions. Such "form without content" – as in previous decades – cannot, in itself, steer the spatial structure of the country in a favourable direction, decentralise the new space-forming forces and create the pre-requisites for multi-polar development. The region, if defined as a framework for regional research, is not capable of organising the space-forming powers of the 21st. century without the competencies, institutions and tools.

Regions in the new member states are necessary, as European regional development clearly proves that a sub-national level with approximately 1-2 million inhabitants regulated on the basis of self-government concepts (as a result of the region's economic capacity and structural abilities) is considered to be

- the optimal spatial framework for the realisation of regional development policy, oriented towards economic development;
- the appropriate field for the operation of post-industrial spatial organisation forces, and the development of their interrelationships;

- the important area in which to enforce regional and social interests;
- the most appropriate size of spatial unit to build a modern infrastructure and the professional organising-planning-executing institution of regional policy;
- the main factor in the decision-making system of the European Union's Regional and Cohesion Policy.

The decentralised state organisation system can be created by organic development following complex legal regulation, but it would be desirable to have those concepts which generate the necessary pre-conditions laid down in the constitution (or, in case of a lack of consensus, in the Law on Decentralisation) – namely

- the state, in its development activity and economic policy, builds on the inter-relationships and conformities between the regional abilities and the spatial elements, and, by utilising these, it provides the necessary conditions to exercise the basic social functions;
- the state, in realising the concept of social impartiality and justice, contributes with its own tools to a decrease in the objective, and, at the same time, large and constant, regional differences in creating equal opportunities for access to public services;
- active regional policy on the part of the state promotes the regional decentralisation of economic activities and functions;
- the state shares its regional political tasks and tools with local authorities on the basis of precise rules, delegating regional coordination rights and development resources to the regional authorities.

Naturally, creating political, public administration regions is a time-consuming task, but, in relation to the future, it was at this historically important time of the country's modernisation prior to EU accession that agreement should have been reached. At the same time, it has to be said that bitter political disputes do no favours to large-scale regional political reform, but, that apart, it is difficult to find arguments against the decentralising trends of modernisation and rationalisation. Disputes notwithstanding, the target should be to submit to Parliament the basic documents necessary for changing to a regional public service and administration organisation system – "the sooner the better".

In the current period of transition the strengthening of the spatial development regions cannot be postponed. In the years immediately following accession, our ability, as shown in our utilisation of Structural Funds, will be a decisive reference for the regional political decisions made in the period after 2007. Over the following eighteen months the regions must be totally prepared to organise their regional operative programmes directly. For this reason, their legitimacy needs to be strengthened in terms of partnership, their professional

level in terms of efficiency and transparency and their resources in terms of additionality, complexity and concentration.

The pressure for regionalisation in Eastern and Central Europe today has been created not in relation to public administration or even for reason associated with EU membership. The increasing size of the economies, the modernisation of the countries, the decline in regional differences and the future of the positions to be gained in the Europe-wide regional division of labour constitute the stake. Regionalism can be the new motivating force for modernisation at the beginning of the 21st century.

The current institutional system of regional development cannot even meet the original targets. Some regional agencies have the task of gathering projects together, and, consequently, they promote the carrying out of the will of central government and not the realisation of regional concepts. In the performance of regional agencies, some basic differences can be seen. There are, for sure, some innovative examples willing to use the methods of modern regional economic development agencies, but there are also a number of traditional agencies operating in an executive role.

On the basis of empirical research, the greatest protest against the decentralised model has been provoked within the circle of the ministries. Balanced against this can be the fact that the majority of stakeholders involved in regional formation theoretically support reform, but are not convinced of the appropriateness of current regional borders and of regional centres, their regional relationships being in a narrower circle. It seems, however, in the opinion of the actors, that it is impossible to create regional borders more acceptable than the current ones, and it is most important not to distract attention from significant questions, such as the decentralisation of the state and the strengthening of regional autonomy, with a debate about regional borders and the tug-of-war over regional centres. At the moment these last two questions are the ones which most excite the various county elite circles.

Never discussed or debated are the core questions such as: What functions should a region have? What responsibilities should central government pass to the regions? (Since the ministries also now realise, that perhaps they are facing a change.) Why does the central administration deal with the evaluation of an application for a couple of million Forints? Whilst hundreds and thousands of applications are evaluated and ruled on, the same level of intensity is nowhere to be seen in any debate on strategic questions. Why is not the most important task for the central state administration to work out the sectoral operative programmes so-important for EU Accession? Why are there no intricately elaborated long-term development ideas?

Not only operative, but also important planning-strategy tasks can be delegated to the regions. This is rather more the case, as what central offices suggest

will not be a realistic solution in the new programming period – namely, that: the methods tested in one corner of the country can be used in another. Each region should be allowed to find its own way. Those EU member states are successful where the country is developing along different regional orbits.

To reduce under-development and to develop the regions are the most important strategic aims of the Community, and almost 40% of its budget is used for these purposes. For catching-up, the member states, or, rather their regions (depending on their level of development), are given considerable support from the common budget. At the same time, we also have to see that, besides the large support in the ranking list of the regions in the individual member states, changes could only happen if, in the utilisation of EU support, a long-term (several decades-long) structural policy were used. The regions in their development policy concentrated not on the development of traditional infrastructural elements, but on the modern regional development driving forces (innovation, business-services, modern industry-organisation methods and HR development). Those regions which expected success exclusively from the EU's support policy and tried to fulfil the actual development policy aims at that specific moment were unable to improve their relative position.

The basic concepts valid for all member states and related to fulfilling structural policy – subsidiarity, decentralisation, additionality, concentration, programming, partnership, transparency – also demanded the modernisation of the national-regional political institutional system, and these points of view must also be taken into account when the reform of public administration is being planned. The consistent application of these concepts in the EU member states has increased the efficiency of regional development and strengthened cohesion, and in the latest period a more frequently voiced new support policy aim, the development of competitiveness, is targeting the sustainable development of the regions. What is, perhaps, most important, is that the main aim of the EU's membership is not to obtain structural support, but to exploit the privileges of the 450- million market. Deriving from this is that the method for further development of regional policy should be found not merely (and exclusively) in the expansion of redistribution, but in the opportunities for mobilising resources.

In most EU member states today, it is obvious that the division of power and the institutions of multi-level government increase both the economic performance capacity and welfare in the individual regions. The lobbyist politician will be replaced by the developer-type politician who regulates, with directives and laws, the long-term guarantees of local autonomous development, who promotes European cooperation and builds partnership connections among the region's actors. The success of this approach is proved by the successful development of numerous West European regions and by its outstanding role as the creator of regional identity.

References

Amin, A. – Tomaney, J. 1995: The regional dilemma in a neo-libaral Europe. – *European Urban and Regional Studies*. 2. pp. 171–188.

Bachtler, J. – Downes, R. – Gorzelak, G. (Eds.) 2000: *Transition, Cohesion and Regional Policy in Central and Eastern Europe*. Aldershot, Ashgate.

Benedek, J. 2004: *Amenajarea teritorului şi dezvoltarea regională*. Cluj-Napoca, Editura Presa Universitară Clujaeană.

Blažek, J. – Boeckhout, S. 2000: Regional policy in the Czech Republic and EU accession. – Bachtler, J. – Downes, R. – Gorzelak, G. (Eds.): pp. 301–318.

Boev, J. 2002: Bulgaria: decentralization and modernization of public administration. In: Péteri, G. (Ed.): *Mastering Decentralization and Public Administration Reforms in Central and Eastern Europe*. Budapest, Open Society Institute, Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative. Pp. 93–120.

Buček, M. 1999: Regional disparities in transition in the Slovak Republic. – *European Urban and Regional Studies*. 4. pp. 360–364.

Cheshire, P. 1999: Cities in competition: Articulating the gains from integration. – *Urban Studies*. 5–6. pp. 843–864.

Cities in the new EU countries. Position, problems, policies. Amsterdam, Ministry of the Interrior and Kingdom Affairs. 2004.

Domanski, B. 2003: Industrial change and foreign direct investment in then postsocialist countries. – *European Urban and Regional Studies*. 2. pp. 99–118.

Dostál, P. 2000: Reintegrating Central European region: challenges of trans-border spatial development. – *Acta Universitatis Carolinae. Geographica*. 1. 21–38.o.

Enyedi Gy. 1978: *Kelet-Közép-Európa gazdasági földrajza*. Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó.

Enyedi Gy. 1989: Településpolitikák Kelet-Közép-Európában. – *Társadalmi Szemle*. 10. pp. 20–31.

Enyedi Gy. 1992: Urbanizáció Kelet-Közép-Európában. – *Magyar Tudomány*. 6. pp. 393–401.

Enyedi Gy. 2003: *Városi világ - városfejlődés a globalizáció korában*. Pécs, Pécsi Tudományegyetem Regionális Politika és Gazdaságtan Doktori Iskola.

Faludi, A. – Waterhout, B. 2002: *The Making of the European Sőatial Development Perspective. No Masterplan!* London, Routledge.

Geografija na Balgarija. Fizicheska geografija, socialno-ikonomicheska geografija. Sofia, Izdatelstvo ForKom. 2003.

Geshev, G. 1997: Initiatives for the launching of a co-operative spatial planning process. Bonn, Bundesforschungsanstalt für Landeskunde und Raumordnung.

Geshev, G. (Ed.) 1997: *The Geographical Space – an Investment for the 21th Century*. Sofia, Institute of Geography, BAS.

Geshev, G. 1999: *Problemi na regionalnoto razvitie i regionalnata politika v Republika Balgarija*. Sofia, Geografski institut BAN, Jugozapaden universitet Neofit Rilski.

Geshev, G. 2001: The role of regions of South-Eastern space in the enlarging European Union. In: Gál, Z. (Ed.): *Role of the Regions in the Enlarging European Union.* Pécs, Centre for Regional Studies, HAS. Discussion Papers, Special Issue. pp. 81–100.

Gorzelak, G. 1998: *Regional and Local Potential for Transformation in Poland.* Warsaw, University of Warsaw.

Green Paper. Regional Development Policy in Romania. Bucharest, Romanian Government and the European Commission. 1997.

Gyurova, E. 2002: Emerging multi-ethnic policies in Bulgaria: a central – local perspective. In: Bíró, A-M. – Kovács P. (Eds.): *Diversity in Action. Local Public Management of Multi-ethnic Communities in Central and Eastern Europe.* Budapest, Open Society Institute, Local Government and Public Service Reform Initiative. pp. 97–133.

Halász I. 2001: A regionális önkormányzatok és az átfogó közigazgatási reformok a „Visegrádi csoport" országaiban. In: Szigeti E. (Ed.): *Régió, közigazgatás, önkormányzat.* Budapest, Nagyra Közigazgatási Intézet. pp. 43–64.

Horváth, Gy. 1996: Transition and regionalism in East-Central Europe. Tübingen, Europäischen Zentrum für Föderalismus-Forschung. *Occasional Papers*, 7.

Horváth Gy. 1998: Az átmenet regionális hatásai Kelet-Közép-Európában. – *Területi Statisztika.* 4. pp. 295–318.

Horváth Gy. 2000: Decentralizáció és a régiók – kelet-közép-európai nézőpontból. In: Horváth Gy. – Rechnitzer J. (Eds.): *Magyarország területi szerkezete és folyamatai az ezredfordulón.* Pécs, MTA Regionális Kutatások Központja. 60–72. o.

Horváth, Gy. (Ed.) 2002: *Regional Challenges of the Transition in Bulgaria and Hungary.* Pécs, Centre for Regional Studies, HAS.

Horváth Gy. (Ed.) 2003: *Székelyföld.* Budapest–Pécs, Dialóg Campus Kiadó, MTA Regionális Kutatások Központja.

Horváth Gy. (Ed.) 2004: Dél-Szlovákia. Budapest–Pécs, Dialóg Campus Kiadó, MTA Regionális Kutatások Központja.

Ianoş, I. 2000a: Less-favoured areas and regional development in Romania. In: Horváth, Gy. (Ed.): *Regions and Cities in the Global World.* Pécs, Centre for Regional Studies, HAS. pp. 176–191.

Ianoş, I. 2000b: Romania. In: Bachtler, J. – Downes, R. – Gorzelak, G. (Eds.): *Transition, Cohesion and Regional Policy in Central and Eastern Europe.* Aldershot, Ashgate. pp. 167–176.

Ianoş, I. – Pumain, D. – Racine, J. B. (Eds.) 2000: Integrated Urban Systems and Sustainability of Urban Life. Bucureşti, Editura Technică.

Ilieva, M. 2002: Transformations in the territorial structure of Bulgarian economy in the 1990s. In: Horváth, Gy. (Ed.): pp. 49–61.

Illés I. 2002: *Közép- és Délkelet-Európa az ezredfordulón. Átalakulás, integráció, régiók.* Budapest–Pécs, Dialóg Campus Kiadó.

Illner, M. 2000: Issues of decentralization. Reforms in former communist countries. – *Infomationen zur Raumforschung.* 7–8. pp. 391–401.

Keating, M. – Loughlin, J. (Eds.) 1997: *The Political Economy of Regionalism.* London, Frank Cass.

Kolev, B. 2002: Legal framework of regional development in Bulgaria. In Horváth, Gy. (Ed.): pp. 78–85.

Le Galès, P. 2002: *European Cities. Social Conflicts and Governance.* Oxford, University Press.

Mezei I. – Hardi T. 2003: A szlovák közigazgatás és a területfejlesztés aszimmetriái. – *Tér és Társadalom.* 4. pp. 127–155.

Michalski, A. – Saraceno, A. 2000: *Regions in Enlarged European Union.* Brussels, EC, Forward Studies Unit.

Mladenov, Ch. 2002: Population distribution in Bulgaria. In: Horváth, Gy. (Ed.): pp. 201–26.

Nemes Nagy J. 1987: *A regionális gazdasági fejlődés összehasonlító vizsgálata.* Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó.

A new partnership for cohesion. Convergence, competitiveness, cooperation. Third report on economic and social cohesion. Brussels, European Commission. February 2004.

Pascariu, S. 2000: Programrégiók és a határ menti területek fejlesztése Romániában. In: Horváth Gy. (Ed.): *A régiók szerepe a bővülő Európai Unióban.* Pécs, MTA Regionális Kutatások Központja. pp. 60–71.

Potentials for polycentric development in Europe. Annex Report A. Critical dictionary of polycentricity European urban networking. Stockholm, Norfic Centre for Spatial Development. August 2004.

Potentials for polycentric development in Europe. Annex Report B. Stockholm, Norfic Centre for Spatial Development. August 2004.

Sandu, D. 1999: *Spaţiul social al tranziţei.* Bucureşti, Poliprom.

Schindegger, F. – Tatzberger, G. 2002: *Polizentrismus – ein europisches Leitbild für die räumliche Entwicklung.* Wien, ÖROK.

Sekeresová, E. 2004: Institutions of regional policy at the regional level in the Slovak Republic. In: Enyedi, Gy. – Tózsa, I. (Eds.): *Region. Regional Development Policy, Administration and E-government.* Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó. pp. 342–370.

Späth, L. 1991: *1992 – Európa álma.* Budapest, Közgazdasági és Jogi Könyvkiadó.

Spiridonova, J. – Grigorov, N. 2000: Bulgaria. In: Bachtler, J. – Downes, R. – Gorzelak, G. (Eds.): *Transition, Cohesion and Regional Policy in Central and Eastern Europe.* Aldershot, Ashgate. pp. 71–83.

Stasiak, A. 1999: The new administrative division of Poland. – Duró, A. (Ed.): *Spatial Research in Support of the European Integration.* Pécs, Centre for Regional Studies HAS. pp. 31–42.

Szreniawski, P. 2004: Regions in Poland. In: Enyedi, Gy. – Tózsa, I. (Eds.): *Region. Regional Development Policy, Administration and E-government.* Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó. pp. 277–292.

Tariska, M. 2004: Regional administration in the Slovak Republic. In: Enyedi, Gy. – Tózsa, I. (Eds.): *Region. Regional Development Policy, Administration and E-government.* Budapest, Akadémiai Kiadó. pp. 310–341.

van der Berg, L. – Braun, E. – van der Meer, J. (Eds.) 1998: *National Urban Policies in the European Union. Responses to Urban Issues in the Fifiteen Member States.* Aldershot, Ashgate.

