RELOCAL

Resituating the Local in Cohesion and Territorial Development

Case Study Report
Give Kids a Chance: Spatial Injustice of Child Welfare at the Peripheries
The Case of Encs, Hungary

Authors: Judit Keller, Tünde Virág

Report Information

Title:	Case Study Report: Give Kids a Chance: Spatial Injustice of Child Welfare at the Peripheries. The Case of Encs, Hungary (RELOCAL Deliverable 6.2)
Authors:	Judit Keller, Tünde Virág
Contributions from:	Centre for Economic and Regional Studies HAS, Budapest
Version:	Final
Date of Publication:	29.03.2019.
Dissemination level:	Public

Project Information

Project Acronym	RELOCAL
Project Full title:	Resituating the Local in Cohesion and Territorial Development
Grant Agreement:	727097
Project Duration:	48 months
Project coordinator:	UEF

Bibliographic Information

This paper can be downloaded from our website: https://relocal.eu

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Abbreviations

ESF   European Social Fund
RMSG   Roma Minority Self-Government
MPMP   Multi-Purpose Micro-regional Partnerships
KLIK   Centre for Maintaining Institutions
PESD   Public Education Service District

Executive Summary

Background

Our case study is based on fieldwork in the district of Encs, one of the traditionally disadvantaged micro regions, located in the Northern periphery of the country. The settlements are characterized by the complex interplay of spatial, social and ethnic exclusion, and have demographically polarized society with very high unemployment rate and low level educational attainment. Within the district, intra-regional inequalities are manifest in anomalies of availability, accessibility and affordability of services that are mostly supplied in the district center but not in villages. The general approach of the Give Kids a Chance programme combined the reduction of child poverty with the eradication of poverty among families, ending segregation and ensuring a healthy childhood that support children's capability expansion. Therefore, the programme has assigned the highest priority to early childhood education and care services, inter-professional institutional cooperation among the local education, social- and healthcare sectors, and long-term strategic planning.

Findings

Give Kids a Chance program could only provide temporary relief for marginalized communities in the district of Encs to access child-welfare services and alleviate scarcities fed by the dysfunctional bureaucratic institutional structure of child-welfare policies. The absence of institutional incentives from the domestic policy field and changes in Hungary' public administration and public policy regime largely contributed to the program's gradually loss of its place-based character, accentuating space-blind content and weakening the legitimacy of the local programme. It curtailed the capacity of the local level to make autonomous decisions about its own developmental needs and goals, leaving less room for manoeuver for local incumbents while introducing increasing burocratic control over programme implementation. The main mechanisms that have driven spatial injustice in the district of Encs were the hierarchical dependencies of a variety of local actors. The dependent position of small settlements and neighbourhoods on the district centre and on external resources disabled relationships based on dialogue and partnership. The dominant role of local governments in development processes is supplemented by the general lack of local civil society whose capacity to challenge existing hierarchies and social relations could provide alternative visions for local development. Under these circumstances the perceptions of social and spatial injustice and unequal power relations determined developmental outcomes. Hierarchical dependencies especially limited the representation of marginalized groups in the design and implementation of place-based interventions.

Outlook

The central goal of Give Kids a Chance was to resolve bottlenecks and inequality in service provision by introducing new services that improve living conditions for children and trigger institutional changes that not only "modernize" child welfare services through inter-institutional professional cooperation but also transform local institutions in a way that distribute authority more equally among diverse social groups and empower marginalized groups to have better access to services. In the absence of institutional change within the overall framework of child welfare policy regime improvements of services remained sketchy locally. Overall, the impact of place-based development programmes remains weak as the short time frame of development projects does not support institutional change that is rather a process of incremental transformation than abrupt change. Furthermore, the impact of development projects is weakened if the overall institutional framework of the policy regime does not support the just distribution of public goods, but rather carries counteracting institutional logics that are built on exclusionary mechanisms between state levels, among social groups and a diversity of policy actors. The role of the state, thus should not be disregarded in setting frameworks conditions of spatially just policy contexts.

1. Introduction

Child poverty displays a particular spatial pattern in Hungary. Statistical data about child poverty and deprivation rates indicate that disadvantaged children[1] are concentrated in small villages in micro-regions located in the north-eastern and south-western parts of the country. In 2007 these micro-regions were classified on the basis of their underdeveloped economic, social and infrastructural conditions as "most disadvantaged" (Bauer et al, 2015).[2] Disadvantaged micro-regions comprised settlements in remote areas with a population at high risk of deprivation due to unemployment, low educational attainment, and underdeveloped public institutional infrastructure with low-quality public services and shortages in social and health care and in education. Children living in these areas not only suffered from material deprivation due to their parents' socio-economic status but also exclusion from high quality public services that could alleviate the impact of socio-economic disadvantages. The provision of these services gradually declines with the settlement slope; i.e. services concentrate in micro-regional centers as small towns, leaving small villages with sporadic and poor service provision.

It was under these circumstances that academics at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) initiated a programme to tackle child poverty. The general approach of Give Kids a Chance was to combine the reduction of child poverty with the eradication of poverty among families, ending segregation and ensuring a healthy childhood that support children's capability expansion. The organizing principle of the programme was seen to be local autonomy in defining the goals and means of resolving child poverty and segregation locally through coalition-building. It set out to resolve bottlenecks in service provision by introducing new services that improve living conditions for children and expand their capabilities. The programme was shaped by the National Strategy to Combat Child Poverty (2007), and the implementation, funded by the Structural Funds, was facilitated by the inclusion of the National Strategy in Hungary's National Development Plan (2011). During the first three programme cycles between 2009 and 2012, 23 of the most disadvantaged micro-regions implemented Give Kids a Chance locally.

Our case study is based on fieldwork in the district of Encs, one of the traditionally disadvantaged micro regions, located in the Northern periphery of the country. It mainly consists of small villages and is characterized by economic decline, selective outmigration, and a concentration of poverty. It has a demographically polarized society with very high unemployment rate and low level educational attainment. Within the micro-region, intra-regional inequalities are manifest in anomalies of availability, accessibility and affordability of services that are mostly supplied in the district center but not in villages. Services offered in the district are not affordable or troublesome to reach by those who live in villages due to inadequate transport infrastructure services. The settlement hierarchy/slope also manifests in the quality of services available in villages. Schools and kindergartens in villages are less equipped, human competencies are often inadequate, and buildings are often in bad conditions. The depth of child poverty is reflected in the fact that intra-regional differences in the central indicators used for programme allocation in Give Kids a Chance – the rate of disadvantaged children, and of those receiving permanent child

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[1] Due to the lack of accessible data child poverty was estimated by the number of "disadvantaged and multiply disadvantaged children". The "disadvantaged" status indicator (hátrányos helyzetű, HH) was developed by the definition of "disadvantaged children" in Act XXVII of 2013 as those who are eligible for regular child protection allowance and who are being are raised by unemployed parent(s) or by parents with low educational attainment or live in a segregated/low amenity environment (Bauer et al, 2015). "Multiply disadvantaged" (halmozottan hátrányos helyzetű, HHH) children are those who meet at least two of the latter three criteria (Bauer et al, 2015). Disadvantaged status in Hungary provides eligibility for financial assistance and in-kind benefits as well.

[2] Decree 311/2007 XI.17 defined these localities as "most disadvantaged" (*leghátrányosabb helyzetű*, LHH) on the basis of complex socio-economic indicators

benefits – are not significant. It is only the indicator of "multiply disadvantaged children" that shows more variability among settlements, which reflects the pervasive presence of extreme deprivation in the settlements of the micro-region. Give Kids a Chance programme was brought about to alleviate such instances of spatial injustice, which affect children's development and capability expansion in reaching their full potentials.

As a result of the weak applicability of statistical data on child poverty, we set out to conduct qualitative social research in the micro-region, which is more likely to yield data on intra-regional differences and spatial (in)justice in child welfare service provisions. During the empirical research our sample reflected to the socio –spatial processes of the last decades. In doing so, we have chosen localities according to its recent administrative position, accessibility of institutions, the social composition of the locality and the position of child poverty in the development plan. We conducted empirical fieldwork in four sites within the micro-region of Encs: in the district centre and in one of the ghettoized part of the town, in a local centre with around one-thousand inhabitants and some locally available services, and in one ghettoized village that suffers from the lack of local service provision.

The main actors of the overall programme at the central state level are the Ministry of Human Resources (Humán Erőforrások Minisztériuma), and its background institution (due to frequent changes first it was Wekerle Sándor Fund Managing Agency, and later Human Resources Fund Managing Agency). The latter formed a consortium with The Hungarian Charity Service of the Order of Malta[3] and a research group[4] within the Social Science Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences that was established to supplement the overall Give Kids a Chance programme with methodological support and mentoring for micro-regions in the design and implementation of their local programmes. At the local level, the most important actor of the Give Kids a Chance micro-regional programme has been the Give Kids a Chance Office[5], a unit set up within the Multi-Purpose Micro-regional Association of Encs to manage and coordinate programme planning and implementation through the association of diverse local public sector stakeholders, the public and the leadership of settlements. Due their decade-long experience in coordinating cross-sectoral and cross-settlement development programmes and public service provision, the staff of the local Office was deeply embedded in local as well as vertical policy networks.

Our research aimed to answer the question whether or not and how Give Kids a Chance could fulfil its overall goal to improve children's well-being by altering institutions so that they better coordinate public service provision and drive policy mechanisms in a way that support intra-regional spatial justice. It studied the way the governance of the local programme reflected on intra-regional disparities in service provision and differences in capacities and competences between settlements. In this vein, it analysed the impact of the programme for small settlements, whether or not they managed to take advantage of the two-and-a-half year long programme in terms of a more just service delivery for children.

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[3] In the text, the organisation is referred to as it is used in colloquial language: the "Order of Malta", or "Malta".

[4] Following the termination of the Programme Office to Combat Child Poverty at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (HAS) and the dismissal of its staff in 2011, the government initiated the establishment of the Give Kids a Chance Research Group at HAS to be a member of a new consortium for the management Give Kids a Chance programme supplying it with background research.

[5] In the text, the organisation is referred to as it is used in colloquial language: the "Office", or "local Office".

2. Methodological Reflection

During our fieldwork, sometimes we could not shape formal interview situations, despite being recorded, e.g. sometimes we had to make interviews with two or three members of the given institution simultaneously which on the one hand hidden some conflicts between them, but on the other hand gave them the possibility to reflect on each other. Sometimes stakeholders have different overlapping roles in the action and the locality, e.g. the women who is the leader of the chosen action, also secretary of the association of localities and one of the representatives of the locality. In these cases we had to make separate interviews or separate the different roles within the interviews. During our fieldwork we realized that in some situations, especially regarding the perceptions of benefitting users participatory observations and informal conversations (anthropological approaches) were much more effective than formal interviews.

Formal interviews with benefitting users (local inhabitants) on development projects and locality, especially on the local elite/decision takers were not really successful. According to our experiences approaching benefitting users' needs special methodology, e.g. participatory observations, informal conversations, participations in their activities in the development project can be more effective. We learned much more when we just spent time in a 'Sure Start House' with mothers chatting with them and observing their activities, than when we asked them directly. These anthropological approaches need more time spent in the community which raise further methodological considerations and related resources.

3. The Locality

3.1 Territorial Context and Characteristics of the Locality

Name of Case Study Area	Encs micro-region
Size	379 km²
Total population (2016)	21 562
Population density (2016)	57/ km²
Level of development in relation to wider socio-economic context • Disadvantaged within a developed region/city? • Disadvantaged within a wider underdeveloped region?	Disadvantaged within a wider underdeveloped region
Name and Identification Code of the NUTS-3 area, in which the locality is situated (NUTS 3 Code(s) as of 2013)	HU311 Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén
Name and Identification Code of the NUTS-2 area, in which the locality is situated (NUTS 2 Code(s) as of 2013)	HU 31 Észak- Magyarország/ Northern Hungary
Type of the region (NUTS3-Eurostat) • Predominantly urban? • Intermediate? • Predominantly rural?	Intermediate

Table 1: Basic socio-economic characteristics of the area

The traditionally disadvantaged area, the district of Encs, is located in the Northern periphery of the country at the Slovakian border, on the main railway and motorway line connecting Miskolc and Kosice[6]. (Slovakia). The town of Encs and its neighbouring villages historically belong to the geographical region called Cserehát shaped by three formal districts: Encs, Edelény and Szikszó. Encs and the neighbouring villages sometimes also define themselves as 'Abaúj', the area at the lower section of the river Hernád, comprising the districts of Encs, Szikszó and partly Abaúj-Hegyköz. The area is characterized by micro-villages and small towns. From the 29 settlements of the Encs district 20 have less than five hundred inhabitants, where only 22% of the total population of the district live. Encs, the district centre and the only town has 6434 inhabitants. (Table 5).

Lagging rural areas, like the Encs district are characterized by economic decline, selective out-migration, and a concentration of poverty, and have demographically polarized societies with very high unemployment rate and low level of educational attainment. The origins of this disadvantageous are manifold. The loss of its organic economic centre Kosice (Kassa) after the Trianon Treaty in 1921 put this region on the periphery of the state border. Subsequently Encs had developed into a micro-regional[7] centre due to the forced changes of public administration after the World War II which reinforced the state borders between Hungary and Slovakia. Due to its

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[6] The locality is discussed from the point of view of its current administrative status, hence is the reference the „district of Encs".

[7] The action had been designed for micro-regions, hence is the use of the term „micro-region". The territorial unit of the micro-region of Encs and the district of Encs are 80% identical. At the coming about of districts, few settlements were separated administratively from the territory of the previous micro-region and transferred to neighbouring public administration districts. In this study we use the terms "micro-region" and "district" interchangeably.

favourable geographical location the previously village-style settlement became the centre of public administration (*járás központ*) of the neighbouring villages. As a result, in the 1960s the main institutions of public administration and education; the district court, police and firework station, health care centre and ambulance service, secondary schools, commercial and social services were all settled in this locality. It was reinforced by the settlement policy of the 1970s, which aimed to centralize the economic, administrative and educational institutions, bringing them into the micro-regional centre and the designated larger settlements. This caused fundamental imbalances in socio-economic and infrastructural development and in the accessibility of social services among the settlements. As a result, in the 1970s in most of the small villages the elementary schools were closed and the local government lost its power in decision making and over development possibility.

Differences in the accessibility of workplaces and institutions induced out migration flows from the villages, which increased disparities between the settlements of the region. The district centre Encs with its own labour market, better public transport possibilities and available social services became the destination of migration for the better-off, educated and younger people. The population has constantly grown in the last decades in the micro-regional centre. (Table 6) Settlements (larger villages within the micro-region) that were made the administration centre of their neighbouring villages (like Hernádvécse in our sample) could keep their basic institutions (local government, elementary school and agriculture cooperative), which helped to keep the local population in place; from those villages outmigration was less significant during socialist times. Outmigration in general mostly affected those small villages which due to the centralization politics lost their institutions. In our sample Csenyéte lost half of its dwellers between 1970-1990. (Table 6)

Due to differences in the accessibility and development of institutions, selective migration transformed local societies. Socio-economic data (level of employment, educational attainment, and demographic constitution) of the entire micro-region shows considerable lagging behind from the national average, but intra-regional disparities are also significant between the socio-economic data of the micro-regional centre Encs and the other settlements. The socio-economic data of Encs is close to the national average; while the socio-economic data of the other settlements reflect demographically polarized local societies (see Table 8 and map 4-8). Even though out-migration has been a characteristic tendency in this micro-region for decades, after 1990 numerous poor families moved into this area, primarily those who were unable to maintain their former standard of living in towns. Fertility rates of impoverished families have also changed (Durst, 2002). Due to these changes the social and ethnic composition of settlements has significantly changed: the rate of those under the age of 14 within the population is considerably higher, sometimes double than the national average and ethnic concentration has increased, too. (Table 8 Map 4-5) Scholars identify two types of exclusion: one is linked to spatial inequalities that affect families living in economically depressed areas like the district of Encs and isolated small villages within the micro-region, while the other is linked to ethnic origin, afflicting the poor who account for the majority of the Roma. The complex interplay of spatial, social and ethnic exclusion produces a special socio-spatial formation in the rural peripheries: the ghettoized rural villages, like Csenyéte in our sample (Virág 2006, Ladányi-Szelényi 2006, Nagy et all 2015).

The sample of this empirical research reflects on socio –spatial processes of the last decades. In this vein, we have chosen localities according to their recent administrative positions (1.), accessibility of institutions (2.) the social composition of the locality (3.) and their position in the development plan on child poverty (4.).

	Position	Accessibility of SGI	Social composition of the locality	Position in the development plan on child poverty
Encs	District centre	Locally	Socially and ethnically heterogeneous, part of the locality is ghettoized (Fügöd)	The ghettoized part of the town is the main target place in the development programme.
Hernádvécse	Micro –regional centre	Partly locally, partly in the district centre	Dominantly Roma and impoverished families	Main target place in the development programme.
Csenyéte	Small village with limited local autonomy	Partly locally, partly in the micro-regional centre, partly in the district centre	Socially and ethnically homogenous ghettoized village	Main target place in the development programme.

Table 2 The sample of the localities

3.2 Analytical Dimension 1: Perception of spatial (in-)justice within and across the locality

Local narratives mainly define socio-spatial differences between the district of Encs and the rest of Hungary, as well as within the district in terms of spatial injustice. Spatial injustice is understood here as the absence of opportunities, manifested in the general scarcity of human and social capital, of infrastructure and employment, and of entrepreneurship. Spatial injustice is also seen to prevail in an undifferentiated and space-blind domestic system of measures and standards to which local institutions must adhere in public service provision with their meagre human, financial and infrastructural capacities and that throw localities with different socio-economic background into competition with one another. Schools in the district of Encs, with the highest concentration of poverty and lowest educational attainment in the country produce pupil competency tests that are measured by the same central standards as in wealthy, upper-middle class neighbourhoods elsewhere in Hungary. Interpreting the low efficacy of local public services as underperformance appears in local narratives as double-bound spatial injustice: in the comparatively deprived socio-economic local context ridden with scarce resources it is difficult to live up to objective standards and produce similar institutional results. In this understanding spatial justice is understood in terms of equity, rather than equality. In other words, spatial justice would be produced by place-based and equitable procedures and distributive mechanisms, rather than measures that aim at (re)producing equal performance in places with diverse backgrounds.

This local narrative on spatial injustice reflects the centralization process of the last decades, which caused fundamental differences in the positionality of settlements by power, financial resources, access to institutions and services and in general living conditions. Encs as a district centre has been an attractive relocation destination for the better-off families for decades. "*Actually many families moved to Encs from the villages of Cserehát. Encs is the centre, I mean artificially developed centre of the wider region. And if somebody moves from the villages to Encs, he/she considers oneself a bigger man. It is kind of human foolishness.*"(2) Compared to living in the remote villages, the district centre has high prestige and provides access to several institutions and services, including a range of educational possibilities and workplaces. Contrary to Encs, the villages define themselves as remote places, situated far away from workplaces and

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services. *"Abaúj is not the end of the world but close to".* (20) The quotation of an institutional actor in a remote village refers not only to the spatial distance of the settlement from centres but expresses its abandoned and forgotten position too.