FRAGILE STRUCTURES OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN SOUTHEAST-EUROPE

Ilona Pálné Kovács

1. Introduction

General development trends of the public administration

Public administration underwent significant transformations during the last decades. The changes have two principal trends: the first type is structural, organisational transformation and the other is functional change. The modernisation of national public administrations and local governments has been carried out mostly in the form of structural reforms in Europe during the last decades (*Wright 1997*). However alongside structural, organisational changes the functioning and behaviour often remain unchanged (*Lazareviciute 2000*), structural reforms may remain inefficient. This means that "radical" reforms implemented on the surface reshaped sometimes only the structure but not the content, values and attitude.

The dominating structural trends in public administration are spatial integration or the evolution of larger territorial scales (regions) connected to the emergence of strategic governmental planning. Besides the integration and rescaling of public administration units, transparency and the democratic participation are not present because of the emergence of new types of institutions and new networks, which is also connected with the multi-level governance system of the EU. The reshaping of public administrative spaces has therefore not only changed the borders, but also the traditional institutional systems. Moreover, even if the transformation shows relatively similar trends, the national specialties remain significant. No general schemes exist for territorial integration, so it is not by chance that the Southeast European countries are taking also their own way.

The impact of regional policy on territorial administration

The model of regional policy emerged in the 1980s and '90s challenged public administrations in EU member states. During the last programming period be-

tween 2000-2006 in the development of the EU regional policy, 'sound management' became one of the key priorities following the recognition that organisational and management framework are as yet unexploited sources of efficiency and of further development besides the proper identification and correction of objectives and tools. The challenges for the management of development policy are as follows:

- first, development programmes were designed to cover more and larger areas. After dealing with ad hoc projects handling the problems of crisis areas the system became more holistic or comprehensive covering larger territories. This phenomenon launched a series of reforms establishing new administrative levels or amalgamating former ones, encouraging regionalisation (*Keating 1998*);
- second, development programmes became more complex, which necessitated the improvement of performance capacity and the introduction of new functional solutions in management: (a) the preparation of long-term programmes instead of development projects (planning), (b) the implementation of programmes by co-ordination among different branches and sectors;
- the increasing public involvement in economic development and the new, market-oriented system of economic support required: (a) more flexible behaviour of the public administrative staff making them interested in performance, (b) outsourcing activities, (c) new institution building – market-oriented administration;
- the necessary involvement of external resources and the more and more comprehensive measures naturally strengthened horizontal relationships as opposed to vertical ones – partnership involving economic and civic actors into formal and informal networks.

The deepest impact was obviously experienced in countries that benefit most from EU grants and subsidies, and where the structure, logic and culture of national public administration were the least compatible with the European requirements. For these countries, it was not enough to make minor corrections, establish special institutions or adopt special regulations; they needed comprehensive reforms of both the structure and methods of operation. However, it has to be emphasised that the adaptation pressure to the Structural Funds did not result in public administrative reform in every country. There are adaptation forms which do not require dramatic changes in national public administrative structures. The member states had a choice to protect their national administration or change it if other elements made it also necessary. It is crucial that the requirements of the Structural Funds in themselves did not comprise the need of public administrative reform, but they made it important to develop the proper

mechanism of adjustment than continuously rely on 'temporarily institutionalised' solutions. In this respect, institutionalised networks are more important than drawing the new administrative borderlines. It is the processes of adaptation, changing and learning that should be institutionalised (*Haynes et al. 1997*). What is needed is not the development of the 'federalist' structures but the application of 'federalist principles' like flexibility and partnership. Public institutions are supposed to be integrating organs, initiators of strategic programmes and managers of co-operation among the actors concerned (*Cappellin 1997*).

The question is how the different groups of South-Eastern European countries will react to these challenges.

2. The adaptation difficulties of public administration in new democracies of Europe

The systemic changes have significantly reorganised the order of territorial power division. At the beginning of the 1990's new constitutions, new acts on local governments and public administration were passed alongside of which completely contrary processes proceeded compared to the transformation of Western European territorial public administration, especially as regards the medium tier and fragmentation in general. During the first half of the decade, the malfunctions of the fragmented municipal self-governments were already visible. The low development capacity of the fragmented units was evident by that time and the encouragement to association proved to be insufficient too (*Surazska 1997*). The first efforts to reinforce the lower medium tiers also failed.

The idea of regionalisation was almost everywhere in Central-East- Europe object to disputes by the second half of the 1990's. However, the regionalisation attempts could not count on larger social support, but rather on the modernisation and centralisation efforts of the central state. In this respect, there is a basic difference between the Western-European and the Eastern European regionalism. While in Western Europe the strengthening of the regions is "a natural process in the development of multicultural democracies" (*Sharpe 1993, p.8.*), in the post-communist countries it is rather a top-down process and its motivations are rather centralising.

As it is well known, the expectations of the European Union for the public administration of the countries in the last round of accession were much more definite than at any other previous enlargement. The expectations for accession countries in the field of public administration can be seen in the Copenhagen criteria on the one hand, and in the country reports issued by the European Commission since 1997, on the other. However, these expectations are hardly

more than a loose framework and are not even consistent. The accession states practically had to adapt to a "moving target". In the shaping of the territorial administration model of the transitional countries the necessity for a democratic but decentralised state and the political aspect of reinforcement of the local roots were simultaneously present, reflecting the thesis of Sharpe on the "democratic maturation" (*Sharpe 1993*).

Besides the challenges of the choice of model, it is also a fact that the systemic change of East-European countries proceeded under the functional influence of the New Public Management. These countries faced the challenge that they should have implemented both legitimacy (democracy) and managerialism and they needed too much and too little bureaucracy at the same time. The recommendations formulated by research programmes carried out in the framework of the common programmes of OECD and the European Union labelled as SIGMA (1998) confirmed that the public administrative systems of certain member states are extremely different. The evaluations regarding the implementations of recommendations were careful. These evaluations pointed out that several Central and East European countries have launched significant reforms but these reforms came at many places to a standstill. The medium tier was considered as especially problematic (*COR 2000*).

Therefore, the public administrations of the Eastern European countries must find the right balance between the adaptation to the requirement by the European Union and the maintenance of national properties and needs. They need therefore a model that does not follow the Western territorial scales and institutional schemes but is able to create a modern but still democratic public administrative system.

3. National examples on the conversion of public administrative structures

3.1. Some common features

Before examining the public administrative characteristics of certain states, it is important to mention some common features of the forms of fragmentation (*Surazska et al. 1997*) especially those hindering the adaptation to the regional policy of the European Union.

- The "municipal democracy", i.e. the extremely fragmented settlement system resulting from the fragmentation of local services, administrative apparatuses and staff. The elimination of this fragmentation is in a politi-

cal sense not an easy task and the protectors of local autonomy could often successfully confront with the target of rationalisation.

- The other form of fragmentation is the medium tier, where sectoral fragmentation is represented by the deconcentrated organs inferior, subordinated to the central organs on one hand, and often missing strong territorial governance, on the other hand, which would be able to integrate the local-territorial interests against the central power.
- Thirdly, fragmentation is present, in addition to institutional structures, in the insufficient coordinating and cooperation mechanisms. There is no co-ordination within the central governance, the impact of planning is weak and the distribution of resources is not transparent.
- New institutions appeared in the territorial tier, which seek to perform special, new functions in a special manner, avoiding the adaptation constraint of traditional institutions.

Several aspects of the above properties are characteristic not only for the new accession countries but also for the new democracies evolving in the Balkan. Where the system of local governance was established, the competencies of local tier were reinforced and expanded (mainly without ensuring the financial conditions), while in the meso-tier either no self-governments were set up or their role is declining for the benefit of the expanding, strengthening deconcentrated state administration (*Kandeva 2001*). In the next part we will see the efforts and ways how several countries try to correct these phenomena adapting to the challenges of regional policy.

3.2. National examples

In 1990 in *Hungary*, the main target was the strengthening of the municipal tier with dissolving and disintegrating the former Soviet type system. Municipalities became the focal point of the public administration. It is a fact, on the other hand, that in the spirit of democracy and decentralisation, the number of local decision-making units was doubled: more than 3,000 local governments/municipalities replaced the former 1,600 local (Soviet) councils. A very important change was the nearly full elimination of the elected county government, which was the most powerful territorial unit of the Hungarian state in history (the new counties suffer from lack of competencies and means, unstable political legitimacy and the loss of social trust). Instead of county governments, ministries expanded and "captured" the most possible from the public tasks and resources. Several different types of deconcentrated organs subordinated to the ministries were established (administration of labour, construction, education, environment protection, consumer protection, and agriculture).

The Act on Regional Development was passed in 1996, bringing fundamen-

tal changes into territorial power use (*Pálné 2001*). The institutional system of regional development in Hungary does not rely on the territorial public administration or local governmental system. On this administrative basis, it was simply impossible to integrate regional policy into this fragmented administrative structure lacking a strong territorial/meso level of public power.

The ambivalence against county self-governments led to the introduction of a specific, "inter-sectoral" construction, the system of development councils consisting by mostly the public partners. The Act on Regional Policy established special development organisations in three spatial units, strengthening or preserving fragmentation on territorial level:

- the smallest spatial unit, the so-called micro-region (statistically delimited to 168), practically the association of municipalities, is the "most democratic" tier of the entire institutional system;
- the next size category in regional development became the county. The 19 county development councils decide upon the development programmes and distribution of decentralised state resources;
- the seven planning-statistical regions cover the NUTS II units. The main contradiction of the system is that the regional tier remained quite unimportant, being left without competencies and resources although since already in 1996 it was a professional commonplace that the strengthening of the NUTS II regional tier is crucial to regional development.

From the 10 years perspective we can conclude that the three territorial tiers and their complicated institutional system were unable to counterbalance the weight of the central government. The regional development policy – in spite of all official intentions – remained centralised, naturally causing frustration, local conflicts and finally disillusionment.

The accession in 2004 caused a shock and disappointment. Referring to the "weak regional capacity", the European Commission insisted on the centralised management of Structural Funds, therefore the regional institutions (regional development councils) have almost completely lost their former influence on regional policy. It has to be realised that the EU does not insist on the active role of the regions, it does not want to take risks with the decentralised structures. However, the biggest obstacles of region building are thus the centralising attitude of the government, and the very fragmented local level of public administration, which is not an appropriate basis for rescaling the territorial governance.

In *Romania* being just after the accession the pressure of adaptation appears in the formulation of the management system of regional policy. The incompetence of background public administration can be the most felt in the formation of the Romanian regional institutional system not only in structural but also in

contextual terms too. The changes in the territorial public administration after 1990 have not brought real decentralisation therefore the institutional system of regional policy was built parallel to public administration.

It is a general opinion that the Romanian constitution does not provide stable guarantees for local autonomy compared to the requirements of the European Charter of Local Governments (*Kassay 2003*). The local administrative level can be regarded as a very integrated one due to a systematic integration process in the second half of the 20th century (*Illés 2002*). A total of 2,686 municipalities integrate 13,092 villages. The micro-regional tier in public administrative sense is practically not operating and the association of municipalities cannot be considered as systematically established.

The territorial public administrative system is also unchanged; the country is divided into 42 counties. The self-governance status of the entire system is questionable, especially considering the role of prefects (*Horváth 2003*). The prefect subordinated to the central government is a very strong actor in territorial context, with controlling competences over local and county governments and coordinating the deconcentrated units of ministries. These characteristics show that in Romania not municipal fragmentation but centralisation is the main obstacle of the adaptation to European requirements.

The eight development regions were set up based on a professional concept, which was financed by the Phare programme (*Borboly 2004*). In the preparation of the concept, foreign professionals had a significant role. Similarly to Hungary, the development regions were built upon the traditional county tier public administrative units following the EU regulation of NUTS system. As an effect of the Phare support, the National Council for Regional Development and its Agency with regional councils and agencies was set up.

The delimitation of regions in 1998 was formally democratic since the government's decision required reinforcement by the concerned county governments. Even though local actors similarly to the central government were not eager, the delimitation can be evaluated as an important step forward compared to the former strongly centralised, nationalistic political culture (*Horváth–Veress 2003*). The territorial division was argued from many aspects since it was not based on the units built on historical-economic cohesion, and an especially large number of debates evolved in connection with the appointment of regional seats. The unstable character of regional delimitation can be seen now from the fact that some actors, counties (mostly populated by Hungarian minorities) would like to change the borders of the NUTS II regions.

Regional development councils govern the eight regions. The members of the councils are the presidents of county assemblies, and further three members are of the cities with county rank, towns and municipalities. The prefect participates at the meetings of the development council but without voting rights. The

very formal and loose functioning of the councils shows first that the "empty box" is being filled very slowly, the central government is not ready to decentralise competences and resources. The development agency has a greater influence on decision-making. The agencies have a relatively good infrastructure and professional staff, at least compared to the conditions of public administrative organs.

However, we have to mention that no vital relationship has evolved yet between development agencies and local/municipal actors. This very loose embedding or legitimacy relating to public policy and local/civil sector shows that the new networks are many times exclusive and contribute to the low efficiency of development activity in the Eastern countries.

As a summary, we have to emphasise that the new European style of regional policy exists only at the very beginning phase in Romania and the positive impacts are hindered by the unchanged, mostly centralised administrative and political structures.

Slovenia has a strongly integrated local government system. Following the constitutional rules, 147 municipalities replaced the former 462 communes, since only the settlements with more than 5,000 inhabitants have the right for self-governance (*Brjec-Vlaj 2001*). At present, there are 193 local governmental units, and certain cities (11 named as urban municipalities) have a special legal status within the Slovenian self-governing system (*Setnikar-Cankar et al. 1999*). Therefore, in the management of local level, the integrating elements may be qualified as strong and the strengthening of municipal co-operation has a distinguished role among reform efforts.

Considering medium tier management, 58 state administrative units are operated as NUTS IV or LAU 1 units and these units are connected to settlements by a consultative board. These units consist of different departments of ministries but they cannot provide a coordinated model of central control (*Leben 2002*).

The Act on Public Administration encourages the creation of special territorial units. The government elaborated a concept for the creation of larger administrative units. According to the model based on the current Constitution, municipalities are entitled for associating "into" regions. Another solution would be the establishment of self-governing regions with legal entity, but experts express a careful opinion about this alternative (*Brjec-Vlaj 2001*).

The Act on Regional Policy in 1999 mainly focused on the establishment of the institutional system of regional development. Local governments have set up until now 22 agencies but the institutional and resource system of regional development remained centralised (*Tüske 2002*).

Administrative reforms are still belated in Slovenia as the country is strongly

centralised and the development resources of the European Union are utilised in a centralised way. The relatively rapid economic development, the relatively insignificant regional differences, and the small scale of the county – as it seems – do not activate the forces of decentralisation. Maybe due to this fact the NUTS division (1 NUTS II region, 12 NUTS III regions) does not motivate any adaptive changes in territorial public administration, and the eight regional administrative units have no development functions.

In *Bulgaria*, the territorial reforms of 1998 resulted in disintegration instead of the former integration. The former nine administrative regions created after the systemic change were replaced by 28 regions, more exactly districts eliminated ten years earlier, which are exclusively state administrative units with a governor. The territorial self-government's role, on the other hand, is less absent, since municipal tier is strongly integrated as only 262 local governmental units are operating with a total of 5,340 settlements (*Drumeva 2001*, *Geshev 2001*).

Following territorial reforms, the Act on Regional Development was passed. The establishment of six NUTS II regions was carried out explicitly in the interest of the accessibility of the resources of the European Union. However, planning units have no organisational structure and the frequent modification of territorial units implies the absence of a clear concept of regional division. At this point we have to mention that the delimitation of regions was averted by several disputes (and finally 6 regions were designated, replacing the former 9 – *Illés 2001*). At the time of their establishment, an explicit requirement was that the regions without any traditions and institutions should serve exclusively for planning and resource absorption targets and their modification must be based on the agreement of the governors of the districts (*Geshev 2001*). The central government formulated as a resolute target in its national development plan for 2000-2006 the further reduction in the number of municipalities in order to make local development policy more efficient. According to the Act on Regional Development, the medium tier of development and planning consists of 28 districts and the national regional development plan is composed from those (*Gyurova 2001*). Regional/district governors have competences over regional development since their duty is to coordinate governmental and local interest during planning (*Drumeva 2001*). This power configuration projects the strongly centralised management of structural funds after the accession to the EU, which model is rooted also in the centralised distribution of public resources (*Alexandrova 2005*).

In *Albania* the act on local governments was passed in 1992 following the provisional constitutional measures of the systemic change, and in concrete, the act regulated the municipalities and the districts (*Hoxha 2001*). Subsequent to the

decision upon the structural issues, a separate act regulated the fundaments of the functioning. Even though the act declares the independency of the self-governmental organs, the introduction of the prefecture system implied the shadow of centralisation. Although the aim of the legislator was to decentralise, finally the professional and financial conditions were from the very beginning insufficient for the target and the political will was only enough for meeting the basic requirements of the European Chart of Local Governments, which the country joined in 1998.

As the central governance is stabilised in the party political sense, the will to continue decentralisation is declining. In the difficult economic situation, the necessity of budgetary restrictions justified the low financial authority of local governments. Following the adaptation of the new constitution, decentralisation became the focal point of interest again, since its principles provided a better basis for the strengthening of local governmental autonomy.

Besides settlement geographical circumstances the new constitution itself motivated fragmentation therewith, that it attached the modification of the municipal boundaries as well as the merge of municipalities to the result of local referendum. In Albania 309 municipalities and 65 communes, towns operate as the local self-governmental tier. Although there is no hierarchical relationship between the different tiers, still the districts have a relatively significant power in the co-ordination of municipal activities, thus for instance they may oblige the self-governments to cooperate with each other in terms of performing certain municipal tasks. At the same time the own servicing functions of the districts are weak, which is best shown by the fact that they share only 10-20% of all expenditures of the entire self-governmental sector, and their share can be even reduced. (*Hoxha 2001. p. 72.*)

The territorial tier was originally based on the territorial division prior to the transformation, nevertheless referring to the local, historical antecedents the number of districts was increased with 10, up to 36. In the process of developing the territorial structures the local ambitions finally resulted in a fragmented system, which is actually evaluated by experts as a very negative trend concerning the efficiency and proficiency of the functioning.

The new constitution introducing a new territorial category, the region (qarqe), launched a reform process, in course of which the current system of districts will be replaced by a more integrated structure, where the regions can be suitable for the implementation of functions similar to the responsibilities of the regions in the EU member states.

The new constitution declares that the Albanian state is built on the principles of local autonomy and decentralisation. It also launched further reforms, the phases of which were summarised in an action plan. This process will probably integrate the values in the public thinking (such as efficiency, profi-

ciency, economy of scale), which increase the efficiency of the whole system through the better integration of the local and medium tier (*Hoxha 2001*).

In *Serbia* (which confederated with Montenegro until 2006, called Yugoslavia) the new constitution passed in 1990 eliminated the constitutional and ideological obstacles of building a western type of self-governance system, though this process somehow did not result in real decentralisation in a peculiar way. The quasi member state status of previous regions, lands, bearing a strong autonomy has changed; they lost the right of legislation as well as the right for their own Constitutional Court etc. The special legal status of the lands is also implied by the fact that the constitution lists them in particular. Compared to the Vajdaság (Voivodina) the other two lands Kosovo and Metohia are exceptional, which are parts of the Serb Republic but Beograd exercises no control over them. This means that in Serbia the self-governmental meso tier is practically absent, it exists only in the provinces, lands, settled by the national minorities and having a special status.

In addition, the status of municipalities has changed, since the previous approach considered the municipalities as some kind of collective formations, while the new constitution defines them as territorial units, within which the self-governmental rights may be practiced. According to the act on the territorial organisation of the country, currently 169 municipalities and 5 urban local governments function. These numbers well imply that Serbia has a strongly integrated local administrative system.

However, the system of co-called districts implies the fragmentation and the transitional character of the spatial structure. The Serbian government introduced by its order in 1992 the co-called districts as new territorial units, which had never existed before. The 29 districts are the units of state administration and not of the self-governments, and they have a very similar profile as the institution of the prefects.

The necessity of reforms was indicated also in Serbia, since it is clear and accepted that the system is very strongly centralised. Although the reform proposals have been prepared, their reception and success can hardly be forecast (*Sevis 2001*, *Rechnitzer 2006*).

The aspect in terms of evaluation of the building of state administrative system of *Bosnia-Herzegovina* is obviously that the war has not only destroyed and eliminated the previous institutions but also caused a dramatic migration of the population. The time passed since the disintegration of the former Yugoslavia has been too short for stabilisation of public administration. What makes the evaluation of the situation of spatial public administration even more difficult is exactly the territorial structure and the location of national minorities; the geo-

political situation is a source of conflicts. In this respect, the successor states of the former Yugoslavia are in a special situation, which further increases the instability of the East-European region.

The Dayton Treaty accepts Bosnia-Herzegovina as a federal state consisting of two units, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Srpska Republic with the Serb majority (*Jokay 2000*). The federation is further divided into ten cantons which also bear member state status and have their own constitution, legislations and that are entitled to regulate their local governmental system. The constitutional basis, due to the ethnic basis of war conflicts, seeks to provide a maximum level of autonomy for the local communities, which mainly identify themselves on an ethnic basis. The principle of power division between the federation and the cantons is that every matter belongs to the competency of the canton which is not maintained in the own competency by the federation. Since the regulation of the local public administration is a cantonal competency, in the state of Bosnia Herzegovina 11 different systems of local governments operate. Their common feature is that they all try to regulate the territorial based governance of different communities on an ethnic basis too, ensuring the autonomy of the prevailing national minorities. Srpska is divided into 64 communities; it is a centralised unit where the municipalities have a direct relationship with the central government. The ambition to organise the 64 municipalities into clusters co-ordinated by the towns remained unsuccessful due to the resistance of mayors. The 73 municipalities acknowledged in the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina are mainly bound with the cantonal governments, since the regulation and the division of resources are in the competency of this tier.

The outlines of the division of competences between the two tiers are pale, but the institutions of the districts, such as hospitals, or high schools, etc. are maintained by the cantons, since the majority of municipalities, due to their small size, are unable anyway to perform these tasks, not to mention the financial difficulties. The basic paradox of the entire territorial power structure is exactly between the extreme pubic decentralisation and the strong centralisation of real decision-making power and resources (*Jokay 2001, p. 114.*).

The territorial public administration of *Croatia* took significantly more decisive measures towards consolidation. The constitution passed in 1990 already laid down the basis of the local governmental system. However, the implementation of the new system was hindered by the war following the declaration of the sovereignty of Croatia. It is therefore no accident that that the Croatian parliament passed already in 1991 a constitutional act on the rights of the national minorities, which guaranteed a special autonomous status for the municipalities with Serb majority. The acts and the "normal" territorial public administration of the country were first passed at the end of 1992. In 1997, the country joined the

European Chart of the Local Governments.

The Croatian local governmental system has two tiers. Among the local level units, they differentiate between municipalities and towns, with different competencies and equal legal status. The number of municipalities has grown five-fold compared to the previous integrated system, but the local administrative system is still relatively integrated, since the self-governing legal entity, the municipality integrates several villages that culturally and economically belong together. Referring to this latter legal rule, many municipalities acquired autonomy. The average number of municipal population in the 402 municipalities is 3,600 persons (*Ivanisevic et al. 2001, p. 185.*) and therefore the economic and professional power of the local level is at least questionable, and a similar trend is characteristic for the towns, the number of which doubled.

The country has maintained its county tier, but in the delimitation was not always able to follow the historical or economic determinations. The fragmented county tier will probably cause significant difficulties subsequent to the accession to the European Union in the management of development policy, and the county system will probably differ from the NUTS 2 system. The boundaries of the delimited four regions and the country borders are often modified, which implies the uncertainty concerning both the scale and the internal cohesion. The aspect of approaching the Union is yet absent in the regulation of the international cooperation of counties, with respect to the fact that Croatia has not yet joined the necessary international conventions regulating the cross-border co-operation of regions. It is natural that Croatia, similarly to the other self-governmental systems of the region, has a fairly centralised financing system.

It is also a common feature of this region that the target of reforming the system is announced from time to time, especially at the beginning of the governmental cycle. It is, however, a fact that the decentralisation process in Croatia is not yet completed, although different committees of experts and programmes are to enhance the reforms (*Ivanisevic et al. 2001, p. 224.*) The failure of reforms is due among other things to the fact that the professional and political consensus is absent concerning the vision of state development, the role and structure of state, as the systemised, analysed information concerning the real situation of public administration and services are also missing (*Kopric 2003*).

The development of the territorial administration in *Macedonia* is also bound to the acquisition of the new sovereignty and the collapse of the former Yugoslav state. While the experts considered the local administrative system in the period between 1974 and 1991 strongly decentralised, since 1992, the obtainment of the state autonomy, sovereignty due to the nation building ambitions a strong centralisation process was launched, however on uncertain legal basis in the

first years (*Todorovski 2001*). The act on local governments took effect in 1996, and it introduced dramatic changes in the position, financing and structure of local governments. The competencies of local governments were cut, their financing was centralised and this process was accompanied by the extreme fragmentation of the structure. A total of 123 local communities replaced the former 34 local governmental units. Similarly to the majority of Yugoslav successor states, the respect of national minority rights were stressed in Macedonia too, guaranteeing the proportionate representation and the right of setting up minority organisations and bodies. The intention of regionalisation was only formulated in the parts of the country settled by the Albanian nationality.

The functioning of the Macedonian local government system as a whole is evaluated positively from the approach that the legal frameworks for democratic, citizen-friendly and autonomous local governance were created. The insight of the urban architects into the system contributed to the improvement of professionalism of the development policy. However, the extreme fragmentation and the narrow competencies of local governments all make the influence and real power of local government illusory in comparison with the strength of the central government. Therefore, it is not accidental that also in Macedonia reforms are planned in order to strengthen the associative system and parallel the local governmental competencies (*Todorovski 2001*).

Although *Greece* joined the EU in 1981, the first steps of the transformation of the Greek territorial administration were actually not motivated by the EU accession. The Socialist Party getting power in 1981 voted alongside party political and ideological interests for the public administrative "decentralisation", yet the reforms left the structure of territorial administration and the relationship of central and territorial administration practically untouched. A further important step concerning the reform of territorial public administration was definitely motivated by the EU membership, respectively by the demand of successful and efficient utilisation of EU grants and resources. In the spirit of the new European regional policy the, 1622/1986 act on local governments, regional development and democratic programming strengthened the democratic character of the planning process and stipulated the creation of the 13 planning regions matching the NUTS 2 level. Thus two important decisions were made in 1986 which determine the Greek regional processes until now. The amendment of the constitution in 1986 created the constitutional guarantees for a substantial decentralisation process. The delimitation of the NUTS 2 regions, on the other hand, has created the spatial frameworks of a later regionalisation.

However, the first real step on the way of public administrative reforms in 1994 was not made in the tier of the regions; the county tier, equal to the NUTS 3, was reorganised. The act set up the structure of the county councils. How-

ever, no sufficient and clear tasks and competencies and resources were devoted to the new institutions.

Nevertheless, the municipal governments – mainly do economy of scales problems and the lack of local experts – were further on not suitable for more competencies and tasks; in fact, they are not even able to perform their tasks according to the current regulation. In order to treat this problem the government elaborated in the period between December 1996 and February 1990 the so-called "Kapodistrias Plan". In consequence of the act on the execution of the plan, the number of local governments in the first tier decreased form 5,775 to 1,033.

Based on the reforms, currently there are 50 county councils in Greece. The NUTS 3 units are also much smaller in Greece than the European (or even the Hungarian) average.

Concerning the local governmental system, the regulation subsequent to the unifications maintained the two types of lower local self-governments: the "urban" and the "municipal" local government.

From among the current 1,033 "first level", local governments, 900 are urban governments (so called 'dimos') and 133 municipal governments ('kinotita'). Due to the reorganisation, the size and the framework conditions of professional operation were optimalised. It is remarkable that the number of population covered by eight urban governments remains below 100 thousand persons, and this number also indicates that the Greek regions do not have real regional centres. The significant steps towards decentralisation and the strengthening of the local governments finally resulted that currently "European type" of local governments operate in Greece (*Perger 2005*).

4. Conclusions

While the regional policy of the European Union supports integration due to the emphasis of the regional scale, we must conclude that accession countries, the new democracies in Eastern Europe, formulate their territorial public administration parallel to the EU's institutional system of regional support. Paradoxically, the institutionalisation of regional policy often led to fragmentation or duplication.

- *The territorial harmonisation of the two systems is not always successful* and the replacement of traditional public administrative units by new, larger ones is a difficult task. The changing geographical borders and the coincidence of organisational structures are new phenomena, which actually shows towards democratisation and decentralisation but their real success can hardly be measured yet, and depend on actual political (parliamen-

tary) relations (*Wolmann 1997).*

- Western European experiences show that adaptation is not always achieved by structural reforms. More flexible, informal formations may bridge the problems of "misfit". However, we have to pay attention to the fact that the new challenges of *regional policy may not threaten the political controlling role of the units of territorial self-government.* However, we have to mention that transitional countries have also applied a number of functional modernisation techniques (such as association, financial incentives, contracting-out of services – *Horváth M. 1997*) but these were unable to eliminate the structural disadvantages of the system in an efficient way.
- It is undeniable that the European Union significantly contributed to the modernisation of territorial public administration in these countries. At the same time, however, we have to emphasise that this effort did not necessarily lead to real decentralisation. It seems that *regional policy was an insufficient motivation to change the territorial structure of power.* The main adaptation pressure of the accession can be taken as a push towards centralisation or neglecting regions, whereas the previous decade was characterised by regionalism and decentralisation. This is why the dilemma whether there would be regional operational programmes in the programming period starting in 2007 in the South-eastern European countries and to what extent regional actors can participate in decision-making.
- The question is whether there are any other motivations besides the Structural Funds for achieving a more professional and flexible public administration at all levels? These countries have to find new (inner) driving forces of the new phase of modernisation and regionalism.
- The other question is why the external adaptation pressure has more influence on public administration than the everyday internal, personal experiences of malfunctions and failures? In order to be able to answer this question at all a deeper and more intensive analysis of the interest background of structural reforms with the evaluation of the objective and subjective conditions of their implementation would be necessary. Comprehensive public administrative reforms otherwise and elsewhere are not always successful, it is more and more accepted that systematic changes are more efficient. The shaping of administrative systems in transitional countries is determined by various factors, and the main trends can be identified only by experiences of a longer time.

Fragmentation is a general feature of meso level public administration in the South-Eastern European countries.

- Medium tiers are rather divided from organisational point of view. State administrative, corporate and other formations have appeared besides or instead of elected governments.
- The geographical borders of the new meso-levels or units are unstable, often there are several different medium tiers and administrative borders are often modified due to the lack of internal cohesion.
- The political legitimacy of medium tier governments is weak as often a closed circle of political elites is active in this space (*Pálné et al. 2004*), and therefore despite the reforms their position against central government cannot be improved.

Finally we would like to point out that currently the most important problem is the weakness of the local tier, which is characterised by a low quality of performance. Despite some initial decentralisation steps after the systemic change, we have witnessed processes of recentralisation referring to low local and regional administrative capacities due to fragmentation (*Elander 1997*).

Regionalism, the decentralisation of the governmental power to the medium tier could be an integrating power, which may contribute to the improvement of the rather weak performance of the Central-East European countries. If the EU and first of all European cohesion policy does not prefer or support regional aspects and the centralised management continues to have dominance during regionalisation process, regional integration will lose one of its most important stimuli in this region.

References

Alexandrovna, Svetlana: Grant Transfers and Financial Supervision in Bulgaria. In. Sevic, Zeljko (Ed.): Fiscal decentralisation and Grant Transfers in Transition Countries. NISPAcee, Bratislava, 2005.

Amin, A. – Thrift, N. (Eds.) 1994: Globalisation, Institutions and Regional Development in Europe. Oxford Universtiy Press, Oxford.

Amin, A.–Thrift, N. 1995: Institutional issues for the European regions: from markets and plans to socioeconomics and powers of association. Economy and Society. 1. pp. 41–66.

Bache, J. (1998): The Politics of European Union Regional Policy. Sheffield Academic Press.

Bak, M-Kulawczuk, P. – Szczesniak, A.: Capital Investment Funding in Poland. In. Davey, 2003.

Barlow, M.: Administrative systems and metropolitan regions= Government and Policy, 1997. 4. pp. 399–413

Blazek, J. – Prikryl, J. – Nejdl, T.: Capital Investment Funding in the Czech Republic. In. Davey, 2003.