Encs, the district centre defines itself as the institutional and service providing centre of neighbouring villages, and calls itself as the *'centre of Abaúj'*. Due to spatial distances, scarce public transport services and their high costs, regular dwellers from remote villages can go to the district centre once or twice a month, usually to apply in the employment office for social benefits and to do some shopping. Generally, impoverished families living in the villages have no access to social services and institutions in the district centre. Regular town dwellers and even stakeholders working in the district centre have no reason to travel to these villages, therefore there is no possibility for regular encounters. Consequently impoverished families living in remote small villages and their everyday problems are invisible for them.

However there are also differences in spatial immobility from remote villages according to gender and age. While men can leave the villages for work, mainly temporally and informally, impoverished children usually can leave the village only once or twice a year for an excursion organised by the local schools/kindergarten. Similarly, young mothers, who take care of their families, cannot leave the villages. They have limited options, relying primarily on kinship and neighbour relationships that operate within segregated villages. Thus spatial immobility of impoverished families is combined with social and spatial segregation: these closed societies are characterized by bonding relationships that are based on reciprocity, trust, and solidarity and provide support and protection. At the same time they also constrain the mobility of the members as they are socially homogenous.

Defining itself as the *'centre of Abaúj'* also has an additional meaning. The district of Encs belongs to 'Abaúj' and 'Cserehát', but the latter geographical unit is generally associated with poverty and the dominancy of Roma ethnicity. In this sense defining itself as part of 'Abaúj' expresses the town's intention to get rid of the territorial stigma connected to 'Cserehát'. The local government of a village refused to apply for a development project aiming at disadvantaged children because they did not want the locality to be associated with disadvantaged children associated in that region (and generally in Hungary) with Roma.

The main narrative on spatial injustice is strongly connected to the Roma ethnicity combined with the positionality of the settlements which induced further differentiations among them. In Hungary there is little to no opportunity for Roma to voluntarily choose their group belonging or to rise to a position of recognition and empowerment (Neményi - Vajda 2014). Thus, in most cases, representations of ethnicity are based on external categorization processes imposed on them by the majority society, distinguished by the presence of unequal social and power relations. Furthermore, the concept of Roma at present is a construct of the majority society, reflecting their perceptions, rather than an actual ethnic community/group (McGarry 2014). The wider region called Cserehát (covering the three districts of Edelény, Szikszó and Encs) has had predominantly Roma population for decades; the idea of a 'Roma autonomous territory' appeared in the county development plan already in the '1980's . This was not a bottom-up initiative with the purpose of empowering Romas rather it was a top-down proposal from the county level with the intention to separate Roma from mainstream society.

In the local narratives perceptions of ethnicity are spatially determined, usually distinguished Roma groups by locality are associated with different stereotypes and are combined with the established and outsider configuration. In many localities (in our sample in Hernádvécse and Fügöd) the main social problem is connected to newcomers from the neighbouring villages who appear in local narratives as outsiders. Distinction is made between our Roma (who live in the given locality for generations) and the others (as newcomers, foreigners). The decay of the locality often connected to outsiders. *"Once Hernádvécse was a very nice village, we never had to call for the police. Since the families from the neighbouring village arrived, once family pulled the other, the village has started to decay."* (23)

Csenyéte become famous as the first Roma-only-locality in the region, as a result of spatial peripherialization and social marginalization, and is considered by the neighbouring settlements as a stigmatized village. The socially and spatially marginalized village is set apart from the other settlements by sharp mental boundaries. Due to its spatial and social marginalization, and its spatial distance even the most impoverished Roma would not want to move to this village which reinforced its enclosure and isolation.

The local narratives are often determined by Roma-phobia and the fearing of growing demographic dominance of Roma (in Hungarian *elcigányosodás*) based on differences in fertility rate and mobility aspirations and possibilities. *"The elderly die out, the Roma get more numerous. So the situation got worse. The social judgement of it is well known, where 85% of the population is Roma, it is said to be over for them."* (19)

"I consider that the mainstream society [meaning ethnic Hungarians] *lost their tolerance, feel oneself in minority, only the elderly stayed in the villages, living alone in defenceless position. There are more and more citizens not only in the small villages but in Encs too. [What does it mean to lose tolerance?] Any initiatives aimed to empower Roma or develop their positions are hardly accepted by them or they even do everything to prevent it."* (1.)

We can find similar drivers in the perception of spatial injustice within the town of Encs. The forced institutional developments of the socialist period divided the town into two parts. The old town centre, actually a village-style neighbourhood with small peasant houses, traditionally was the dwelling place of the Roma and non-Roma poor. It is located on one side of the railway, while at the edge of this part of the town, a Roma neighbourhood is situated. The other side of the railway is the modern part of the town with new institutions and residential areas that were built during the 1970s and 1980s dwelled by educated, young families, often moved from the neighbouring villages. Thus, we identify these differences as the historical spatial division of the local community by social status.

Even though the settlement has become the in-migration destination for more and more families since the 1960s, the number of inhabitants could not reach the limit of town status (five thousand inhabitants) and it got the official town status only in 1984 due to merging with the neighbouring villages (Abaújdevecser, Fügöd, Gibárt). In the narratives the town, Encs and the neighbouring villages Abaújdevecser and Fügöd (Gibárt became independent settlement again in 2006) are always distinguished. They are discussed as a different and independent part of the locality and it is emphasized that the dwellers insist on keeping locally the basic institutions and the local government takes it into consideration in the development planning (see later). The positionality and the historical background of the different parts of the settlement define perceptions and narratives about them.

Despite the above mentioned perceptions of ethnicity based on external categorization, the Roma population is very diverse in the town and should not only be interpreted in socio-economic, social and ethnic terms, but also as lifestyles, attitudes, and activities that are strongly connected to a given part of the settlement. This appears in the narratives of local stakeholders. *"Officially we are all from Encs, but the indigenous local dwellers know who is from Abaújdevecser, Fügöd or Encs. This tryad exists, and in more detail he/she lives in Béke street, in the Szug or Fügöd etc.. The Roma from the Béke street say that in the Szug the millionaire Roma live, because they are involved in the construction business. Fügöd is another question, they appear as an enemy. (...) Abaújdevecser is in another situation again. There never has been a separate Roma neighbourhood or even a street, Roma have always lived scattered and the coexistence with the non-Roma neighbours was the everyday routine. They worked for non-Roma as daily workers, and later on together in the cooperative. "* Another (non-Roma) stakeholder added: *"There are three kinds of Roma families in Encs: the 'well-to-do' who can easily make a living, the middle category who will listen to what they're told, and a third type whom no one can handle."* That categorization appears in an

even more differentiated form spatially, in the segregation map[8] of the town (Map 1) as well. Abaújdevecser, where the 'well-to-do' Roma families live is not signed in the official map and it does not appeared in the narratives as segregated area. The segregated unit No. 1, 2 and 4 are located along the other side of the railway far away from the city centre in the oldest and poorest part of the town, which look more like a village, but there are some differences between them regarding ethnic composition and infrastructural developments. The last streets, called 'Béke' (the No.1 segregated unit), constituted traditionally the Roma segment. In these streets of the neighbourhood Roma families live exclusively but in the other streets ethnic mixing is characteristic. Most of the families live in moderate poverty with cultivated gardens and domestic animals.

Map 1 Segregated units in Encs

Source: Encs ITS 2015. page129-130.

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[8] Map of segregation is a mandatory element of the Integrated Development Strategy and made by the National Statistical Office on national census. Definition of the segregated unit: where the rate of the households with elementary education and without regular income within the active age group is higher than 35% and the territorial unit has minimum 50 inhabitants.

RELOCAL has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement. N° 727097

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	Encs	Segregated unit No.1	Segregated unit No. 2.	Segregated unit No. 3.	Segregated unit No. 4.
Local name in narratives		'Béke street' – Roma neigh-bourhood + mixed ethnic impoverished streets	„Szug" – tra-ditionally impoverished part of the old town	'Fügöd' – the Roma ghetto	Part of the old town con-sider usually not segregat-ed
Number of popu-lation	6344	362	89	384	142
Rate of population under age 14	18,3	35,6	30,3	45,6	26,8
Rate of population over age 60	21,8	9,4	6,7	4,2	16,9
Rate of population with elementary education	22,4	75,4	71,4	88,1	50,0
Rate of house-holds without regular income within the active age groups	46,2	71,4	83,9	89,6	66,3
Rate of house-holds with ele-mentary educa-tion AND without regular income within the active age group	17,2	59,3	58,9	79,3	37,5

Table 3 Socio demographic characteristic of Encs and its segregated units 2014

Source: Encs ITS 2015. Page 129-130.

The segregated unit No. 2 and 4 are situated in the old village part of town. Despite the fact that these areas are designated in various development documents as a segregated neighbourhood, and at the edge of the town (segregated unit no 2.) some impoverished families live in dilapi-dated, shanty houses. We had an interviewee from the municipal government who did not even regard that part of the town as a segregated neighbourhood due to its orderly exterior, and maybe because she lives also in this neighbourhood. She placed that street within the inner bor-ders of the mental map of the town, despite its physical distance. In fact the socio-demographic character of this unit (No 4) is closed to the town average. Due to the effort and willingness of the local municipality the status of this area has been greatly advanced by infrastructural devel-opments in recent years.