Borboly, Cs. (2004): Fejlődő-változó megyék: Brassó, Fehér, Szeben [Developing-changing counties: Brassó, Fehér Szeben]. Kézirat. Pécs: MTA RKK–Új Kézfogás Közalapítvány.
Bovaird, T. – Löffler, E. – Parrado-Diez, S. (2002): Developing Local Governance Networks in Europe. Baden-Baden: Nomos.
Bryson, Ph. – Cornia, G.: The Property Tax – A Missed Opportunity for Fiscal Decentralisation in Transition Countries? The Czech and Slovak Cases. In. Bryane, M. – Kattel, R. – Dreschler, W (Eds.): Enhancing the Capacities to Govern: Challenges Facing the CEE Countries. NISPAcee, Bratislava, 2004. pp. 193–211.
Bucek, J.: Regionalization in the Slovak Republic- from Administrative to Political Regions. In. Marcou, G. (Ed.): Regionalization for Development and the Accession to the European Union: A Comparative Perspective. LGI Studies, Bp. 2002.
Davey, Kenneth (Ed.): Investing in regional development. OSI, Bp. 2003.
Drumeva, Emilia: Local Government in Bulgaria. In: Kandeva, Emilia (Ed.): Stabilization of Local Governments. LGI Books, 2001. Budapest, 141–179.
Emilewicz, J. – Wolek, J. (2002): Reformers and Politicians. Bialystok–Warsawa: SEAP–ELISPA.
Ficza, Cs. (2004): A Felvidék társadalomföldrajza: A stratégia végrehajtását szolgáló szervezeti modell [The social geography of Upper Lands: The organisational model for executing strategy]. Kézirat. Pécs: MTA RKK–Új Kézfogás Közalapítvány.
Geshev, Gesho: The Role of Regions of the South-Eastern Space in the Enlarging European Union. in Gál, Z. (Ed.): Role of the Regions in the Enlarging European Union. Discussion Papers, Centre for Regional Studies of Hungarian Academy of Sciences, Pécs, 2001. pp. 81–101.
Gyurova, Elena: Emerging Multi-ethnic Policies in Bulgaria. A Central-Local Perspective. In. Bíró, A. – Kovács, P.: Diversity in Action. LGI Books, Bp. 2001.
Horváth, Gy. (Ed.) (2003): Székelyföld [Székely-land]. Budapest–Pécs: MTA RKK–Dialóg Campus.
Horváth, R. – Veress, E. (2003): Regionális politika és területfejlesztés Romániában [Regional policy and spatial development in Romania]. Magyar Kisebbség 1: 30–32.
Hoxha, A.: Local government in Albania. In. Kandeva, 2001 (Ed.) pp. 41–89.
Illés, I.:Közép-és Délkelet-Európa az ezredefordulón (Central- and South-east Europe in the Millenium). Dialóg Campus, Budapest–Pécs, 2002
Ivanisevic, S. – Kopric, I. – Omejec, J. – Simovic, J.: Local government in Croatia. In. Kandeva (Ed.), 2001, pp. 179–241.
Jokay, Ch.: Local government in Bosnia and Herzegovina. In. Kandeva (Ed.), 2001, pp. 89–141.
Jones, M: New Institutional Spaces. Jessica Kingsley, London, 1999.
Kandeva, Emilia (Ed.): Stabilization of Local Governments. LGI Books, OSI, Bp. 2001.
Karasinska – Fendler et al. (2002): EU Enlargement and Multi-level Governance in European Regional and Environmental Policies. Adapt Programme, Fifth Framework. Manuscript.
Kassay, J.: A Székelyföld közigazgatása (The public administration of Székely- Land) in. Horváth, Gy. (Ed.) (2003): Székelyföld [Székely-land]. Budapest–Pécs: MTA RKK–Dialóg Campus.

Keating, M (1998): The New Regionalism in Western Europe: Territorial Restructuring and Political Change. Edward Elgar: Cheltenham.
Keating, M. (Ed.): regions and Regionalism in Europe. Elgar Reference Collection, Cheltenham, 2004.
Kohler – Koch, B.: Interaktive Politik in Europa. Regionen im Netzwerk der Integration. Leske-Budrich, Opladen, 1998.
Kopric, I. (Ed.): Modernisation of the Croatian Public Administration, University of Zagreb – Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, Zagreb, 2003.
Leben, Anamarija: Information of Administrative Districts in the Republic of Slovenia. In. Wright, G.- Nemec, J. (Eds.): Public Management in the Central and eastern European Transition: Concepts and Cases. NISPAcee, Bratislava, 2002. pp. 418–441.
Malikova, L. – Staronova, K.: Politico-Administrative relations Under Coalition Politics in Slovakia. In: Peters, G. – Verheijen, T. – Vass, L. (Eds.): Coalitions of the Unwilling? Politicians and Civil Servants in Coalition Governments. NISPAcee, Bratislava, 2005. pp. 178–207.
Marks, G. (1993): Structural Policy and Multilevel Governance in the EC. In: Cafruny – Rosenthal (Eds.): The State of the European Community. Longman Harlow.
Martins, M.R.: Size of municipalities, efficiency, and citizen participation: a cross-European perspective. Government and Policy. 1995. 4. pp. 441–459
Mezei, I. – Hardi, T. (2003): A szlovák közigazgatás és területfejlesztés asszimmetriái [Asymmetries of Slovakian public administration and spatial development]. Tér és Társadalom 4.
Morlini, L. – Bolgherini, S.: The Europeanization of Regions. Reshaping of Territorial representation and Administrative Change. Proceedings of Conference, University of Florence. European Press Academic Publishing, 2005.
Nemes, J.: Decentralisation – the Main Tool of the Public Administration reform in Slovakia? News 2002. NISPAcee.
Olsson, J. (2001): Democracy Paradoxes in Multi-level Governance. RSA International Conference, Gdansk.
Pálné Kovács, I. – Paraskevopoulos, Ch. J. – Horváth, Gy. (2004): Institutional 'Legacies' and the Shaping of Regional Governance in Hungary. Regional and federal Studies. 2004. 3. pp. 430–461
Pálné Kovács, I. (2001): Regional Development and Governance in Hungary. Pécs: CRS HAS.
Paraskevopoulos, Ch. J. – Leonardi, R. (Eds.): Learning from Abroad: Regionalization and Local Institutional Infrastructure in Cohesion and Accession Countries. Regional and Federal Studies, 2004. 3. Special Issue
Perger, É.: A túlközpontosított közigazgatási struktúra lebontása Görögországban. In. Pálné Kovács, I. (Ed.): Regionális reformok Európában. Belügyminisztérium, IDEA, Bp. 2005. pp. 87–119.
Pop, D.: Municipality Size and Citizens' Effectiveness: Hungary, Poland, and Romania. In. Soós, G. – Zentai, V. (Eds.): Faces of Local Democracy. OSI, Bp. 2005. pp. 169–207.
Popa, A: Capital Investment Funding in Romania. In: Davey, 2003

Potucek, M. (Ed.): The Capacity to Govern in Central and eastern Europe. NISPAcee, Bratislava, 2004.
Public Management Profiles. SIGMA, OECD, Paris, 1995.
Rechnitzer, J. (Ed.): Magyarország szerepvállalási lehetõségei a kelet-közép- és délkelet-európai területfejlesztési együttmûködésekben. Országtanulmányok, MTA RKK NYUTI, 2006.
Regulsky, J.: Local government reform in Poland: an insider's story, OSI, Budapest 2003.
Sevic Z.: Local government in Yugoslavia. In. Kandeva (Ed.) 2001. pp. 417–471.
Surazska, W. – Bucek, J. – Malinkova, L. – Danek, P. (1997): Towards regional government in Central Europe= Government and Policy 4: 437–463.
Todorovski, I.: Local government in Macedonia. In: Kandeva (Ed.) 2001, pp. 241–289.
Tüske, T.: A szlovén regionális politika törvényi háttere (The legal background of Slovenian regional policy). in: Mezei Cecília (Ed.) 2003. Pécsi Tudományegyetem Közgazdaság-tudományi Kara Regionális Politika és Gazdaságtan Doktori Iskola Évkönyve 2002. Pécs, 126–143.
Wolmann, H. (1997): Institution building and decentralization in formerly socialist countries. The cases of Poland, Hungary and East-Germany= Government and Policy 4: 463–481.

THE EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND REGIONAL POLICY OF THE WEST BALKAN COUNTRIES

Zoltán Pámer

1. Introduction

The European transformation processes resulted in the birth of new spatial categories. Such a political spatial unit is the "West Balkans" (consisting of five countries when the category appeared, now it has six countries), in whose birth the possibility and necessity of a "joint treatment" played a significant part. Not each country concerned has identified themselves clearly with the "Balkans space", but finally they have approved this category, in their own best interest.

For the European Union the single treatment of these countries is necessary or advantageous from several aspects. There are several similar issues in cooperation, and the utilisation of the previous conflicts seems to be simpler this way. Also, for the preparation of the accession process it is more helpful to think in a group, as is joint planning and possibly also joint action in the future.

Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia, Serbia and Montenegro have a lot of common historical, economic, political etc. features; however, we find alternative features as regards their objectives, as well.

2. Role of the West Balkans in the enlargement policy of the European Union

The history of the European Union is the process of continuous spatial enlargements, among other things. The expansion (enlargement by new members) and the deepening of the community (the continuous "spill-over" of the community policies to more and more sectors) took place parallel to or succeeding each other. Enlargement was promoted above all by the continuous change of the external conditions, the dominance of globalisation on everyday life, especially in the economic processes. The leading economic actors of the EU were forced by the increasing competition to continuously expand the boundaries of the common market, as a complementary process of which the eastern half of Europe, breaking away from the socialist arrangements, is trying to become part of the

"West" by the establishment of the western prosperous market economy model and the democratic institutional system. The most striking measure of the "popularity" of the European Union is that all states in the former eastern block – apart from the Middle Asian successor states of the previous Soviet Union – imagine their future in the European Union, in the short, middle or long run.

2.1. Effects of the eastern enlargement of the EU on the West Balkans

The enlargement of the European integration reached the frontier between the east and the west in 1995 for the first time, when Austria and Finland, two countries that formerly declared their neutrality and often played as bridges between the west and the east, became members of the Union. Their accession forecast the scenario of a larger-scale eastern enlargement. The systemic change demanded different sacrifices across the respective countries of the former socialist block. Hungary and Poland, two states that did not have a federal arrangement, became the forerunners of the transformation, where the transitions, though they resulted in a serious economic decline, were peaceful. As regards the Czech Republic and Slovakia, the disintegration of the former Czechoslovakia was an example to be followed even for the western democracies. The peaceful nature of the changes in the former Soviet Union was not that clear-cut, due to the delicate status of the Baltic States. In Romania, the abolition of the Ceausescu regime took human lives, whereas the semi-peripheral situation of Bulgaria led to a more serious economic decline compared to the other countries.

Following the political transitions, the countries of the eastern block declared, one after the other, their intention to become EU members. The accession talks with the respective countries started at different times, but finally the Council decided that they would approve the admission of ten new members in one single "package". On 16 April 2004, in the Acropolis of Athens the accession treaties were signed by the representatives of the Czech Republic, Estonia, Poland, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Slovakia and Slovenia, together with the leaders of Malta and Cyprus, two countries that had not been in the eastern block but joined the EU at the same time as the other eight states. The official date of admission of the ten countries to the European Union was 1 May 2004.

2.2. Institutional reform attempts of the Union induced by the Eastern enlargement

The "Eastern enlargement" was not only a historical deed of the European Union – it is also a huge challenge for the Community. The early years of the 21st century brought a halt to the economic growth of the EU15 countries; the

international competitiveness of Europe showed a worsening tendency. The new member states featured higher economic growth rates and cheaper production factors, which were important sources of "blood refreshment" for the whole of the European economy. During the enlargements both parties (i.e. the "old" and the "new" members) depicted the expected economic advantages of the enlargement, supported by the thought of the joint European identity. The reform of the institutional system of the community did not keep up with this economic and "emotional" enlargement.

Prior to the enlargement, the last serious reform of the institutional system was the Maastricht Treaty (1993), which established the structure of pillars and created the European Union. The coming into effect of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1997, in force since 1999) "communitised" several policies, further deepening integration. The enlarging Union was faced with more and more operational problems already after the enlargement of the 1990s. The Treaty of Amsterdam introduced the principle of flexibility, which allows "flexible integration" (*Szalayné 2003, Vida 2003*), but only in a way that all this „must be compatible with the objectives of the Union and the Community (...), must respect the single institutional framework of the Union and the acquis communitaire. On the other hand, it must promote the development of the integration", also, the possibility of accession "is open to all member states". As opposed to the Treaty of Amsterdam, the Treaty of Nice, a document of basic importance for the preparation of the institutional system of the Union for the enlargement, considers "flexibility" as a means to be used only in exceptional cases. The Treaty of Nice regulates the decision-making mechanism after the enlargement, without making significant alterations (rotation, number of committee members), at the same time it somewhat extends the range of issues that require qualified decision-making, increases the role of the European Parliament and decreases to some extent the democratic deficit.

The Treaty of Nice calculates, in addition with the enlargement with the ten new members, with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania that joined the Union on 1 January 2007. The enlargement reaching beyond the East Balkans, however, necessitates further and more in-depth institutional reforms than the previous palliative treatments. An attempt for this was made by the Treaty on the Constitution, which was rejected by the electors in the Netherlands and France in 2005. The success or failure of the further organisational reform attempts will in all probabilities have a serious impact on the integration of the West Balkans.

2.3. The West Balkans in the 1990s

In the former Yugoslavia, the transition required very serious sacrifices. Yugo-

slavia became a federation of socialist republics after World War II, its state system was characterised by a Serb dominance. The ethnic oppositions were temporarily put into the background because of the self-fought independence, and the religious oppositions were suppressed by the atheist socialist ideology. The key of the sustainability of the system was the charismatic liberating military activity, and later the state political activity of Tito, which brought an economic boom and an international recognition for the multi-ethnic state.

In 1989 Slobodan Milošević became the leader of the Serb Communist Party, who proposed changes of centralisation character in the socialist state system in 1990 ("anti-bureaucratic revolution"), which was not appreciated by the then leaders of the majority of the member republics, above all of the more advanced western Slovenia and Croatia. As a protest these two latter member republics declared their independence (25 June 1991), which – including the ten-day war of Slovenia – could only be realised by war. The European states acknowledged, one after the other, the sovereignty of the two countries, but certain Easter Slavonian territories of Croatia remained under the control of different paramilitary Serb forces right until 1995. For Bosnia and Herzegovina, independence required a lengthy war, as a result of which in the so-called Dayton Peace Treaty (21 November 1995) the internal division of the country on ethnic grounds took place, albeit with unchanged external borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The sovereignty of Macedonia, due to its unfavourable location from a geo-strategic point and weak economy, did not provoke external military aggression, but the large number of Albanian ethnic minority citizens used weapons to enforce the expansion of their rights. In Albania the political transformation was peaceful too, but the then poorest country of Europe became an extremely instable factor of the region, due the prolonged economic crisis ("pyramid games"), the political and tribal division generated continuous inner oppositions and led to the constant division of the country, a constant threat of civil war. Serbia (with its autonomous provinces of Voivodina and Kosovo) and Montenegro (Crna Gora) operated as a formal federation, first called Little Yugoslavia, then after the armed conflict in Kosovo, the NATO bombing and the fall of Milošević under the name Serbia-Montenegro (after February 2003), until Montenegro declared itself a sovereign state at a referendum on 21 May 2006, disintegrating this way the last federal formation of the region.

2.4. The Stabilisation and Association Process

The prolonged armed conflicts of the 1990s, parallel to the economic stabilisation of East-Central Europe and the intention to preserve this stability, made the European Community take a more active part in the preservation of the peace in the Southeast-European space. The Union has an intention to bring these coun-

tries closer to Europe, provide them with a kind of integration prospect, because the European Community has undeniably proved to be a successful "project" for the preservation of the peace of the European continent. A key element in this strategy is the so-called Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP), which concerned five countries of the region, the "West Balkans" at its approval, later six countries after the gaining of sovereignty by Montenegro. The SAP gives considerable financial support to the respective countries, on the other hand, it defines very strict requirements against them from social and economic aspects. Co-operation among the countries is a key element of the process. In order for these countries to get closer to the European Union, they have to adapt the basic values of the Community, i.e. democracy, the respect for human rights and the market economy. For all these the Union provides support, financial assistance.

The basic principles of the SAP were defined in a Commission declaration, the opening act of the process was the Zagreb Summit on 11 November 2000, in which the objectives of the process and the way to the achievement of the goals were approved. These are the signing of Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA), the introduction of autonomous trading regulations for the region, financial assistance, all besides the deepening of regional co-operation. At the meeting of the Council of Europe in Thessaly (19-20 June 2003) the so-called Salonika Minutes was approved, specifying the accession prospects of the West Balkans countries and defining the SAP as the way to the integration.

The EU offered associate member status for the countries signing the association agreements (the same way as it did in the case of the "European agreements", before the Eastern enlargement), and gives support for the transformation of the state institutional system. The acquisition of the "acquis" is supported by the support programme called TAIEX, the CARDS programme is starting, the Twinning programme is extended to the SAP countries (where the financial background is provided by the CARDS). The launch of the CARDS programme creates the possibilities for the use of the pre-accession funds of the Union (PHARE, SAPARD, ISPA), which promotes the integration of the countries of the region into the European regional policy.

After the launch of the SAP the countries of the region started the signing of the association agreements. *Table 11* shows that presently only Croatia and Macedonia has a real prospect of accession. As regards the other countries, only Albania signed the SAA, with Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia-Montenegro only the negotiations have started, but the signing of the agreement is held back by various internal factors. In the case of Serbia this internal factor is the failure of the authorities' efforts made for the extradition of the still wanted two war criminals (Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić), in Bosnia the slower than expected implementation of the state reform.

Table 11.

Milestones in the integration processes of the SAP countries

Country	Signing of SAA	Entering into force of SAA	Official associate member status	Start of the accession talks
Albania	12 June 2006	–	–	
Bosnia-Herzegovina	–	–	–	–
Croatia	29 Oct. 2001; 1 Feb. 2005	1 June 2004	3 Oct. 2005	
Macedonia	9 Sept. 2001; 1 April 2004	2005.12.17.	–	
Serbia-Montenegro	–	–	–	–

2.5. Financial assistance within the frameworks of the SAP

The financial background for the implementation of the Stabilisation and Association Process is provided by the CARDS programme, entering into force by the decree No. 2666/2000 (5 December 2000) of the Council of Europe. However, there had already been technical assistance funds for the region before the SAP:

- the OBNOVA supported the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and Macedonia with a total of 400 million ECU in 1996–1999;
- the TAIEX is a technical assistance office and programme launched in 1996, which provides technical assistance for the associate countries by the financing of smaller-scale consultancy works. The programme was available for all countries intending to join the Community, including the East-Central European and the West Balkans states.

2.5.1. The CARDS programme

The CARDS programme (Community Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilization) provided approximately a total of 4.65 billion Euro support in the 2000–2006 period for the SAP countries, mainly along the following priorities:

- reconstruction, democratic stabilisation, peace creation and return of refugees;
- development of the institutional system and legislation, in harmony with

the EU norms: strengthening of democracy, constitutional state, human rights, civil society, media, creation of a viable market economy;
- sustainable economic ands social development, including the structural reform;
- strengthening of the co-operation among the SAP countries, promotion of the establishment of relations between the respective SAP countries and the EU member states and between the Central European associate countries.

The assistance finances institutional development and investment projects, in the form of non-refundable supports. The beneficiaries of the programme are above all the different tiers of state administration, public institutions, business support organisations, associations, societies, foundations and non-governmental organisations (NGOs).

The CARDS programme can be divided into two main support components: the five national programmes and the regional programme. All these six programmes have a strategic programme (national CARDS strategies, regional CARDS strategy), whereas the concrete tasks are included in the Multi-annual Indicative Programme (MIP) (2002–04, 2005–06), which are further operationalised by the so-called annual action plans. The allocations of the national programmes and the regional programme for the 2002–2004 period are demonstrated in *Table 12.*

Table 12.
Allocations for the national and the regional CARDS programmes on the basis of the indicative plan for 2002–04, in million EURO

	2002	2003	2004	Total
Albania	44.90	46.50	63.50	149.90
Bosnia-Herzegovina	71.90	63.00	72.00	199.90
Croatia	59.00	62.00	81.00	197.00
Macedonia	41.50	43.50	55.50	136.00
Serbia-Montenegro (with Kosovo)	359.60	331.20	312.40	987.88
Regional programme	43.50	31.50	-	75.00
Total	620.40	577.78	584.40	1.745.68

2.5.2. The regional CARDS programme

The strategic document pf the regional CARDS programme was approved by the European Commission on 22 October 2001. The regional programme disposes of not more than a mere 10% of the already mentioned 4.65 billion Euro

support. It is designed to handle problems which are common for the SAP countries, thus their solution requires the co-operation of the respective countries. The regional programmes are organically supplemented by the national programmes. The regional strategy describes four priority areas:

- construction of an integrating border protection system;
- promotion of democratic stabilisation;
- strengthening of the co-operation capacities of the state institutions, including the justice and home affairs organisations; and
- infrastructure developments with a regional view.

The regional CARDS programme was designed in a way that it should complement and harmonise with the five national programmes. The regional programme only targets issues whose joint management at the regional level brings clear comparative advantages. Typical issues of this kind are the protection of the borders and the development of the transport infrastructure, but issues such as economic relations and the promotion of the trade among the respective countries are also included.

The implementation of the regional CARDS programme – as it realises projects covering several countries – is done in a centralised way. In this case the individual supported projects are approved by the Commission in Brussels, the complete administration is done by the Commission and the member states only have a right of consultation. However, the priority aiming at the construction of the integrated border protection system has elements financed by the respective national programmes. In such cases the programme management is done not in a centralised but a deconcentrated manner. The competence of the Commission is the same as in the centralised model, but in this case it is practiced through local representatives, the Delegations of the European Commission. The allocations of the regional CARDS programme by priorities for the 2005–2006 period is shown by *Table 13.*

Table 13.

Cornerstones of the indicative programme of the regional CARDS programme for the 2005–2006 period by priorities (million EUR)

Priority	Allocation for 2005–2006	
	Minimum	Maximum
Institutional development	16.0	18.0
Justice and police	5.0	6.0
Cross-border co-operation	33.0	39.0
Development of the private sector	2.5	3.5
Infrastructure developments	21.0	26.0
Reserve	0.7	0.9
Total	85.0	

3. Issues of adaptation to the regional policy of the European Union

Although the Structural Funds only provide support for the members states for the implementation of the regional policy of the European Union, and the structural and cohesion policy will in all probabilities undergo significant changes until the full integration of the countries of the West Balkans, the survey of the system of the Funds is important from the aspect of the regional policy of the concerned countries. The objectives must harmonise with the aims of the structural and cohesion policy, and in the case of the pre-accession funds with the general objectives of regional policy; also, the Structural Funds support many activities (e.g. the INTERREG community initiative) which are available for the West Balkans countries through the pre-accession funds.

3.1. The regional policy of the EU and the system of the Structural Funds

The policy of territorial equalisation is one of the first community policies, and consists of the total of development objectives, catching-up measures and procedures. The level of the interventions of regional policy are the regions, which are organic units from social, economic or geographical aspects. Already the Treaty of Rome founding the European Economic Community mentions that the establishment of the common market requires the creation of the economic and social cohesion, as one of the objectives of the community policies. The Treaty establishing the European Communities amended by the Treaty of Nice discusses in a separate chapter (Chapter XVII) the policy of the strengthening of social and economic cohesion. It defines the system of the structural and cohesion funds, specifies the responsibilities of the European Regional Development Fund, together with the roles of the two auxiliary organs important in equalisation policy, the Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions, and the relevant decision-making procedures. The Treaty of Rome requires the intervention of the member states for the implementation of the above-mentioned objectives, but also establishes the Structural Funds for the support of these interventions at the community level. The Structural Funds are the financial means of the spatial equalisation policy, regulated by the European Community decree No. 1260/1999 (21 June 1999) of the Council. The resources earmarked for structural policy are still the second biggest item in the budget of the European Union, directly following the common agricultural policy.

Among the Structural Funds, the European Social Fund (ESF) and the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund (EAGGF) were set up as soon

as in 1958 and 1962, respectively. For the birth of regional policy, however, the establishment of the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) has a key significance, preceded in 1967 by the setting up of the independent general directorate of regional policy within the working organisation of the Commission in 1967. The last Structural Fund was set up in 1993; this was the Financial Instrument for Fisheries Guidance (FIFG). The Maastricht Treaty (1993) created the Cohesion Fund, which allowed the financing of large-scale infrastructure development projects (transport network, environmental protection) in the so-called cohesion countries.

3.1.1. Basic principles of the operation of the Structural Funds

The operation of the Structural Funds is determined by four classic principles: partnership, programming, concentration and additionality.

The principle of *partnership* can be interpreted in two dimensions. Vertical partnership is the co-operation as partners of the member state and the Union, or of the different hierarchy levels within the respective member state. Horizontal partnership means the inclusion of the actors at a certain level (public sector, businesses, civil organisations) as equal partners in the elaboration, preparation and implementation of development programmes.

According to the principle of *programming*, the supports of the Structural Funds can be provided not to individual projects but to the implementation of coherent programmes concerning the whole of a certain region.

As regards *concentration*, we can differentiate between two dimensions again. One of them aims at the joint, harmonised, coordinated use of the supports coming from different sources. According to the other dimension, the available resources should be focused where they are needed the most, i.e. the resources should be concentrated on selected target areas, primarily in the most backward regions.

According to the principle of *additionality*, supplementing the principle of concentration, the supports provided by the Commission should finance developments that otherwise would not have been implemented. This approach harmonises with the guiding character of the common regional policy. The principle of additionality means two things in practice: the expenses of the respective member state on a certain objective cannot decrease after the absorption of the community support, on the one hand (the national contribution is a prerequisite of the funding), and the community financing prescribes in all circumstances the existence of a national co-financing, on the other hand, i.e. there is no financing exclusively from community resources.

There is one more principle that concerns the total of the common policies,

apart from the Structural Funds: the issue of *subsidiarity* or *decentralisation*, whose importance increases parallel to the enlargement of the Community. These principles say that the regional tiers of different scale and legal status have free space of action and decision-making competency in the use of their internal resources and the harmonisation of their development strategies. The decisions must be made as close as possible to the citizens, at the level where most information is available.

3.1.2. Objectives of the Structural Funds in the 2000–2006 period

The overall objective of the operation of the European Regional Development Fund is the decrease of the disparities across the regions, the creation of the social and economic cohesion. The specific objectives of the structural policy have continuously changed with the enlargement of the Community and the changing challenges. As regards the period of the present study, the three main objectives laid down in the Agenda 2000, covering the 2000–2006 period, are to be met:

- assistance for the development and structural transformation of the regions lagging in development (Objective 1.);
- support for the economic and social transformation of the areas struggling with structural problems (Objective 2.);
- support for the application and modernisation of the education, training and employment policies and systems (Objective 3.).

Objective 1. concerns all regions at NUTS 2 level whose GDP per capita does not reach 75% of the average of the European Union. The major part of the resources of the Structural Funds is allocated to this objective. Under Objective 2., several regions not eligible in Objective 1 can be supported (industrial areas under restructuring, declining rural areas, urban areas with special problems etc.). Objective 3. focuses on the development of the human resources, its dimension is not a regional one. Besides the objectives described above we have to mention the system of so-called horizontal objectives, the harmony with which must be considered in all Objectives (equality, sustainable development etc.).

3.1.3 Community initiatives

In addition to the above objectives, the so-called community initiatives are worth mentioning. These initiatives aim at the implementation of all-Union objectives that require a European level, cross-border view. Among these initiatives, several of which existed in the 2000–2006 period, the INTERREG pro-

gramme deserves a special attention.

The general objective of the INTERREG initiative is to prevent the national borders from setting back the balanced development and the integration of the European territories. The borders, on the one hand, tear apart the communities on the two sides of the borderline, on the other hand, the border regions are often the "orphan children" of the national development policies, their situation is often peripheral. The enlargement of the community increased the number of borders, both the external and the internal ones. The INTERREG III programme valid for the 2000–2006- period provided support along the three following pillars:

- The *cross-border co-operations* (Pillar "A") support NUTS 3 level territorial units that are located along (external or internal) borders, or certain seaside areas;
- The objective of the transnational co-operations (pillar "B") is the creation of transnational co-operations among the national, regional and local organisations, which results in a harmonious and balanced territorial development. In order to achieve this, 13 co-operation areas were designated, areas with similar problems;
- The interregional co-operations (pillar "C") promote the establishment of the thematic networks and the exchange of information of regions located far away from each other, irrespective of which Objective area they belong to.

3.1.4. Change of the objectives of the Structural Funds after 2007

The European Commission released in late 2004 its third report on the economic and social cohesion. The document summarises the achievements of the cohesion policy to that point, and accordingly defines new objectives for the budgetary period starting with 2007:

- convergence (Objective 1.): Similarly to the former Objective 1, it is designed to support the regions with a GDP per capita below 75% of the average of the European Union. This would use 78% of the budget of the Structural Funds;
- competitiveness (Objective 2.): it serves the strengthening of regional competitiveness and the support of the increase of employment at European level;
- Territorial co-operation (Objective 3.): according to the logic of the former INTERREG initiative, it is designed to support the deepening of cross-border, transnational and interregional relations.

3.1.5. Use of the resources coming from the Structural Funds

As it has already been mentioned at the basic principles, the use of the Structural Funds takes place in the form of development programmes. The development programmes are made by the regions (or member states) eligible for support under the certain objectives. The final programme contains the objectives and priorities of the development for the given multi-annual period. If the plan is approved by the European Commission, it becomes a Community Support Framework (CSF). The operational programmes (OP) describing the implementation of the Support Framework must be approved by the Commission, too. A CSF covering a period of several years usually involves several OP-s.

The details of the implementation of the operational programmes are included in the so-called programme supplementing documents. The implementation of a given programme usually requires the establishment of the following institutions:

- Managing Authorities (MA): there is a managing authority for each OP, responsible for the control of the submission and later the implementation of the programme. The institutional system responsible for the implementation may contain several levels, which might be functionally separate (elaboration of project, evaluation etc.), managed by so-called contributing organisations.
- Monitoring Committee (MC): it is responsible for the monitoring of the programme on the basis of the report by the Managing Authority. Its members might be representatives of the different partner organisations.
- Paying Authority (PA): it is the organisation responsible for the financial management. This authority receives the supports and forwards it to the final beneficiaries.

3.2. The system of the pre-accession funds

The European Community, in order to assist the integration of the Central-Eastern European countries, created the system of the pre-accession funds.

3.2.1 PHARE, SAPARD, ISPA

Undoubtedly, the most important of the pre-accession funds is the PHARE programme. The original objective of the launch of the programme in 1989 was to assist Hungary and Poland, then the focus of the programme was expanded to cover the other East-Central European states (Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia). Until 2000, the fol-

lowing West Balkans states were beneficiaries of this programme: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Macedonia. When the Eastern enlargement was within reach, a "profile cleansing" of the programme took place, restricting the circle of the beneficiaries to those just before the accession, and the West Balkans states were eligible for support under the CARDS programme. The objectives of the PHARE are as follows:

- strengthening of the effective co-operation of administrative organs and institutions;
- support for the adaptation of the "extensive" law of the European Union (acquis communitaire), decrease of the duration of the transitory period;
- creation of economic and social cohesion.

The list reveals that the overall objective of the regional policy of the European Union appears among the objectives. For the countries becoming members after the Eastern enlargement, the assistance from the PHARE gradually ceased to exist, the last programmes were launched in 2003 and finished around the end of 2006. After the gaining of the membership, the tasks of the Commission delegations were taken over by the local authorities, so the implementation of the programme has gradually become decentralised.

In the assistance for the preparation for the accession, the launch of the support programmes called SAPARD and ISPA were important milestones in 1999. SAPARD prepares the associate countries for the supports from the Guidance part of the European Agricultural Guidance and Guarantee Fund, supporting agricultural and rural development goals. ISPA, similarly to the Cohesion Fund, finances larges-scale infrastructure investments in the pre-accession period.

3.2.2 Use of the supports from the pre-accession funds

The basis of the use of the PHARE resources are the pre-accession strategies of the respective countries with associate member status (presently Croatia and Macedonia), which are in effect the roadmaps of the accession process.

The use of the pre-accession funds of the European Union can take place in several ways which are different by some procedural rules, defined in details by the document called 'Practical Guidelines', published by the Commission. According to these Guidelines, the following ways of implementation can be differentiated:

- centralised system of implementation: the European Commission acts on behalf of the beneficiary country, the Commission makes the decisions in connection with procurements and contracts;
- centralised but deconcentrated system of implementation: the European Commission transfers its competencies regarding procurements and con-

tracts to its own local representation (Delegation);
- decentralised system of implementation with ex-ante control: the Commission transfers its competencies regarding procurements and contracts to the designated organ of the beneficiary country. The ex-ante control means that the Commission must approve every document regarding procurements and contracts, before they enter into force;
- decentralised system of implementation with ex-post control: the Commission transfers its competencies regarding procurements and contracts to the designated organ of the beneficiary country. The ex-post control means that the unit responsible for the implementation of the programme or project (contractor) makes all decisions concerning procurements and contracts without the prior consent of the Commission; the Commission only makes an ex-post revision after the programme/project is finished.