Fügöd (segregated unit No 3) was a small village attached to the town in the 1970s. Nowadays there are only a few elderly non-Roma people residing in the middle of the neighbour-hood/former village (mostly one the Main Street, where houses are relatively orderly), and more than 350 Roma live on three streets at the end of the village in dilapidated or even shanty hous-es. There are no fences, nor yards; most households use illegally connected electricity; they have no bathrooms, plumbing, or modern heating; and families usually get water from public wells which are closed from time to time. This neighbourhood is not only far away from the city centre but it is set apart from the town by sharp mental boundaries. From the perspective of local stakeholders working for the municipality and its institutions this neighbourhood is a stigma-

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tized and criminalized space. The aim of these stakeholders has been to make Roma families living in the segregated neighbourhood invisible, through which the social and ethnic problems and conflicts are kept in a distance from those regular families living in the town centre. The visibility of the Roma families in the town center always reminds the town dwellers of the fear and closeness of the stigmatized place. *"In the shop everybody recognize who is from Fügöd and who is from another part of the town. They feel it as danger."* (3)

In our sample there are two localities, Csenyéte and Fügöd, that are considered as stigmatized ghettos, but there are considerable differences between them: Csenyéte is situated far away from the district centre and due to its geographical isolation and immobility of Roma families, they are invisible for the mainstream society and decision makers, contrary to Roma families in Fügöd who are visible and the town dwellers can meet them daily. These differences fundamentally determine perceptions.

3.3 Analytical Dimension 2: Tools and policies for development and cohesion

In the beginning of the 1990s, in the face of mounting social problems and the weakening of the county level, the central state was in need of new partners for its new territorial development policy that displayed elements of decentralization (Fekete, 1995). Micro-regional associations served as potential new partners for the central state to resolve social tensions and developmental bottlenecks caused by economic transformation; thus the central state encouraged the coming about of such associations with financial incentives and flexible institutional structures that enabled the voluntary association of diverse local actors in jurisdictions at their own discretion. Since the devolution of administrative and public services to the local level was not followed by financial decentralization, local governments had to find ways to "work closer together" with other local actors. Initiatives ranged from special sectoral associations to coordinate public education administration and organize pedagogical service provision in the territory of member municipalities (Public Education Service District, PESD *Közoktatási Ellátási Körzet*), to encompassing cross-settlement developmental alliances (Cserehát Alliance and Abaúj Alliance for Regional Development) integrating state and non-state actors across the vertical and horizontal spectrum (government agencies, local governments, firms, civil society, sectoral-professional organisations and academia) through non-hierarchical and consensus-based coordination practices (Keller, 2010). At the turn of millennium several types of associations could be found in the micro-region of Encs that had informal, ad hoc ties to one another and operated various development coalitions. This period was characterized by informal decision -making mechanisms, and strong bottom-up development activism at the local level, which guaranteed to reach consensus-based decisions through the support of cross organisational membership. This civic associationalism began to weaken at the turn of the millennium, when the institutional framework of the Hungarian development regime began to change. Domestic regulations and financial instruments began to restrict local actors to organize their voluntary micro-regional associations by prescribing centrally defined institutional solutions in the sectoral composition (local governments), the territorial extension (statistical micro-regions) and the organizational form (local governmental partnerships) of associations.

By the time Hungary joined the European Union in 2004, the micro-region of Encs was transformed from a flexible developmental community based on organic ties and armoured with a plurality of developmental visions, into an administrative sub-national unit with decreasing mandates. The organisational structure and institutional background of micro-regional associations became defined by the central state, ordering the establishment of mandatory multi-purpose micro-regional partnerships (MPMP), based on statistical administrative micro-regional units, to organize social provisions in education, social services, regional development and health care (Keller 2010, 2011, Kovács 2008). Usually the mayor of the micro-regional centre became the formal leader of the MPMP – in our case the mayor of Encs – and the core/management team (operative staff) was recruited from the staff of previous Public Educa-

tion Service District. Due to a decade-long involvement in cross-municipal associations, the operative staff of MPMP was deeply embedded in professional and personal networks in the micro-region. This enabled them to continue to rely on more or less informal and organic and bottom-up decision making procedures in the planning and implementation of development projects. On the other hand, maintaining a good relationship with the operative staff of the MPMP was in the interest of mayors and stakeholders in the villages in order to guarantee the representation and involvement of their settlement in different development programmes and regularly get information about new tenders and possibilities.

The centralization process that had started in the early 2000s switched gears in 2010 with the coming to power of a new conservative/right-wing government that began intensive centralisation in public policy making by pulling administrative and executive functions away from local governments in all policy areas. Changes in the country's public administration and public policy system increased burocratic control mechanisms over local governments by the central state and decreased their room for manoeuvres in making autonomous decisions about public service provisions and local development. The new Public Education Act (2011) took the rights of settlements away to maintain educational institutions and recentralized public education in other domains as well, e.g.: in curriculum development, in content-development, text-book publishing. A central office (Klebelsberg Centre for Maintaining Institutions (*Klebelsberg Intézményfenntartó Központ – KLIK*) and its district level institutions were founded by the national government to manage and control the administration of public schools. The Local Government Act (2012) took tax-extracting functions away from local governments and introduced earmarked financial mechanisms in public service provision that still remained in local governmental maintenance. The Local Government Act was amended in order to re-introduce public administration districts (*járások*) as well as district offices (*járási hivatalok*) in 2013, fulfilling both administrative and organisational functions. Similar changes took place in the child welfare sector, where after the merging of family support services with child welfare services without adequate financial and human resources to cover increased costs and needs, day-to-day services had to be provided by local governments, while administrative functions were pulled into family and child welfare centers placed at the district level. District offices are directly connected to central government agencies, ensuring the direct top-down control of the local level by the central state. Due to these changes local governments, especially those in smaller settlements, with increasingly limited financing opportunities, lost their influence to maintain and develop local institutions. The new public administration structure, for instance, terminated the funding of MPMPs, leading to the dissolution of this organisational form. Nevertheless, in the district of Encs, the local governments decided to keep MPMP for the purpose of providing social care services in member settlements, in addition to the organisational units of the mandatory public district of Encs. The operative staff of MPMP got integrated into different departments of the town's local government, and run micro-regional development programmes, such as *Give Kids a Chance* (see the action).

The micro-region of Encs and its wider region called Cserehát was the place of several pilot development programmes from the early 1990s aiming to mitigate social and spatial disparities during the unprecedented socio-economic crisis of the systemic change. The region of Cserehát was a special laboratory of developmental experiments initiated by a diversity of actors from across various levels of governance (local, county, national, international) and from different sectors (governmental, non-governmental, employment, education, social care). The so called "Cserehát development programmes" were co-funded by the Ministry of Equal Opportunities and the UNDP between 2004 and 2007, and functioned as pilot programmes that helped to define the 33 most disadvantaged – mainly underfunded – micro-regions in country. In 2007 a separate funding scheme was established for them (2007/311 Governmental Decree: "Funding for the catching up of mostly disadvantaged micro-regions") (Kovács 2011, Németh 2013). This decentralized, dedicated fund originally based on local needs and place based planning was intended to finance human infrastructure development to reduce burdens of local governments in terms of service provisions, to support local entrepreneurs and infrastructural development

between 2008 and 2011. The experiences of the pilot programme highlighted the limitation of the place based planning methods rooted in the weakness of local actors, especially the lack of NGO-s. In these disadvantageous areas the main local actor in the development programme, the driver in the planning and implementation process is the local government, in smaller settlements the mayor himself/herself, which determine capabilities. Due to the power relations between the different local governmental actors the everyday practices of deliberation and negotiation are strongly limited. General experiences show that due to inadequate financing schemes, and the lack of own contributions and resources, settlements' dependency on development tenders is very high. Thus even if the local government has developmental visions, it is in fact „ *the tenders (that) decide what we can do for the development of town."(8)* The implication of this is that the goals and means of the settlement's development are defined externally rather than "from within".

Institutional changes and increasing project dependency after 2010 are reflected in the capabilities of different settlements to access development sources. The capabilities of Encs as the only town and the centre of the micro-region are much higher than the other villages, and the differences in the ability of accessing resources became bigger in the last decade. The human capacities and knowledge are also concentrated in Encs; the operative staffs of the MPMP and different departments of the local governments always work in very close cooperation which is reinforced by the mayor's double role. The development projects of the town mainly focused on infrastructural investments, in the last decades every institution, public spaces have been renovated and modernized, under the pressure of project dependency. (Table 9.) *"The interesting thing is, that on the one hand, whoever sat here, in this chair, whoever was the council member, everybody was aiming to strengthen the settlement and Abaúj with this structure. And I think that this is a nice, livable, small town. Esthetically as well as in its public spaces, institutions and services."* (1.)