The above-depicted procedural arrangements vary across the individual CARDS or PHARE beneficiary countries. The more liberalised the system in a given country, the higher level the institutional harmonisation has reached.

In the case of the decentralised institutional system, the Delegation transfers some of its competencies to the national organs; the role of the Delegation is restricted to the control. The establishment and appointment of the following main functions and persons is necessary in case of introducing a decentralised system at national level:

- Central Finance and Contracting Unit (CFCU);
- Joint Monitoring Committee (JMC);
- National Assistance Coordinator (NAC);
- National Accreditation Officer (NAO);
- National Fund (NF);
- Programme Accreditation Officer (PAO).

The establishment of these functions has only taken place in Croatia among all AP countries, so the programme implementation in Croatia can be called decentralised, while it has not been or is being created in the other countries.

3.2.3 Relations of the pre-accession funds and the CARDS to the community initiatives of the Union

As the CARDS programme was created by the European Union definitely for the promotion of the integration of the Western Balkans, this can also be considered a kind of special pre-accession fund. As the procedural rules described in Chapter 2.2.2. are common to all assistance funds used outside the territory of the Union, from the institutional aspect there is no difference between the management of the "classical" pre-accession funds and the CARDS resources. At

the same time, while the beneficiaries of the CARDS are typically public administration, policing and the state structures in general, the resources of PHARE – and even more so the SAPARD supporting rural development – are available for other small beneficiaries from the non-governmental sector, selected by a tender procedure, keeping in touch with whom needs a much more complicated system that has to be just as transparent as the system working in CARDS, a system with a handful of beneficiaries only.

The other common feature of PHARE and CARDS is that both can be used for participation in community initiatives (e.g. INTERREG) and other union-supported programmes (e.g. LIFE, TEMPUS etc.), the participation in which would otherwise be impossible. These programmes make a serious contribution to the building out of the international relations of these presently rather isolated countries.

Among the already mentioned spatial co-operation programmes, the so-called Adriatic Neighbourhood Programme launched in the 2000–2006 period within the cross-border programmes (INTERREG IIIA) is worth special attention. The specific feature of the programme is that instead of supporting bi- or trilateral border regions, it is a larger-scale programme meant to support the two sides of a seacoast, the target regions of which are the seaside NUTS 3 units, provinces on the Italian side, while states with their total territories participate in the programme from the other coast (*Figure 15*), so practically all states of the Western Balkans, the focus of our study, participate in the programme, with the exception of Macedonia. As Italy is a full right member of the Union, the resources are provided by the European Regional Development Fund, while the Western Balkans partner countries have access to the CARDS, Croatia to the CARDS and the PHARE resources.

3.2.4. The future of the pre-accession funds after 2007

The new pre-accession instrument from 2007, the IPA (Instrument for Pre-Accession) unites not only the three "traditional" pre-accession funds (PHARE, SAPARD and ISPA), but also the resources of the CARDS and the TAIEX. According to the draft of the decree under preparation, the IPA introduces a three-year, dynamic planning programme called "multi-annual indicative financial framework" (MIFF) which serves as the basis of the programming activity. This will probably make the presently rather complicated system more transparent and more permeable. For the SAP countries the IPA will provide the opportunity for participation in Objective 3. (Territorial co-operation) programmes, which are the successors of the INTERREG.

Figure 15.

Target area of the Adriatic cross-border programme



4. Integration and regional policy of the states with no accession prospect in the short run

4.1. Methodology

The order of the survey of the individual countries was determined by their maturity for the Union membership that they defined as their objective. Because presently it is only Croatia that has a chance for full-time membership in the middle run (i.e. within 5 or 6 years), the level of the building out of the institutional system is the most advanced in this country.

The survey is started in the case of each country with the brief overview of the European integration process of the given state. As decentralisation and subsidiarity are vital issues from the aspect of regional policy, it is worth taking a look at the regionalisation level and parallel to this the institutional system of public administration in the given countries. The next aspect of the examination – in connection with the overview of public administration – is to look at the levels of spatial planning (if it is meaningful to talk about spatial planning in the respective country). Finally, the main indices relating to the use of the pre-

accession funds in each of the countries were considered.

4.2. Serbia and Montenegro

As the population of Montenegro decided upon sovereignty at the referendum on 21 May 2006, the commonwealth called Serbia and Montenegro actually ceased to exist. Although the separation of the joint institutional system will definitely take some time, from several aspects the two countries followed different paths already in the times of the commonwealth. Montenegro wished to demonstrate, by using Euro as the official currency instead of the Dinar from 1 January 2002, its intention not to adapt itself to the bulky and problem-laden Serbia in the approach to the Union. Accordingly, although Montenegro is already a UNO member, it should be looked at as a separate country; nevertheless the European Commission still treats it together with Serbia.

Serbia and Montenegro (then as Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) joined the Stability and Association Process (SAP) in 2000, at the Thessaly Summit it was defined as a potential member of the Union. The Commission declared the country as mature for the start of the talks aiming at the signing of the Stability and Association Agreement in April 2005. The talks with the two member republic started at the same time ("twin-track approach"). The Commission obliged Serbia to cooperate without reservations with the international court examining the war crimes committed by the former Yugoslavia (ICTY). The negotiations started in October 2005, but since the co-operation – despite the arrest of two war criminals, Slobodan Milošević (who died since then in his cell in the Hague) and *Vojislav Šešelj* – has not proved to be sufficient, the negotiations were suspended in early May 2006 until Karadžić and Mladić are arrested or the co-operation willingness of the country is clearly proved.

Montenegro, almost immediately after the successful referendum on its sovereignty, declared that it would not "wait" for Serbia in the accession process, thus the country set as an objective the gaining of the independent associate state status. According to the position of the Commission, Montenegro does not have to start the SAA talks from the beginning, although the successor of the commonwealth is Serbia according to the international law. For the small country of Montenegro, the implementation of the accession talks is a serious challenge, the biggest problem for the time being is the lack of adequate quantity and quality of experts, as most of the negotiations have been done by Serb diplomats so far.

4.2.1 Regionalisation in Serbia

Regionalisation in Serbia – and generally in the states of the former Yugoslavia – is a historical heritage. Within Yugoslavia, two autonomous provinces (*pocraine*), belonged to Serbia: Voivodina and Kosovo (Kosovo and Metohija); the "remaining" (Central) Serbia and the other states were not divided into smaller administrative levels. There was no administrative tier between the state (or province) and the municipalities (*opština*). As the individual municipalities were quite large (the centres of most of them were towns), an administrative reform was carried out in all former member states after the disintegration of Greater Yugoslavia, as a consequence of which the former large municipalities were succeeded by 4-5 smaller self-governments. (The word 'opština' [or općina, občina], used to specify the municipalities of the successor states of the former Yugoslavia, can be translated as 'járás' in Hungarian ['district' in English], which may cause misunderstandings. 'Járás' [i.e. district] in Hungarian means the lower meso-level including several municipalities, whereas in the countries in question this is the lowest level of self-governance, although their size is rather different, 3 to 20 settlements belong to one district.)

The system has thus become more democratic, on the one hand, but it was not accompanied by the creation of the meso-level in Serbia, on the other hand. A meso-level led by a ministry representative has been created recently at NUTS 3 level (okrug), without public administrative functions and with limited state administrative roles. It does not represent a spatial planning level, either. It is planned, on the other hand, to fill up this level with real content, the first sign of which is the fact that 5 border okrug-s and one in the proximity of the border make the target area of the INTERREG IIIA Serbia-Bulgaria Neighbourhood Programme.

Because the two provinces enjoyed quite extended rights (until the constitutional reform by Milošević in 1989), they had separate votes in the presidency (which practically meant that Serbia had three votes), Milošević abolished this system to prevent the further disintegration, the provincial bodies remained void of any competency. After the democratic turn and the placement of Kosovo under an international protectorate, the Parliament and government (Executive Council) of Voivodina were given back some of their former functions. Voivodina – as a NUTS 2 compatible regional tier and regional governance – actively joined in the relations system of the European regions; it is a member in the Assembly of European Regions (AER). In 2002 it set up an own development fund, which gives support in several fields (small and medium sized enterprises, handling of unemployment, export support, innovation, use of alternative sources of energy, establishment of quality assurance systems, environment protection). The distribution of the supports is assisted by sectoral development

plans at provincial level.

Apart from Voivodina, the issue of regionalisation is not a topical one in Serbia. In academic circles, the regional division of the otherwise extremely heterogeneous country is an issue discussed for a long time, nevertheless the official division has not been made so far and is not expected to be made in the near future, as presently the most urgent task is the preservation of the territorial unity of the country, which is against decentralisation. There is no act on regional development in Serbia, development programmes are only made at the state level for the whole of the country, and these plans have a sectoral view. In addition to them, several plans for the use of the funds assisting the accession to the Union and the financial assistance funds have been made (border protection strategy, institutional development strategy of the ministries etc.), but they cannot be considered as the forerunners of regional policy.

4.2.2 The sovereign Montenegro

In Montenegro – just like in Serbia – there is no meso-level between the local self-governments and the central state. The Montenegrin government approved in 2005 the principles of the act on spatial development and planning under preparation. The goal of the act is the improvement of the quality of life, the safeguarding of sustainable development, the respecting of the freedom of entrepreneurship. This suggests that an act with planning view will be made, which is understandable if we think of the fact that the seaside areas of this small country have become rather heavily congested, due to the increased tourism investments of the last few years.

In harmony with the act, an administrative reform is envisaged: the creation of micro-regions (consisting of 2-3 opština-s) is planned, which would become the basic level of spatial planning. The plans forecast the establishment of a network of development institutions (agencies) for these levels, which would be controlled by development councils, with the inclusion of the local civil sector (partnership). These all suggest the following of the European "good practice", in line with the wish to join the Union as soon as possible.

4.2.3. Use of EU resources

Serbia and Montenegro – due to the more serious economic and social problems compared to the other countries and the issue of Kosovo – are the main beneficiaries of the CARDS funds (*Table 14*).

The data demonstrate that a negligible part of the resources was allocated to the commonwealth level. The highest proportion of the funds was absorbed by

the priority "social and economic cohesion", which means the implementation of regional policy objectives. Serbia and Montenegro used the tools allocated for this priority for the participation in three cross-border programmes (INTRREG IIIA): the Hungarian–Romanian-Serb, the Serb–Bulgarian and the so-called Adriatic cross-border programme.

Table 14.
CARDS allocations for Serbia and Montenegro (including Kosovo) in the 2005–2006 period (million EUR)

Target area	Commonwealth	Serbia	Montenegro	Kosovo	Total
Justice and police	1.8	24.8	3.0	11.6	41.2
Development of the institutional system	5.6	87.5	11.0	29.5	133.6
Economic and social development	3.0	124	16.3	64.8	208.1
Environment protection, protection of natural resources	0.0	22.5	6.0	6.0	34.5
Democratic stabilisation	3.4	28.5	3.7	11.5	47.1
Other	2.2	46.2	6.5	20.1	75.0
Total	16.0	333.5	46.5	143.5	539.5

4.3. Bosnia and Herzegovina

4.3.1 The integration process

The talks about the SAA with the Western Balkans country having the most problematic and touchy ethnic composition started in Sarajevo on 21 November 2005, as the last country among the SAP states. The start of the negotiations was taken by the Bosnian political elite as the appreciation of the work done in the last few years. The Union stressed that Bosnia and Herzegovina must improve their co-operation with the court of Hague examining war crimes, must approve of the act on public service broadcasting and carry out a reform of the police forces.

Bosnia has made very serious steps since the signing of the Dayton peace agreement for stabilisation, but the two state-making entities and the representatives of the three ethnic groups have still not been able to come to agreement in several issues that are of basic importance for the effective state organisation.

After serious fights, the single value added tax with one key (17%) was introduced on 1 January 2006, which is a serious step in fighting back the black economy. No agreement has been achieved, on the other hand, on the issue of a single police, frontier guard and statistical service. The Serb Republic sees the creation of the single state organs as a threat to its own sovereignty within the state, so they do their best to prolong the decision. Finally this led to the temporary prolongation of the signing of the SAA, but the official statements of the government set late 2006 as the target date of the signing of the document.

4.3.2 Regionalisation

There are hardly any countries in Europe whose division has been so much debated by the surrounding states. Nevertheless the territorial unity of Bosnia and Herzegovina has a long history, due to their clear-cut natural boundaries.

According to the Dayton agreement of 1995, the country is made by two equal entities, the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina making 51% of the territory of the country, and the Serb Republic (RS – Republika Srpska) on the remaining 49%. In addition, the city of Brčko enjoys an independent spatial ("district") status, because of its key importance from the aspect of transportation as a link between the northern and the eastern pars of the RS just as much as between the Sava-side Canton of the Federation and the main area of the Federation. Brčko can be seen as a sample region of the country as regards reconstruction after the war, this is the city where most refugees who had formerly fled from the war returned, and the economic growth rate is also the highest here. The territory of the Federation is divided into 10 Cantons (*Figure 16*), each of which involves 3 to 14 local self-governments (općina-s). The respective Cantons (just like the state and its two entities) have sovereign governments, ministries and elected legislative bodies. The varied and intransparent public administration results in an extremely inefficient operation of the state and an inadequate distribution of the resources. In the territory of the RS the meso-level between the općina-s and the entity, 7 state administrative regions – following the Serbian pattern, okrug-s – can be found, only with central executive functions.

In the Dayton Peace Treaty – which originally was made for 10 years in 1995 – the amendment of the territorial division of the country was raised. One possible solution would have been the strengthening of the positions of the two entities (which of course was supported by the RS in the first place), and the formation of a third entity – with Croatian majority – in Herzegovina, as well as the "cantonisation" of the whole territory of the country, including the territory of the RS, but with the consideration of the ethnic principles. In this issue, however, the politicians were unable to come to an agreement.

Figure 16.

Entities and Cantons in Bosnia-Herzegovina



If we look at the present division, the two entities meet the requirements against the NUTS 2 regions, as regards the number of population (between 800 thousand and 3 million), but they fail to fulfil the criterion of territorial cohesion, especially in the case of the RS. The cantons are suitable for covering the NUTS 3 level, but only if their functions are harmonised with the okrug-s in the territory of the RS.

4.3.3 The levels of spatial planning: the development regions

As the central power seems to be a rather weak factor in the country, there is no regional planning at state level in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Different sectoral plans have been made at the level of the two entities, including some that contain regional approach as well, in fact, some make proposals for regional division (e.g. development strategy for the small and medium sized enterprises of the RS), but the problem of these programmes is that they are only made for the respective entities; however, these spatial units, for the reasons said above, cannot be con-

sidered as organic regions. In addition, the respective cantons in the Federation have different development programmes whose overview could be the subject of a separate study.

For the successful absorption of the European development resources, 9 regional development agencies have been set up so far. The territorial coverage of the respective agencies is varied, but in many cases they cross the borders of the entities. These regions do not have elected bodies, they are the scenes of planning and project generation, with the strong support of European resources, the World Bank, the European Investment and Development Bank and the Office of the High Representative of the European Union.

These "project regions" suggest a regional division on mainly economic organisation principles that they donor organisations supporting the abovementioned agencies calculate with. On the basis of this, the country is divided into five macro-regions: Northwest (Banja Luka, Prnjavor, Bihać, Prijedor, Sanski Most, Ključ, Drvar), Northeast (Tuzla, Orašje, Doboj, Brčko), Southeast (Mostar, Livno, Trebinje), the Sarajevo Region and the Central Region (Zenica, Goražde, Foča).

4.3.4. Community assistance

Bosnia-Herzegovina has been part of the SAP since the beginning, thus being beneficiary of the CARDS resources. In the case of Bosnia the target areas of the CARDS supports is usually the assistance of the return of refugees and the establishment of the institutional system of the state (tax and customs office), the social cohesion, the provision of the refugees, integrated border control, environmental protection and the protection of the natural resources. The allocation plan made for 2005–2006 along these objectives is featured in *Table 15.*

Table 15.

Cornerstones of the 2005–06 indicative programme of the Bosnian national CARDS programme (million EUR)

Priority	Allocation 2005–2006	
	Minimum	Maximum
1. Democratic stabilisation	5.0	6.2
2. Good governance and institutional system	48.7	59.5
3. Economic and social cohesion	34.0	41.6
4. Community programmes	3.5	
5. Reserve	1.0	
Total	102.0	

Parallel to the progress of the SAP, Bosnia has to make its institutional system suitable for the reception of resources bigger in volume than the CARDS. The use of the resources takes place presently in a centralised way, but according to the so-called deconcentrated model. The government has made its strategy for the introduction of the decentralised programme implementation model, but the precondition of that is the signing of the SAA.

4.4. Albania

Since Albania signed the SAA on 12 June 2006 in Luxembourg, it has been an associate member of the European Union. This is a very important step, because Albania, once the poorest and most isolated country of Europe which was a dangerous destabilising factor for a long time, is approaching the European Integration, formally preceding several other countries in the region. Despite these achievements, the official associate member status and the start of the accession negotiations are still uncertain, as the public opinion of Europe is becoming more and more sceptic about further enlargements, and especially has reservations against the Muslim countries.

The country is basically a unitary one; there are no NUTS 2 level regions with self-governments. Albania is divided into 29 districts, below which we find the level of the municipalities. In addition, the associations of districts created regional development agencies that play an important part in building out the democratic institutional system and the specification of the development objectives. The activity of these agencies is typically focused on economic development (support of SMEs, trainings), but cross-border co-operations, the support of non-governmental organisations and international exchange of experience are also featured among their responsibilities.

Parallel to the launch of the Stabilisation and Association Process, Albania became a beneficiary of the CARDS programme. Areas especially supported by the Albanian national CARDS programme are the following: fighting back crime, fraud and corruption; a more efficient public administration; development of trade, education and transport; monitoring of polluting processes, urban planning; and reform of the election system. The allocation plan according to the above priorities for the 2005–06 period can be seen in *Table 16*. The total sum of the allocation is smaller but the proportions are the same as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the projects supported within the respective priorities are naturally different. Albania uses the CARDS resources to participate in the neighbourhood programme formulated along the Greek–Macedon–Albanian triple border (INTERREG IIIA) and the already mentioned Adriatic Neighbourhood Programme.

Table 16.
Allocation plans of the Albanian national CARDS programme for the 2005–06 period (million EUR)

Priority	Allocation 2005–2006	
	Minimum	Maximum
1. Democratic stabilisation	4.0	4,8
2. Good governance and institutional system	46.8	57,2
3. Economic and social cohesion	27.6	33,8
4. Community programmes	3.2	
5. Reserve	1.0	
Total	91.0	

4.5. Macedonia

4.5.1 Sovereignty and integration

The least developed ex-Yugoslav member republic decided on its own sovereignty at the referendum held on 17 November 1991, which ran relatively smooth compared to the other countries in the region. As Greece – afraid of separatism – was unwilling to acknowledge the sovereignty of the small state under the name "Republic of Macedonia", as a solution acceptable for all parties the official name of the country is still "Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM).

Between February and August 2001 a serious ethnic conflict broke out in the northeast, mostly Albanian-inhabited part of the country. The riots were concluded by the Ohrid Framework Agreement, which declared the multiethnic character of Macedonia and made both Macedon and Albanian equally official languages in several districts.

Macedonia joined in the European integration process relatively early. It signed the agreement in 1996, which allowed the country to join in the PHARE programme. It was the first country to sign the SAA as soon as in April 2001, which came into force as of 1 April 2004. In December 2005 Macedonia became an official associate member, but the accession negotiations have not started yet. The preconditions of the talks are further progress in a number of fields, including local public administration and decentralisation; fight against crime, strengthening of the jurisdiction; fight against corruption; a more democratic election system; and improvement of the business environment. Nevertheless the integration of the small country is openly supported by the majority of

the European countries; the main obstacle is Greece who is still reluctant to accept that its northern neighbour becomes a member of the Community under the name Republic of Macedonia.

4.5.2. Public administration and spatial planning

As Macedonia was the least developed member of the former Yugoslavia, it was also the main beneficiary of the federal transfers, so there is a tradition in the country of the efforts made to decrease spatial disparities.

Like in the other ex-Yugoslav member republics, the gained independence was accompanied by an administrative reform. The republic consisting of 35 municipalities originally had 85, later 120 local self-governments. According to the present act on local governments in effect, made in 2004, the basis of the public administration of Macedonia are 84 opstina-s, in 28 of which Albanian is also an official language; also, the city of Skopje has a special status, divided into 10 self-government units. Parallel to the passing of the new act on local governments the national government launched a broad decentralisation programme, the beneficiaries of which are the local self-governments. Territorial meso-level with elected self-government does not exist in Macedonia.

In April 2004 the Ministry of Environment Protection and Spatial Planning worked out the spatial plan of the country, which, in addition to defining the objectives of spatial planning, divides the central places into four categories. A hierarchy among the urban centres was defined, and hinterlands are ordered to the urban centres; all this with the objective of securing a better quality of life and territorial decentralisation. The plan defines Skopje as a centre of national importance, with a population of 490 thousand (and a hinterland covering the whole of the country with its 2.2 million inhabitants), it defines four macro-regional centres with population over 45 thousand (Bitola – with a hinterland of 300 thousand, Stip – with a hinterland of 350 thousand, Tetovo – with a hinterland of more than 1 million inhabitants). The act also defines 9 meso-regional centres (Kumanovo, Prilep, Veles, Ohrid, Strumica, Gostivar, Kavadarci, Kicevo, Kocani), each with a population in excess of 30 thousand. In addition, the document defines the micro-regional and the elementary centres as well. The plan does not suggest that the planning and administrative functions should be allocated to these hinterlands, but treats the districts as organic economic units.

The creation of a new territorial concept was especially timely because serious changes took place in the territorial structure of the country. The natural birth rate of the Albanian minority exceeds by far that of the Macedon majority, so the urban centres in the northwest part of the country produced a significant

growth in the last decade. The area bordered by the Priština–Tetovo–Skopje–Kumanovo line is one of the most densely populated areas of Europe, it is a rural agglomeration with a high population density in excess of 1000 persons per /km^2.

4.5.3. Use of pre-accession funds

Macedonia was the first among the Western Balkans countries to join in the PHARE programme. Because of the changed focus of the PHARE on pre-accession and the launch of the SAP, the last year of the country to participate in the programme was 2000, and the country was eligible for some 240 million Euro support until 2001. As SAP started, Macedonia too joined in the CARDS programme. The national CARDS strategy of Macedonia focuses on the following key areas: democracy and constitutional state; economic and social development; justice and policing; and environment and natural resources. The cornerstones of the indicative programme for the 2005–06 period (*Table 17*) demonstrate that Macedonia has the most modest share of the community assistance among all SAP countries. With the gaining of the official associate state status of the country, the date of which is uncertain for the time being, Macedonia would become beneficiary of the PHARE programme and the other two pre-accession funds. As this is unlikely to happen before the end of 2007, Macedonia can only be a beneficiary of the IPA resources from 2007. The implementation of the programmes takes place in a centralised but deconcentrated way, by the gaining of the associate member status this system will probably become decentralised.

Table 17.
Breakdown of the CARDS resources available for Macedonia in the 2005–06 period by priorities (million EUR)

Priority	Allocation 2005–2006	
	Minimum	Maximum
1. Democratic stabilisation	1.8	2.2
2. Good governance and institutional system	32.6	39.4
2a. Justice and policing	10.7	12.7
2b. Administrative reform	21.9	26.7
3. Economic and social cohesion	23.4	28.2
4. Community programmes	4.0	
5. Reserve	0.8	
6. Other	11.5	
Total	79.0	

5. The integration process and the regional policy of Croatia

As the integration process of Croatia is the most advanced among all West Balkans countries, the development processes of regional policy, the continuous development of the institutional system to make it more suitable for the absorption of the Structural Funds and the management of the programmes can be best observed in this country. The thematic breakdown applied in the previous chapter is followed here as well, with the slight difference that at the survey of regional policy the national support policy of the Croatian state is briefly discussed, too (Chapter 5.3.1), as the objective areas are integrated into the future objectives of the pre-accession and structural funds (Chapter 5.3.3). In addition, in Chapter 5.4. there is a more detailed analysis of the use of the pre-accession funds than in the case of the previous countries.

5.1. Accession within reach

Croatia was the second country, only preceded by Macedonia, to sign the SAA on 29 October 2001, which came into effect as of 1 February 2005. This was followed soon by the submission of the application for membership on 21 February 2003, and in June the year after Croatia became an official associate country.

As Croatia, just like the other states of the region, has still not done its best in the co-operation of the court of Hague investigating war crimes, the start of the accession negotiations were first postponed (16 March 2005). Several of the war criminals wanted died in the years following the war (Tuđman, Bobetko); among the Croatian generals wanted by the law Ante Gotovina became the key figure, the start of the negotiation talks is tied by the Union to the soonest possible arrest and extradition of him. Although Gotovina has still not been arrested, many of his assistants and less wanted war criminals were in the summer of 2005, so the ICTY declared Croatia as a country ready for co-operation on 3 October 2005, and the negotiation talks could be started that day. Not so much after this (on 8 December 2005) Gotovina himself was arrested, this way the last formal obstacle was eliminated.

During the negotiation talks – which the declarations of the Croatian government estimated to last for 2 or 3 years – new and new issues were raised. Until the end of April 2006, a total of four chapters were closed. The main deficiencies were the slow pace of the return of the refugees, the too slow reform of the jurisdiction, corruption omnipresent in the state administration, discrimination against the Serb minority, and the inadequate independence of the public service media. From economic aspects the Commission clearly considers Croa-

tia as a market economy, although they feel that privatisation is slow and problematic, it is still difficult for foreigners to get properties, in many cases procedures with alleged discrimination can be seen. Another serious problem is the large deficit of the state budget that necessitates amendments in the state expenditure as soon as possible.

Croatia progressed parallel to Turkey in the negotiation talks for a long time, but the lack of solution in the issue of North Cyprus made the accession processes of the two countries clearly diverge. The communication of the Croatian government has become more optimistic again, they estimate the date of the accession by 2009 or 2010 the latest.

5.2. Public administration and regionalisation

Croatia – similarly to the other states of the region – is a unitary, strongly centralised state. The county system created parallel to the gaining of the sovereignty resulted in a very much fragmented system, which is a heritage of the historical traditions. The 20 counties (županija) and the city of Zagreb with county rank are rather heterogeneous both as regards their territory and their population. The municipal level – unlike in the other ex-Yugoslav member republics – uses different specifications for the towns and the non-urban settlements. The name of the municipal units with town centres is "town" (grad); those without urban centres are dubbed village/district (općina). Parallel to the birth of the county system, the division of the local level was made in Croatia as well, which radically increased the number of municipalities and resulted in the birth of new municipalities with town rank.

The meso-level self-governments of the counties are called regional self-governments by the law. The counties as meso-level have elected bodies, the chairmen of the counties, the chief governors (zhupan) have also been elected since 2003. The functions of the counties are similar to those in Hungary, they are mainly responsible for the maintenance of institutions but also have coordinating functions in several fields (economic development, health care, making of a physical plan, direction of protected areas in county management etc.).

The regionalisation of Croatia – coming from historical reasons – may seem self-explanatory, considering that the country consists of parts with very different traditions and history (Slavonia, Central Croatia, Zagorje, Seaside, Dalmatia etc.). Several regionalisation proposals were made on this principle, but the experience of the war of independence and the partition of the country is so decisive and so close in time that the creation of a strong meso-level with self-governments is not on the schedule even in connection with the European integration.

Despite this fact – coming from the requirement of the harmonisation of the

statistical system – there have been attempts for the creation of the NUTS 2 level, primarily with statistical, to a lesser degree with a planning objective. The proposal approved by the Croatian government (*Figure 17*) contains five regions: North Croatia (of 4 counties), East Croatia (5 counties), Central Croatia (4 counties + Zagreb), West Croatia (3 counties) and South Croatia (4 counties). *Table 18* reveals that this division results in a system very heterogeneous not only in territory but also population, and this proposal has not been approved by the Eurostat yet. It should be remarked here that in Croatia no statistical data collection takes place either at county or regional (NUTS 2) level (the data of *Table 18* were made on the basis of the population census in 2001), the creation of the territorial statistical data provision system is underway, supported by the European Union.

Figure 17.

Planned NUTS 2 division of Croatia



Table 18.

Main data of the proposed NUTS 2 regions of Croatia (2001)

NUTS 2	NUTS 3	Territory (km^2)	Population
North	Krapina and Zagorje county	1,229	142,432
	Medjimurje county	729	118,426
	Varaždin county	1,262	184,769
	total	4,968	570,094
Centre	Bjelovar and Bilogora county	2,640	133,084
	Karlovac county	3,626	141,787
	Sisak and Moslavina county	4,468	185,387
	Zagreb county	3,060	309,696
	Zagreb city	641	779,415
	total	14,435	1,549,099
West	Istria	2,813	206,344
	Lika and Senj county	5,353	53,677
	Adriatic and Gorski Kotar	3,588	305,505
	total	11,754	565,526
East	Slavonski Brod and Posavina county	2,030	176,765
	Osijek and Baranja county	4,155	330,506
	Požega and Slavonia county	1,823	85,831
	Virovitica and Podravina county	2,024	93,389
	Vukovar and Srijem county	2,454	204,768
	total	12,486	891,259
South	Dubrovnik and Neretva county	1,781	122,870
	Split and Dalmatia county	4,540	463,676
	Šibenik and Knin county	2,984	112,891
	Zadar county	3,646	162,045
	total	12,951	861,482
Croatia total		56,594	4,437,460

In the absence of regionalisation, the main space of the implementation of regional policy is primarily the counties. In the previous years the European Integration Councils have been set up in each county. They are bodies consisting of a few politicians and experts, responsible for the coordination of county level planning and project generation. The working out of the county level regional development documents, the so-called regional operational programmes (ROP) has been going on since 2004. These county programmes – whose preparation is in the final phase in all counties at the time of the writing of this essay – are not operational programmes in the "Brussels" meaning of the word, they are a sort of complex development programmes which prioritise in a typically sectoral view the areas to be developed within the respective counties. The preparation of these programmes is often considered by the counties as only one of their

obligatory tasks, they do not invite the stakeholders to participate in planning, and they try to define measures that – wishing to benefit everyone – try to focus on all fields, with a lack of strategic approach, which is detrimental to the principle of concentration. In most of the cases – even in the best-off counties – no financial means can be coordinated to the measures of the ROP at county level, so their viability is uncertain because of the casual availability of the different external resources (from the national government or the European Union). Nevertheless the respective counties often have other development strategies (e.g. tourism development plans in the seaside areas, post-war reconstruction plans in Slavonia etc), which do not necessarily harmonise with the ROP-s. All in all, the elaboration of the regional operational programmes can be seen as a sort of learning process that can serve as the basis for the acquisition of the making of regional programmes after the accession to the Union.

Regional development agencies have been set up at county level and often at regional level as well (with a competency covering several counties, not necessarily coinciding with the above-mentioned NUTS 2 proposal). The owners of these regional development agencies are the counties and the county seat towns. The primary focus of the activity of these agencies is the support of local small and medium size enterprises, in co-operation with the business development centres that can be found in almost all towns. They are often owners of business zones, carry out incubation activity, provide smaller amounts of business credits; also, project development and implementation is becoming a more and more important part of their activities, both from Croatian and Union resources.

5.3. Regional policy and institutional system

5.3.1. A brief overview of the Croatian spatial equalisation transfers

As we could see from the statistical figures, the country is very heterogeneous from the aspect of population density, and the picture is similar if we look at gross domestic product per capita by counties (*Figure 18*).

The equalisation of the spatial disparities is a selected priority of the present government. The respective regions can be classified as underdeveloped from several aspects. This classification is regulated by several acts. On the basis of these acts, the following regions are specified as "in need of support":

1. areas under special state treatment:
    a. areas occupied in the war,
    b. areas eligible for support by certain criteria of underdevelopment;
2. mountainous areas;

3. islands;
4. border regions.

Figure 18.

GDP per capita by counties, calculated at purchasing power standards (EUR, 2001)



The act on the areas under special treatment was made in 1996, and has been amended several times since then. The original objective of the act was the elimination of the consequences of the war, the promotion of the return of refugees and the socio-economic progress, and spatial equalisation. The act differentiates among 4 areas eligible for support; it allows the renovation of houses, the provision of different tax allowances for real estate purchase and other works of restoration etc. A separate act is on the restoration of Vukovar, in ef-

fect since 2001, the main objective of which is the remedy of the war damages, too.

The act on the islands provides support for the traditionally underdeveloped areas of Croatia, in bad need of aids: the Adriatic archipelago. Its fund is the National Programme for the Development of the Islands; its task is the safeguarding of the sustainable development of the islands. The act divides the islands into two categories on the basis of their level of development, and the measures are diversified accordingly. Among the possible ways of support there is the provision of credit, tax allowances, establishment of a trademark system for the goods produced on the islands, supports for job creation and communal infrastructure investments. The act on the mountainous areas provides support for the eligible areas with a similar logic: it is designed to safeguard the sustainable use of the natural resources. The financial means for the support are provided by the programme on the sustainable development of the mountainous areas, and the operational programmes that make parts of it.