Due to the historical spatial division of the town most of the institutions are concentrated in one neighbourhood that was developed in the 60ies and 70ies. Over the last decade most of the development projects aimed at renovation and modernization concentrated in that neighbourhood. There is only one institution, a community center in the village-style old part of the town. When the renovation of that center was planned, it was a consideration moves it from the village-part neighbourhood to modern one. „*And in the part in the old town of Encs, the problem was always that there is nothing, that the town would throw them out, and our community center is right there. There was a plan to move it, we have a park, and here could be a community center next to it. And then maybe to preserve the population, we decided to try it there, so that we at least have that one institution over the railways. And by the way, in the long run, people appreciated it."* (*8*)

Abaújdevecser and Fügöd was merged with Encs in the 80ies, and they are discussed as a different and independent part of the locality and it is emphasized that dwellers insist to keep locally the basic institutions and the local government takes it into consideration in the development planning. Indeed there are kindergartens in both neighbourhoods and Fügöd also has elementary school. By the establishment of a primary school, the aim of the local decision makers had been not to strengthen services locally, rather to control access to social services especially to educational institutions. The primary school in the centre of the micro-region in Encs has always been considered an elite school in the region and the town. Thanks to the good reputation of the school, it has been flooded with children from better-off families from the neighbouring settlements and has never suffered from a lack of students. A member institution of the elementary school with primary classes has been operating in the neighbourhood of Fügöd since the 1980s, taking exclusively Roma children from the Roma segment. In the last decade the town school was unable to handle the behavioural problems and low knowledge base of the children arriving at the upper four grades from the segregated school. The school leadership and decision makers at the municipality decided to "help the children" by starting the upper four grades at the Fügöd school as well. Discrepancies between the conditions of the two schools are obvious: there is a newly built, renovated modern school building in the town centre by contrary the school build-

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ing in Fügöd is crowded and rundown. There has been a strong social expectation of the town to keep the ghetto school of Fügöd operational, thus keeping "problematic children" away from the town and from "regular" children. *"It would be an explosion if those children from Fügöd appear in the town school"(1.)* From the other side it resonated as: *Fügöd has always been a stepchild"(9).*

During the evaluation of development projects aimed at mitigating social and spatial injustice, it is mandatory to incorporate into the consortium a Roma or pro-Roma NGO. In most cases due to the weakness of the civil sector and lack of the local NGOs, it is the local Roma Minority Self-Government (RMSG) as the official and elected representatives of local Roma community[9]. Generally co-operation between local governments and RMSGs are usually based on informal, personal relationships and express unequal power relations (Szalai 2015). Due to some financial and administrative complications during the implementation of development projects, the local government of Encs has had an imbalanced cooperation with the previous leader of the RMSG, who lives in one of the poorest Roma neighbourhoods. Recently, the new leader of the RMSG is educated, has wide network with national and international Roma and pro-Roma organizations and is employed in one of the local governmental departments. Relations and cooperation in development programmes between the local government and the RMSG have become more balanced, since the new leadership of the RMSG took office. Nevertheless, the RMSG stayed invisible for Roma living in segregated and impoverished Fügöd, reflecting the fragmentation of the local Roma community by social class and status. The representation of the Roma is thus limited, due to the dissociation of Roma leadership from vulnerable groups. (see more detailed in 4.3)

Hernádvécse has around one thousand inhabitants and as the local centre it could keep its basic institutions (kindergarten, elementary schools, and social services). Nevertheless it is a relatively small locality where development is fragmented, distinctively connected to three different actor groups. Generally the local government is eligible for applying for development funds provisioning local institutions. In this case the mayor as the head of the local government, is not the initiator of the development project; her activity is limited to taking part in micro-regional projects coordinated from Encs. The main initiator of the development projects is the principal of the elementary schools, who has wide national network with pro-Roma organizations through which he introduced new methods in education. Previously they worked together with the local government on development projects but due to the lack of transparency distrust evolved between the principal and the local government.

The third actor is an outsider, who arrived from the other part of the country in order to renovate and operate the local mansion as a wellness hotel. Due to the low level of educational attainment in the region the staff of the hotel commutes from the other parts of the country is the wellness hotel employs only a few people from the village as cleaning lady, gardener. *"People come here from the city, it's a closed world, it doesn't really affect the settlement."* The wellness hotel is walled and its gate is always close, in the website is defines itself as a *"Closed a town in a mansion"*.

In Csenyéte from the early 1990's a range of different intellectuals, development experts from Hungary and abroad initiated different development programmes and founded alternative institutions in the agriculture as well as in the education. (Ladányi-Szelényi, 2006) Sooner or later the development programmes failed and the initiators left the village and the mayor remained the only stakeholder in the village. The mayor with her strong authority is the only decision maker locally, the everyday life of the village inhabitants is organized by the mayor's strong control and authority. In this village half of the population is under age 14 and only a few families have regular income. In this village – and many other villages in the region - the administrative staff and the knowledge for planning and implementing the more and more complicated devel-

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[9] The primary duties of the RMSG are besides the strengthening cultural autonomy and representing the interests of the particular community, promoting equal opportunities, is co-operation in preparing development plans. Act CLXXIX of 2011, On the Rights of National Minorities

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opment projects is absent. The last successful development tender of the local government was in 2006 when the school building was renewed. Consequently local institutions, such as the crowded kindergarten, were renovated 20 years ago. The kindergarten with its broken windows and abandoned playground is in very poor conditions. The staff of the institution, as the mayor too, commutes from the neighbouring village, a social workers and the home-visiting nurse comes to the village twice a week for a half day to provide social services for the whole village. The local government was involved in different micro-reginal development programmes through which different projects were implemented in order to improve the education of children in kindergarten and school, trainings for young adult etc., but it only got resources allocated for infrastructural investment in one case: in 2014 a house for community activities renewed within the frames of the "Give Kids Chance" programme.

The overall evaluation of the varieties of development projects reflects the social composition of the micro-region, namely the complex interplay of spatial, social and ethnic marginalization: „*A part of these courses, trainings, programmes is useful. How useful I do not know, but a significant part, I feel like, did not fulfill its role. So the inadequate programmes were introduced. But because of such general reasons, it doesn't matter what programme we introduce. Masses struggle with inclusion in the society. If somebody walks through a village in Abaúj, on the main street of the village, then can realize it in a few minutes. So here, opposed to the understandable attempts of modernization, we would need significantly different programmes. (…) So the ethnical composition, the aging – I don't think that these are signs that point towards that… migrating youngsters… how would there be any hope in the future here? I think we are just trying to stabilize the situation, or trying to save what we can, with the remaining professionals.*" (1.)

4. The Action

4.1 Basic Characteristics of the Action

Give Kids a Chance was first implemented as a pilot project in one of the most disadvantaged micro-regions, in Northern Hungary in 2006. The goal of the Szécsény pilot project was to gain experiences about methods of place-based planning about child welfare services and institutions that can improve families' situation in the most disadvantaged micro-regions and to develop a curriculum for the adaptation of the Sure Start Programme[10]. Financed by the Norwegian Fund and managed by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences' (HAS) Programme Office to Combat Child Poverty in cooperation with the Prime Minister's Office, the Szécsény pilot project was based on the elicitation of local knowledge through participatory institutions. These institutions had been initiated by academics and experts from HAS who provided some knowledge transfer in these disadvantaged settlements generally short of human resource capacities. The inclusion of the National Strategy in Hungary's National Development Plan in 2011 provided funding for extensions of the programme from the European Social Fund.

Micro-regional extensions of Give Kids a Chance have been carried out in four phases in the most disadvantaged micro-regions of the country. In the first programme cycle five disadvantaged micro-regions could begin implementation in 2010. An additional six disadvantaged micro-regions started planning in 2011 and implementation in 2012, while in the third round in 2012 fifteen micro-regions applied for funding and twelve of them began implementation of their Give Kids a Chance micro-regional programmes in 2013.[11] Funding provided by the European Social Fund (ESF) was available for three years for all micro-regions with a budget of HUF 450-600 million (€1.5–2 million) per micro-region. The fourth extension of the programme is currently taking place in the current programing period (2017-2022), when 31 districts will be funded over a five-year period, 24 of whom had already participated in previous funding cycles. Despite its 5 year implementation timeframe, the amount of funding in the fourth programme cycle has not changed, it remained around HUF 450-600 million.

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[10] The Sure Start programme was adapted from the British modell in Hungary in 2003. Initially, pilot projects began in six deprived localities in Hungary, then in 2009 the programme was extended to other localities financed by the European Social Fund. Similar to its original British methodology, Hungarian Sure Start houses are children and family centers established in deprived localities to provide services that support early childhood development by linking it to child well-being, family welfare and the development of parental competencies. In order to avoid stigmatization and improve accessibility all families living in depressed neigbourhoods have access to Sure Start Houses, irrespective of their socio-economic background. The Sure Start programme aims to reduce regional disadvantages by filling gaps in local early childhood care and family welfare services and enhancing the quality and accessibility of existing services. Since 2009 Hungarian Sure Start houses could also be established within Give Kids a Chance programme first as an optional, later on as a mandatory programme element. In 2012 Sure Start houses were incorporated in the domestic institutional system of child-welfare services financed by the central state through annual funding of approximately €20 000.

[11] Micro-regions in the first two programme cycles had three years to implement micro-regional Give Kids a Chance. Due to institutional and organisational anomalies at the central state level, micro-regions in the third round of programme cycle could begin implementation later and had only two and a half year to implement local programmes.

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Map 2 Micro-regions participating in Give Kids a Chance programme

Source: www.teir.hu by Gergely Tagai

The general approach of the Give Kids a Chance combined the reduction of child poverty with the eradication of poverty among families, ending segregation and ensuring a healthy childhood that support children's capability expansion. Therefore, the programme has assigned the highest priority to early childhood education and care services (between 0 to 5 years), inter-professional institutional cooperation among the local education, social- and healthcare sectors, and long-term strategic planning (Bauer, et al, 2015). Overall, programme components included early childhood education and capability expansion services, such as Sure Start houses, integrated public education services, such as after school tutorials, complex family support and capability expansion services, such as community houses and special developmental in-school classes, second chance programmes, as well as employment, health screening and housing programmes (Table 10 in Annex)[12].

The institutional framework of Give Kids a Chance has gone through considerable changes since its inception and its first programme cycle in 2009. Changes entailed the transformation of the programme's content with an increasing number of mandatory programme components and regulations requiring detailed expectations for implementation, the transformation of the project evaluation system that increasingly gave priority to administrative project requirements, and the alteration of programme regulations to give discretionary decision-making power to actors unembedded in localities .

The number of mandatory programme elements gradually increased across tender cycles: in 2009 there were 10, in 2011 there were 13, while in 2012, 17 programme elements were listed as mandatory, out of approximately 24-25 (Bauer et al, 2015).[13] Similarly, the call for proposals in the programme periods of 2009 and 2011 outlined only general requirements concerning implementation, while in 2012 the call contained detailed expectations and requirements in programme implementation.[14] Due to the general shortage of competencies in the most disad-

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[12] One positive aspect was the inclusion of Sure Start Houses in the Act on Child Protection (1997) as one of several daytime childcare services and the provision of central state funding. State funding contributed to the sustainability of Sure Start Houses after project ending in several localities, even if services could be provided on significantly lower scale and often of worse quality due to considerably less amount of state funding compared to the project period that did not bear the capacity to mobilize local stakeholders.

[13] The current programing cycle does not offer options for local actors, all programme components are mandatory for implementation.

[14] For instance, the priority of early childhood programme elements, such as Sure Start Houses and related programmes, grew stronger each tender cycle: while in the first cycle this requirement was not present, in

vantaged micro-regions, the place-based logic was a strong element of the intervention from the beginning. Give Kids a Chance micro-regional programmes had been influenced by external actors (academics, mentors, experts) in all tender cycles, who helped local governmental stakeholders – a the single developmental actor of these localities – to elicit local needs and competencies as well as to tailor the programme frame to local needs through facilitating participatory institutions and methodological mentoring for local actors. This place-based approach was weakened by a new project evaluation system in 2012 that, unlike the first two programme tender cycles in 2009 and in 2011, gave priority to formal tender requirements over innovative local solutions and content-based programing. In this institutional framework, the applications drafted by external professional actors were more successful than those prepared on the basis of local needs by local actors (Bauer et al, 2015). (See Table 7)

4.2 Analytical Dimension 3 & 5: Coordination and implementation of the action: the role and importance of place-based knowledge in planning and implementation process

In the micro-region of Encs, a separate unit – the Give Kids a Chance Office – was set up within the Multi-Purpose Micro-regional Association of Encs for programme coordination and the preparation of the tender. The staff of the local Give Kids a Chance Office consisted of education and social care professionals who were part of the operative staff of the Micro-Regional Association for over a decade and had developed competencies through their involvement in multiple local developmental projects of previous decades. Their extended personal and professional networks ensured the representation of all policy sectors relevant for children's well-being: education, social- and healthcare.

The coordination of the programme was also facilitated by the central state through a supplementary programme scheme of the mainstream Give Kids a Chance programme for micro-regions. The supplementary programme (Priority programme) had been established to provide methodological support and mentoring during local programme development and implementation. It was coordinated by a consortium of the background institutions of the Ministry of Human Resources, such as Wekerle Sándor Fund Managing Agency, and later Human Resources Fund, the Order of Malta and the Kids' Chance research team at HAS. The background institutions of the Ministry were responsible for mentoring originally seven micro-regions – in addition to their task of mentoring Sure Start Houses – while the Order of Malta was responsible for mentoring eight micro-regions while the research team at HAS supported this mentoring by academic research, such as surveys and statistical analysis. In the planning phase mentors' duties included the facilitation of local planning through participatory events to assess local needs and the adaptation of micro-regional needs to overall programme components. During implementation mentors were expected to provide professional and methodological support for local implementers, ensure quality control and if necessary help the operative staff in micro-regions in administrative affairs.

Hence, the coordination of the micro-regional programme took place on two parallel platforms: micro-regional mentors of Malta had visited settlements in order to assess the conditions of public services in small settlements and collected local needs from institutional actors and the public. Parallel to this, the local Office team organized thematic workshops for local stakeholders, including mayors, home visiting nurses, kindergarten teachers, primary school teachers, social workers from the Family and Child Welfare Services, special education needs teachers from the Pedagogical Services. Thematic workshops were partly formal events to fulfil programme re-

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the second the implementation of two, and in the third the implementation of three Sure Start services was defined as mandatory (Bauer et al, 2015). Also, the improvement of parents' employability was not a priority in the first tendering cycle, mostly because it was seen to be the responsibility of other state institutions and programmes. In the second cycle, this element appeared as optional, while in the third it was mandatory for implementation (Bauer et al, 2015).

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quirement (inter-professional cooperation), but on the other hand, they were one of those regular events that local stakeholders always organized at the micro-regional level for the planning of development projects (see: 3.2. dimension 2).

Methods and old practices of associating diverse local actors were easily mobilized for new purposes in the Give Kids a Chance programme, whose greatest impact was defined by local stakeholders as *"the re-strengthening of professional cooperation and networks"* (interview No.3.). According to local assessment, at least 20 such planning workshops had been organized during the planning phase of Give Kids a Chance, in addition to stable channels of informal dialogue among local stakeholders. Existing platforms of collaborative coordination mobilized for new purposes and informal networks guaranteed the embeddedness that was necessary for the local Office to coordinate micro-regional Give Kids a Chance programmes in full capacity and legitimacy. Local narratives of spatial injustice often refer to the invisibility of the successful (re)mobilization of social capital resources from the 1990s for new purposes in Give Kids a Chance. Due to the re-mobilization of developmental networks, local agents experienced the strengthening of the local institutional system of child welfare services through more permanent ties and cross-sectoral cooperation.

Parallel to thematic workshops, the priority scheme of Give Kids a Chance offered additional horizontal platforms for coordination through mentors from the Order of Malta and its partners from HAS. Mentors of Malta organized focus group discussions, and informal public forums, in the form of "playing together" events in mobile playgrounds of the Order of Malta. At these events Malta mentors taught games for parents and children that they can play together later on and generated situations to informally chat with parents while children were playing, in order to gain insights about community issues, local institutional conditions in child welfare services and map out sources of conflicts and social crisis. The findings of these informal forums and focus group discussions, along with basic statistical data were compiled in the Micro-Regional Mirror, a micro-regional programming document that was prepared by external experts, subcontracted by Malta. The programing document was supplemented by a survey conducted by the research team of HAS among families raising children between the age of 0 and 17 in the micro-region. The survey systematically mapped out the situation of families with children and collected additional dimensions of needs through survey methods. Eventually, the Micro-Regional Mirror drew up recommendations about the distribution of programme components based on identified needs in settlements that were presented to local stakeholders for commenting. Supported by statistical data about the number of multiply disadvantaged children and a poverty index, the distribution of programme elements was recommended to reflect on intra-regional disparities through a "differential distribution" of resources in the most deprived settlements such as Fáj, Fügöd or Csenyéte. Eventually, the local Office staff harmonized the results of the stakeholder workshops with the findings of the Micro-regional Mirror and included them in tender documents.

The local Office team had limited room for manoeuver in this. Their actions were guided by striking a balance between local needs expressed by stakeholders, mandatory programme components defined at the level of the central state and the recommendations of Malta compiled in the Micro-Regional Mirror. At the same time, endowed with informal discretionary rights by the central state, Malta's mentors had mandate to approve or disapprove local decisions on micro-regional programme design despite the original principle of the priority scheme merely to facilitate decision-making among micro-regional actors based on collaborative platforms. In the absence of similar entitlements, the local Office staff was constrained in coordinating the programme autonomously. The process was often laden with tension between mentors of Malta, the local Office staff and programme implementers in settlements as local stakeholders often felt that Malta directly influenced decisions on the basis of particular interests. Tensions particularly arose when local stakeholders thought the findings of the Micro-regional Mirror unfounded, and some of them claimed that its recommendations about the allocation of programme elements are unjust. A stakeholder from one of the better-off settlements that would not be eligible for

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allocated resources based on its statistics in poverty and disadvantaged children lobbied for a Sure Start House through log-rolling with Malta and successfully changed the composition of the local programme. In the implementation phase tensions persisted between mentors and coordinators of Malta and local stakeholders as a result of different methodologies applied in the integration of marginalized groups. Local stakeholders claimed that mentors of Malta sometimes disregarded local social conditions when they mainly relied on their previous experiences in other localities and recommended methods that had worked elsewhere. Local stakeholders felt that their knowledge of local societies was sidelined by uniform methodological solutions proposed by mentors, who never stayed in the locality longer periods of time. *"We are the faces of these programmes. (…) it is great that they come with their toys and enchant the children but for one day. They come at 10 a.m. and leave at 2 p.m., while our people are out there 8 hours per day and struggle to get something started with them. (…) It is a real problem that people think it is enough to come here and throw a show on an ad hoc basis. (…) This is worse than not being present consistently at all"* (Interview focus group). Neglecting local solutions can also be seen in the way Malta failed to include the finding of public forums in the Micro-Regional Mirror, which could have been the result of changing institutional conditions, favouring the fulfilment of formal and administrative project requirements rather than encouraging innovative local solutions. [15]

The priority scheme also meant a platform for vertical coordination between the central state and micro-regional stakeholders. Originally, in the Szécsény pilot and the first two extension programmes, mentors' intervention was intended to be guided by a place-based logic in which the formal institutional framework would be translated for local knowledge and tailored to local needs. Institutional conditions in the 2012 programme cycle, however, instigated formal and top-down communication channels between upper policy levels and local stakeholders. The central state communicated with the local level through increasingly strict regulations, in which it defined the programme elements that the local level must implement and requirements about the way it should implement them. A growing shadow of hierarchy with burocratic control functions can be seen in regulations about the number and kind of mandatory programme elements. Out of twenty-four programme elements seventeen were mandatory for local implementation. *"With this overwhelming number of mandatory programme components, it is exactly local problems that vanish into the thin air"* (Interview focus groups). Local stakeholders emphasized that *"We did not want to have a psychologist in these places! It is perverse to put a psychologist to lead a self-awareness group in a village where this word cannot be pronounced"* (Interview focus group). The implementation scheme also included detailed requirements about the means and conditions local actors were expected to adhere to during implementation. Moreover, the interpretation of these regulations often changed during programme implementation. *"I was totally shocked when they told us, threatened us that they can audit even five years later whether the people who signed the attendance sheets did actually participate in the programme. I'm sorry but they should be happy that there are still some people here who are ready to implement these programmes according to central regulations and to the best of their knowledge. (…) And it is not enough that they (the local poor) come into the house and participate in the washing programme, I have to ask their social security number, address and so on. This creates distrust. But I have to do it because otherwise I cannot fulfil my indicators. And then three years later it (the central state) changes the interpretation of its own rules"* (Interview focus group).