Of special importance for the Croatian regional policy is the act on the Regional Development Fund. The Fund primarily finances infrastructure investments, its financial means are provided by the regional development programme of Croatia. The Fund is operated by a separate Board of Directors. The Fund provides support for all areas listed above (areas under special treatment, areas suffering from war damages, islands, mountainous areas, and border regions) and all areas where the GDP per capita is less than 65% of the Croatian average, also some other (not specified) regions. The resources of the Fund are provided by revenues from privatisation, resources coming from the central state budget, credits provided by financial institutions, donations and other sources. The Fund provides as a basic rule credits for infrastructure investments (above all communal infrastructure developments); the beneficiaries are the local self-governments. The selection of the supported projects takes place in a tender system, in special cases, if the GDP per capita in the target area (county) remains below 65% of the Croatian average, non-refundable support can be granted up to 50% of the project costs. The grants from the Fund can also be used for the repayment of the interest rates of former credits. Despite the main rule the Managing Authority can make decisions on grating non-refundable supports, but only in individual cases. Despite this, the practice of the operation of the Fund shows that the major part of the supports is non-refundable supports, which is against the regulation.

Apart from the Regional Development Fund we have to mention a fund operating with similar principles but focusing on small enterprises instead of large-scale projects: this is the Employment and Development Fund. The act set up a separate body for the operation of this fund, the basis of the grant of the supports is the annual financial plan of the Fund. The main activities supported

by the Fund are as follows: support of small and medium size enterprises, employment supports (mainly for the youth and those with higher education diplomas), the financing of smaller-scale infrastructure investments, support for business start-ups, renovation of industrial parks, incubators and state-owned properties not used presently (brownfields). Its operation is similar to the Fund described above.

5.3.2. The institutional system of the national development policy

In the present structure of the Croatian state administration, the coordinating function in the realisation of regional policy belongs to the Ministry of Maritime Issues, Tourism, Transport and Development (MMTPR). In addition, in line with the sectoral view, a number of other ministries (Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry and Water Management; Ministry of Environmental Protection, Spatial Planning and Constructions etc.) play part in the development policy, together with the different development funds (Regional Development Fund, Employment and Development Fund).

Regional planning is evidently the competence of the chief organ, the MMTPR, in close co-operation with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration (MVPEI). The tasks of the MMTPR include the implementation of the reconciliations among the respective ministries, the harmonisation of the Croatian regional policy with the similar policy of the European Union, and the coordination of the operation of the above-mentioned structural funds distribution systems.

Although it is under the control of the MMTPR, the Central State Office for Development Strategy and Coordination of the European Union Resources (SDURF) is an independent organ responsible for the preparation of the planning and development documents necessitated by the approach of the EU accession, for the establishment of the legal background serving as the basis of the allocation of the resources and for the creation of the institutional frameworks necessary for the absorption of the resources coming from the European Union. The Office has recently been given another task, the coordination of the use of the EU resources, which formerly – being a deconcentrated pre-accession system – was the competence of the Delegation of the European Commission, then, after the introduction of the decentralised implementation regime, some competencies were assigned to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration and the Ministry of Finance. However, the preparation for the reception of the Structural Funds made it necessary to set up an independent office.

5.3.3. The present state of the planning and programming process

Due to the physical limits of the present study, in this chapter we do not look at the already described programming activity connected to the objective areas of national development, instead we introduce briefly where Croatia is at the moment, together with the preparation of its Strategic Development Framework, which is actually equal to the Croatian national development plan and which will be transformed into a Community Support Framework after the accession, valid until the years remaining from the period lasting until 2013.

The main coordinator of the implementation of development documents is the MMTPR, while the operational work in connection with planning and programming is done by the SDURF, introduced in the previous sub-chapter. The preparation of the planning work was supported by the project called "Regional Development Strategy and Capacity Building" implemented under the aegis of the CARDS programme of 2002 (the beneficiary was the MMTPR), in which a proposal for the development of the institutional system was made with the assistance of foreign consulting organisations to make Croatia suitable for the reception of the pre-accession and the Structural Funds. One of the results of this project was the document called Regional Development Strategy (RFS), whose main objective was the creation of a viable regional development policy in Croatia, contributing to sustainable development and the competitiveness of the country. The two concrete objectives defined in the document earmark the decrease of the spatial disparities, and the launch of the counties/regions on a sustainable development path, on the one hand; and the creation of an effective regional development institutional system, on the other. The time horizon of the document spans from 2006 to 2013, it is accompanied by an action plan for the 2006–07 period that earmarks the most urgent programme-making activities that need to be done. The RFS earmarks the preparation of the following documents:

- development plans for the counties (and for the wider "regions");
- development plans to be worked out for the areas struggling with development problems (so-called areas in "need of support");
- cross-border and interregional co-operation programme;
- single legal framework regulating regional development;
- plan for the development of the institutional system.

The working out of the development programmes (ROP-s) of the counties as the implementation of the strategy at the local level has already started (and is going to be finished by the time the study is written in almost all counties), but this has to be followed by the working out of development plans for the regions "broader" than the counties (with no specified spatial delineation). The sectoral

plans for the regions "in need of support" (areas requiring special treatment, islands, mountainous areas, and border regions) are centrally made as document subordinate to the RFS.

Meanwhile the preparation of the National Strategic Framework (NSK) has started. Subordinated to this, at the same level as the RFS, the respective sectoral operational programmes are going to be made. The number of these programmes is unknown as yet; also, NSK is only available for the time being in a very brief initial version.

5.4. The use of Community resources

Croatia became beneficiary of the PHARE, SAPARD and ISPA programmes in June 2004, with the gaining of the official associate member status. Prior to this Croatia was – and until the programme is finished, still is – one of the main beneficiaries of the CARDS resources. According to the Croatian national CARDS strategy, the supports were allocated along the following main priorities:

1. democratic stabilisation: return of refugees, strengthening of civil society;
2. economic and social development: improvement of the conditions of trade, the business environment and the social cohesion;
3. justice and policing issues: modernisation of the jurisdiction, fight against organised crime, integrated border control;
4. capacity building in public administration, administrative reform;
5. protection of the environment and the natural resources.

As Croatia became an associate member in 2004, no allocation plan was made for the 2005–06 period; presently the projects of the 2003–2004 period are underway. The allocation of the Croatian national CARDS programme by different priorities is shown by *Table 19.*

Table 19.

CARDS allocations of Croatia by sectors, 2002-2004 (in million EUR)

Priority	2002	2003	2004	Total
Justice and policing	10.0	12.0	26.85	43.85
Capacity building in public administration	12.0	11.8	15.10	38.90
Economic and social development	18.0	17.5	17.75	53.25
Protection of environment and natural resources	3.0	3.7	3.80	10.50
Democratic stabilisation	16.0	17.0	17.50	50.50
Total	59.0	62.0	81.00	197.00

In most of the CARDS supported projects – just like in the case of the other

countries – the beneficiaries are primarily central state organs (employment service, border guard, statistical office, the respective ministries), in these cases the project selection was not done in an open tender procedure but the Delegation of the Commission made the decision on the support of the individual projects (deconcentrated system). In certain priorities (democratic stabilisation, socio-economic cohesion) it was possible to support bottom-up initiatives through a tender system. The major part of these projects was generated by the respective counties, and their beneficiaries were usually different county organs (tourism societies, business centres). This was the first project generation experience for the local level; the coordinating role was played by the integration councils of the counties. The differences in the project generation capacities of the individual counties became visible relatively quickly.

By the launch of the PHARE programme in 2005, new possibilities opened up for the local initiatives. Within the tender programme called "Support of the social and economic cohesion", started from the 2004 CARDS and continued from the 2005 PHARE programme, a call for tender has just been announced in a total value of approximately 6.6 million Euro, supporting business infrastructure developments of organs interested in local economic development (municipalities, business development centres, incubators, tourism societies etc.), in the form of open tender system.

It was also the CARDS and the PHARE programmes that financed in Croatia the participation in the INTERREG III programme. With the assistance of the CARDS programme Croatia takes part in the INTERREG IIIB CADSES programme, in INTERREG IIIC and two cross-border co-operation programmes: the Adriatic Neighbourhood Programme and the Slovenia–Hungary–Croatia Neighbourhood Programme. In the year 2006 the PHARE programme provides 3 million Euro support per programme for project partners on the Croatian side. In addition, there is a Slovenian–Croatian CBC programme that supports two selected projects: a cross-border sewage treatment investment in Brežice, and a local capacity development project whose objective is the working out of cross-border projects.

In Croatia the programme implementation takes place in a decentralised system at the moment, with ex-ante control. The officers responsible for the accreditation of the programme and the programme coordinators have been appointed, the central financing and contracting unit (CFCU) functions are done by the Ministry of Finance. In 2007 PHARE will be replaced by the IPA in Croatia, uniting the resources for the development of the rural areas and the structural investments.

References

Bevezetés az Európai Unió támogatási rendszerébe – Közigazgatási továbbképzési jegyzet. *Magyar Közigazgatási Intézet, Budapest, 2005.*

CARDS Assistance to the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia – Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2005-6. *European Commission.*

CARDS Assistance Programme – Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia 2002-2006. *European Commission.*

CARDS Assistance to Albania: Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2005-6. *European Commission.*

CARDS Assistance to Bosnia and Herzegovina: Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2005-6. *European Commission.*

CARDS Country Strategy Paper for Croatia 2002–2006. *European Commission.*

CARDS Regional Multi-annual Indicative Programme 2005–2006. *European Commission.*

Croatia Screening – Poglavlje 21: Regionalna politika i koordinacija strukturnih instrumenta. *A Horvát Köztársaság Külügyi és Európai Integrációs Minisztériuma.*

CROST – Projektfejlesztő műhelymunka-sorozat a Dél-Dunántúl és Horvátország határmenti megyéinek helyi szereplői számára. Hallgatói kézikönyv. *Dél-Dunántúli Regionális Fejlesztési Ügynökség Kht., Pécs, 2005.*

Ekonomski biletin No. 8. *OHR, 1 January 2006.*

Fazekas, J. (Ed.): Az európai integráció alapszerződései. *KJK Kerszöv, Budapest, 2002.*

Fond za regionalni razvoj Republike Hrvatske – Uvjeti kreditiranja infrastrukturnih i gospodarskih projekata. *MMTPR, Zágráb, 2002. augusztus.*

Fond za regionalni razvoj Republike Hrvatske. *Az Állami Revíziós Iroda jelentése az Alap gazdálkodásáról, 2003.*

Hajdú, Z.: Bosznia-Hercegovina: államiság és közigazgatási térszervezés (In: Balkán Füzetek No. 2). *PTE TTK FI K – MBTK, Pécs, 2005.*

Horváth, Gy.: Európai regionális politika. *Dialóg-Campus, Budapest-Pécs, 1998.*

Illés, I.: Közép- és Délkelet-Európa az ezredfordulón. *Dialóg Campus, Budapest–Pécs, 2002.*

Az INTERREG Magyarországon – Kézikönyv. *VÁTI Kht., Budapest, 2004. szeptember.*

Mesić, S.: Jugoszlávia nincs többé. *Helikon, Budapest, 2003.*

A new partnership for cohesion: convergence, competitiveness, cooperation – Third report on economic and social cohesion. *Commission of the European Union, February 2004*

Osmanković, J.: Regionalizacija i regionalni razvoj Bosne i Hercegovine u poslijeratnom razdoblju. *A Zágrábi Közgazdaságtudományi Kar évkönyve II. évfolyam 1. szám, 2004.*

Polazne osnove za reformu sistema planiranja i uređenja prostora – Koncept zakona o planiranju i uređenju prostora (radna verzija za diskusiju). *Ministry of the Environment and Spagial Planning of the Republic of Montenegro, 2005.*

Practical Guide to contract procedures financed from the General Budget of the European Communities in the context of external actions (PraG). *European Commission,*

May 2003
Program pomoći CARDS – Regionalna strategija 2002–2006. *European Commission, 2002.*
Program pomoći CARDS – Regionalna strategija 2002–2006. *European Commission, 2002.*
Programme Complement – INTERREG IIIA Adriatic Cross-border.
Rényi, P. – Végh, A.: A Brčkoi Körzet: megoldás vagy zsákutca? (In: Balkán Füzetek No. 2). *PTE TTK FI K – MBTK, Pécs, 2005.*
Strategija i jačanje kapaciteta za regionalni razvoj (CARDS 2002 program za Hrvatsku) – Analiza stanja u regionalnom razvoju RH. *MMTPR, ECORYS, ÖAR, Zágráb, 2004. szeptember.*
Strategija i jačanje kapaciteta za regionalni razvoj (CARDS 2002 program za Hrvatsku) – Programi, pravni i institucionalni okvir – Nacrt. *MMTPR, ECORYS, ÖAR, Zagreb, September 2004*
Strategija razvoja malih i srednjih preduzeća u Republici Srpskoj za period 2006–2010. godina. *Government of the Republic of Serbia, Banja Luka, February 200.*
Strategija regionalnog razvoja Republike Hrvatske. Ministry of Maritime Issues, Tourism, Transport and Development of the Republic of Croatia, Zagreb, September 2005
Strategija za uvođenje decentraliziranog sistema upravljanja programima pomoći Evropske unije u BiH. European Union Integration Directorate of the Council of Ministrers of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
Strateški okvir za razvoj 2006–2013. Radna verzija. *SDURF, Zagreb, May 2006*
Susedski program Srbija i Crna Gora–Bugarska. Zajednički programski dokument 2004–2006.
Szalayné Sándor, E.: Az Európai Unió közjogi alapjai I. kötet. *Dialóg Campus, Budapest–Pécs, 2003.*
Švigir, Z. – Teodorović, I.: A sokszínűség, mint fejlesztési forrás. A régiók szerepe Horvátországban. In: Horváth Gyula (Ed.): A régiók szerepe a bővülő Európában. *Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Regionális Kutatások Központja, Pécs, 2000.*
Upravljanje projektnim ciklusom u Srbiji. *Government of the Republic of Serbia, March 2004*
Vašić – Mijatović – Simić – Radović: Regionalizacija Srbije. *Centar za liberalno-demokratske studije, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2003.*
Vida Krisztina: Ez európai integráció története. In: Kende, T. – Szűcs, T. (Eds.): Európai közjog és politika. *Osiris, Budapest, 2003.*

Internet-references

European Union Integration Directorate of the Council of Ministers of Bosnia and Herzegovina – http://www.dei.gov.ba/.
Government of the Serbian Republic of Bosnia – http://www.vladars.net/.
Bruxinfo – http://www.bruxinfo.hu/.

Clickable map of Bosnia-Hercegovina – http://www.crwflags.com/fotw/flags/ba(.html.
European Commission, Albanian Delegation – http://www.delalb.cec.eu.int/.
European Commission, Bosnian and Herzegovinan Delegation – http://www.delbih.ec.europa.eu/.
European Commission, Macedonian, Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Delegation – http://www.delmkd.cec.eu.int/.
European Commission, Delegation of Serbia-Montenegro – http://www.eudelyug.org/.
European Commission, DG Enlargement – http://www.ec.europa.eu/comm/enlargement/.
Assembly of the European Regions – http://www.aer.org/.
European Agency of Reconstruction – http://www.ear.eu.int/.
Republic of Croatia, State Office for Development Strategy and the Coordination of the Union Resources – http://www.strategija.hr/.
Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and European Integration – http://www.mvpei.hr/.
Republic of Croatia, Ministry of Maritime Issues, Tourism, Transport and Development – http://www.mmtpr.hr.
Regional Development Agency of Korca– http://www.rda-korca.org/.
Republic of Macedonia, Ministry of Local Self-governments – http://www.mls.gov.mk/.
Government of the Republic of Macedonia – http://www.vlada.mk/.
Republic of Macedonia, Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning – http://www.moepp.gov.mk/.
Republic of Montenegro, Ministry of the Environment and Spatial Planning – http://www.mepp.vlada.cg.yu/.
Government of the Republic of Serbia – http://www.srbija.sr.gov.yu/.
Government of the Republic of Serbia, Office of European Integration – http://www.seio.sr.gov.yu/.
TAIEX – http://taiex.cec.eu.int/.
Economic Secretariat of the Autonomous Province of Voivodina – http://www.spriv.vojvodina.sr.gov.yu/.