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[15] The call for proposals in 2012 invited 15 micro-regions to apply for funding in Give Kids a Chance. In the course of programme development, the Ministry of Finance drew a red line and announced that available funds are enough to fund only 12 of the 15 micro-regions. Eventually those micro-regions won in tendering that either had the competencies to draft a professional proposal (like Encs), or contracted a company to write their proposal for them. These companies ignored place-based needs and innovative ideas to improve social services and included only formal assignments in the proposal that fulfilled administrative project requirements.

Similar unilateral and hierarchical burocratic solutions characterized feedback platforms, in which local stakeholders were required to provide meticulously detailed data about programme participants, to fill out online feedback sheets, surveys without transparent mechanisms for them to follow the path of these data and the opportunity to enter into discussions with central state decision-makers. Local stakeholders felt that "*We keep providing information about the kids. Does anyone hear it, does anyone read it? We do not get any response back at all*!" The lack of transparent feedback platforms from the bottom to the top are symptomatic of more general patterns of domestic developmental governance that are characterized by misaligned responses of the central state to local developmental bottlenecks. In the absence of vertical coordination platforms for feedback and the distribution of intelligence, the "little pieces of success" as much as the struggles of the local level are invisible for the central state, resulting in misaligned responses from the top.

"*Yes, for this (mobilization, attending programmes) is success. This is somehow not seen the same way from above. We also see that there is no change, but from above. Because they (central state) do not consider this as success and their response is that they give more money. That is not the solution. The solution is to give money for things that local people are in need of. Because here we do not need money, we are in need of (social care) professionals, at least 5 more to enable us to cover all areas. That would be helpful for us*" (Interview focus group).

Under the pressure of increasingly burocratic procedures and the lack of feedback platforms, informality pervaded from the centre about the project content, informality pervaded the entire programme. In some instance mentors of the priority programme acted as "the middle-man" between the central state and local stakeholders through informal contacts as in the case when mentors of HAS successfully lobbied for finding institutional solutions to the micro-region's problem of the absence of competent staff. In this concrete matter, mentors managed to change formal regulations with regard to educational attainment of programme staff through their informal contacts at the ministry[16]. Local stakeholders often found solutions to coordination and supply problems through their informal contacts in the lively network of the Micro-Regional Association. In the general shortage of education, social- and healthcare professionals, finding competent staff to community houses and Sure Start Houses usually took place through informal networks. Supplying over-used products, such as washing machines was a phone call away for small settlements during the implementation phase of Give Kids a Chance: "*they asked us what we need and helped us immediately when we needed it, the team has always listened to us*" (23). For small impoverished settlements with no financial resources and very limited capacities in human resources, the services that the programme introduced and the kind of support that "came along" with the programme meant the oxygen tube they had long needed and from which they had been deprived of for decades. Through Give Kids a Chance settlements like Csenyéte, Hernádvécse received education and child welfare services they had only sporadically received before the programme: "*in 2015 we had special education professionals here, speech-therapists, child psychologists, the doctor (general practitioner) came to hold presentations and people in the village spoke about what he said for weeks*" (21). The settlements' dependencies on the micro-regional centre can be seen in the way local stakeholders in Csenyéte and Hernádvécse position themselves vis-á-vis the operative staff in the local Office. These narratives give account of the way the leadership of these settlements feels empty-handed in front of mounting social problems at its doorstep and passively joins a developmental game whose parameters are decided in other centres – the central state and in the district centre, Encs: "*tenders are prepared by the service maintainer* (i.e. the Multi-Purpose Micro-Regional Association of Encs, the district centre,

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[16] Due to general shortages of professionals in the social and health care, as well as the education sectors, it was often difficult to find people with a university/high school degree with language exams, or particular degrees in the social sector. The priority programme successfully lobbied in these cases at the Managing Authority that eventually allowed micro-regions to employ people with regular university/high school degrees and a university degree without exact matching in the call (Bauer et al. 2015).

Encs), *They keep an eye out for tender calls, they know which ones we can go for. And then they let us know. … Give Kids a Chance and the after-school learning hall* (tanoda) *were both taken care of them*" (22). In spite of their obvious dependencies on the centre, Give Kids a Chance improved children's welfare temporarily and in a sketchy way in these small settlements: "*the only good thing from which we have profited has been the Give Kids programme*" (15).

Despite the lack of Malta's embeddedness and occasional tensions, the local Office team and mentors saw eye to eye about the allocation of programme components and the necessity to distribute programme elements across the micro-region. Compared to several other micro-regions where "administrative hierarchy had a strong presence, intensified by possession of information and centralization of resources" (Bauer et al, 2015:24), in the micro-region of Encs resource allocation and the distribution of programme elements were more or less balanced between the centre and smaller settlements. Give Kids a Chance reached a relatively great number of settlements and people, which was accounted for already in 2013: "44% of the local population has heard about the programme, which given the short time since its beginning, is a good rate. This can be due to the good dissemination strategy of the operative staff of the Local Office and the fact that the programme was allocated to a lot of settlements" (Husz, 2013/12). Altogether 7 community house and 5 Sure Start Houses were allocated to 13 settlements but through the programme's "mobile" components, located in kindergartens and schools of local centres[17] it reached children from neighbouring villages as well. Amidst an increasing number of mandatory programme components, and stricter definitions of expectations and requirements in programme implementation[18], it was the embeddedness of the local Office staff in thick professional and personal networks that paved the way for more equal distribution of programme elements: *"The project had lots of mandatory elements, for example school competence screenings that we had to implement whether or not we liked it. But we still managed to put local requests in the final tender in a way that fulfilled the requirements. (…) We played equal; for us all kindergartens were the same, we tried to bring in the same services everywhere"* (3).

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[17] Local centers are typically larger villages that maintain kindergartens and give place to primary schools. The surrounding smaller villages usually lack these institutions, therefore children from those small villages attend institutions at the local centre. Give Kids a Chance programme in 2012 contained plenty of education-oriented programme elements that required the institutional background of a kindergarten or school in order to reach children.

[18] The call for proposals in the programme periods of 2009 and 2011 outlined only general requirements concerning implementation, while in the third round in 2012, the call contained increasingly detailed expectations and requirements in programme implementation. For instance, the priority of early childhood programme elements, such as Sure Start Houses and related programmes, grew stronger each tender cycle: while in the first cycle this requirement was not present, in the second the implementation of two, and in the third the implementation of three Sure Start services was defined as mandatory (Bauer et al, 2015). Also, the improvement of parents' employability was not a priority in the first tendering cycle, mostly because it was seen to be the responsibility of other state institutions and programmes. In the second cycle, this element appeared as optional, while in the third it was mandatory for implementation (Bauer et al, 2015).

RELOCAL has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement. N° 727097

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
Map 3 Distribution of programme components in the micro-region

Source: own resources

The content of Give Kids a Chance also contributed to decisions about a relatively just allocation of programme resources. Give Kids a Chance programme was a "soft" development programme, which did not trigger the local mayors' interests to the extent that they would have put much effort into "fighting for resources" and channelling them unevenly towards stronger local players. Soft development programmes are perceived by local decision-makers as politically risky because of their long-term strategic focus, the invisibility of project outcomes and the indirect Roma emphasis in them. It took the local Office team some time to prove the president of the Multi-Purpose Micro-Regional Association that the programme is more than "just another Roma programme" and that the long-term strategy behind Give Kids a Chance and its programme components are important for the development of the entire micro-region. Convincing the president of the association was a turning point in gaining mayors' support from all settlements.

Despite considerations for a relative balanced nature of distributional justice, the programme failed to comply with recommendations in the Micro-Regional Mirror with regard to a "differential distribution" of resources. Due to the relative scarcity of financial resources in Give Kids a Chance and structural constraints – the lack of professionals and additional infrastructural resources in the most deprived villages – instead of equity-based allocation, equalizing mechanisms prevailed ("we played equal") and all settlements that had a certain ratio of disadvantaged families were allocated some resources. For example, the programme framework in 2012 con-

tained plenty of education-oriented programme elements that required the institutional background of a kindergarten or school. This however weakened the place-based logic as children who attended school/kindergarten from neighbouring small settlements did not get the permanent attention that the programme would otherwise propose.

Structural constraints deriving from institutional incongruities, instability and disinvestment in child welfare policy instruments held back Give Kids a Chance in the district of Encs to permanently improve socio-spatial inequalities. Due to serious disinvestment of the Hungarian state in public education and child welfare policies[19], inefficiencies in service provision and delivery have been prevalent in the whole country, but especially in deprived localities with low human and financial capacities. The district of Encs has been struggling with the outmigration of its elite, especially teachers, child welfare and social care professionals for over a decade as a result of the tension between low prestige and low salaries of these occupations and mounting social and educational problems on the other hand. The scarcity of public service deliverers often paralyzed the programme, while the programme elements that Give Kids a Chance introduced temporarily supplemented those missing services that the central state has resigned from providing. In this sense the programme rather meant an oxygen tube for settlements in the district of Encs that temporarily resuscitated life into tragically weak child welfare services but it came short of triggering more pervasive institutional changes dedicated to spatial justice. In the absence of a long-term and stable institutional and financial framework, the short time frame – 2,5 years – of the local Give Kids a Chance programme could only temporarily supplement missing services and institutions without permanently changing them. It is the permanence of parallel institutional and financial stability in the mainstream policy regime that can trigger long-term institutional changes. "*Sure Start houses are great. And it is great that the Sure Start House is now part of mainstream child welfare policy, it is included in the state budget as a basic child welfare service funded by normative funding. And here is the trick: there is one foot missing: it (Sure Start houses) receives €20 000 per year, 80% of this goes into paying the salaries of the two employees each house has to have. Since it is the voluntary task of local governments, what will the local government of a small, poor village do? It cannot maintain it from its own resources. Even though institutional conditions are provided, without money it cannot sustain it*" (Interview focus group).

4.3 Analytical Dimension 4: Project for whom: Scope of participation and engagement

Processes of participation taking place parallel on two platforms – thematic workshops and forums organized by mentors – failed to integrate and empower marginalized groups in developmental panning. Local stakeholders' thematic workshops were closed events for local professionals who comprise the little local elite that still remain in the region. Given their long-standing professional and personal networks these meetings can be seen as organically organized events. It was the mandate of the mentors to facilitate the inclusion of the local and marginalized population. The "playing events" organized by Malta were based on its methodology developed in the "Presence" programme (Csonkáné – Dusa – Fehér 2011) with the purpose to approach marginalized groups, Romas through informal situations, elicit their knowledge and voice through informal discussion. Although formally, Malta complied with the administrative requirements of the programme framework, not including the findings of these public forums in the Micro-Regional Mirror give account of the exclusion of those marginalized Romas for whom the programme had been initiated originally. *"Not a single Roma has ever been asked anywhere about what she/he wants, what she/he is in need of. This is a difficult issue because communication is very difficult with these uneducated people. But at least they could have been asked through their Roma representatives! But I think this never took place in any of the sights of Give Kids a Chance. In most micro-regions, local stakeholders of the care and education services sat down and planned the*

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[19] According to the OECD, Hungary spent 0, 78% of its GDP on primary education and 0, 86% on early childhood education in 2018.

programme". (27) Within this circle of local "project shapers" whose views are over-represented in programme design horizontal relations feedback loops functioned well and frequently, both through formal and informal contacts. At the same time, vertical feedback platforms existed only through informal relations (through mentors or individual relations between Office members and burocrats at the level of the central state), local stakeholders (see: 4.2.3.).

The way both local stakeholders and mentors of Malta failed to empower impoverished Roma families in developmental planning is a reflection of a "caring abandonment" of marginalized Romas. In this relationship Romas and the settlements and neighbourhoods they live in are passive tools for the local elite and external developmental actors to generate additional resources within an institutional framework that withdraws functions and resources from the local level. Marginalized Romas who were primarily targeted by the programme, were passive "beneficiaries" of Give Kids a Chance. Unlike the networks of local stakeholders, marginalized Romas do not organise themselves autonomously, their informal networks are attached to the village, kinship or neighbouring relations. (see: 3.2.1.). The representation of their interests has not even been ensured by the local leader of the Roma National Self-Government. His abandonment of the most vulnerable groups of local Roma is an example of the way ethnic identities are fragmented by social status. Being a well-educated Roma and a member of the local middle class, he is invisible for Roma living in the segregated part of the settlement, and vice versa. The mutual invisibility between the poor Roma community and its political leadership is seen in the way he was not accepted as an authority when the Roma Self-Government organized a camp for Roma teenage girls. "*There I saw that the fact that J. knew the families and the girls knew J., and I did not, and she is much better at handling them than an outsider. When she was gone for just one day, the girls argued, it was total chaos … From Monday to Friday, it was the last day when I finally was accepted by them and we could have a nice chat*"(4.). As a result, the most marginalized groups living in stigmatized settlements, such as Csenyéte and the segregated neighbourhood of Fügöd had no voice neither during planning, nor implementation. In this sense, Give Kids a Chance failed to transform local institutions in a way that would empower local Romas with voice to make claims for a more just distribution of services through participatory institutions. In the absence of competing local visions on a socially just distribution of services and an enabling institutional framework that would provide resources for long-term institutionalization of these practices, the sketchy improvement of child welfare services in stigmatized spaces could only temporarily alleviate long-standing injustices of the shortage of child welfare professionals and services.

The story of the demise of the Community/Sure Start House in Fügöd is illustrative of the collective marginalization of the most deprived and marginalized Romas in programme coordination. The Romas in Fügöd were abandoned by Malta during the implementation of the programme when during one of the "playing events" social workers from Malta could not uphold a peaceful environment for children to play and adults to chat, and "*packed up their mobile playground and left*" (5). The house in Fügöd first opened as a community house and was transformed into a Sure Start House, similar to the community houses in Csenyéte and Hernádvécse at the end of the project. The purpose of this transformation was to gain access to state funding, thus enable the sustainability of services when project resources run out. Per capita state funding of Sure Start Houses, however provided considerably less financial resources than project funding did and local governments and the operative staff of the local Office soon faced problems familiar to them from the pre-project period: great fluctuation of staff in the house, difficulties to find competent staff due to low wages that state funding provided without the local government's capacities to compensate them with supplementary resources. Local tensions also arose again as a result of the loss of trust and lack of transparency: local Roma families in Fügöd did not understand the transformation of the community house that anybody could visit into a Sure Start House that was specifically designed for mothers and children between 0 and 3 years old. Hence, the house that was successful during the project to "bring in the house" Roma families to participate in programmes, became less frequented. When the head of the House left, it took the local government a long time to find competent staff again, which further deteriorated social relations. Subsequently two social workers took the jobs in the Sure Start House and undertook the

representation of the interests of the Romas in Fügöd in vis-á-vis local stakeholders and decision-makers. The staff began to build networks within the community and managed to mobilize families again to attend programmes. They also tried to build professional networks with local (Fügöd based) institutions – kindergarten and school – as well as child welfare services, home visiting nurses and special education professionals to invite them to continue cooperation and service provision for the Romas in Fügöd in the Sure Start House. Local stakeholders, however, did not react to this call and did/could not provide the two social workers with additional resources to bring into the House services. Perceptions attached to the "non-deserving Romas" living in Fügöd aggravated by the end of 2017 when a local conflict broke out, generated by the Red Cross distributing food donation on the premises of the House, and the two social workers were threatened by some local "rascals". At this point it was easy for the local government to find excuses for shutting down the Sure Start House as it "could not guarantee the security of two of its employees".

Stakeholders at the local level gained insights about governance processes through their active participation in the shaping of the programme. The embeddedness of the operative staff of the local Give Kids a Chance Office in local networks also enhanced local stakeholders' access to information about the goals and means of the programme. Power imbalances, nevertheless, were prevalent among local stakeholders in the way some mayors could play out their stronger interest representation competencies when it was about the allocation of programme components. Typically, the mayors of settlements where the most vulnerable groups of marginalized Roma communities lived (Csenyéte, Fügöd, Pusztaradvány, Hernátpetri) had weak voices, hence could not provoke stronger focus on their settlements. Parallel to this, the capacities of education and care services to raise stakes for the settlement were also weak. In spite of the more or less balanced distribution of programme elements across the micro-region, settlements in the most vulnerable position in terms of the absence of services and capacities remained in dependent position vis-á-vis the micro-regional centre.

Vis-á-vis the central state, however, all local stakeholders lacked access to governance processes and information. The central state communicated information with the local level through regulations without providing formal feedback loops for the local level to shape the programme to local conditions. Central state agencies did not provide explanations for unexpected changes in the evaluation requirements, neither about delays in making decisions about the winning proposals, nor about the reasons why those 3 micro-regions lost in the competition when they were also invited to participate. The lack of bottom-up insights into overall programme management can also be detected in the number of mandatory programme components and detailed requirements for implementation. Similar tendencies can be seen in the way the Order of Malta gained discretionary power to approve micro-regional programme design.

These trends are indicative of the uneven relationship between the central state and the local level in terms of accountability in developmental planning and implementation. Increasing pressure for detailed administrative expectations of programme implementation indicate that it is the local level that is defined being accountable. The central state created mechanisms for controlled programme development at the local level through the presence of the Order of Malta and meticulously detailed procedures for monitoring programme implementation in administrative terms. This has increased burocratic control of the central state over the local level without increasing its own accountability from the bottom-up given the absence of feedback loops.

Top-down mobilization of local knowledge was the original goal of the priority programme scheme and mentors of Malta were entrusted to facilitate horizontal coordination across local stakeholder groups and empower citizens in order to elicit local knowledge for programme design and implementation. However, top-down mobilization of local knowledge failed as opinions and needs formulated by clients' during public forums and "playing events" were not incorporated in the programme strategy, nor in the final tender. In addition, the local Office staff often felt marginalized by Malta when their views on local communities, on local social relations were not taken into consideration during programme implementation. Local stakeholders' perception

was that mentors often used Malta's discretionary power in the overall Give Kids a Chance pro-gramme to "educate" them about the ways they thought local stakeholders should approach marginalized groups. Mentors could not offer the "presence" they could in Malta's Presence pro-gramme, as they had to travel between 8 micro-regions. It was often the case, that mentors rec-ommended solutions to a local problem and then left the locality, while local stakeholders stayed behind facing local social tensions.

The spatial scope of the intervention comprised 36 member settlements of the Multi-Purpose Micro-Regional Association of Encs. The scope had been defined by the central state based on the territorial boundaries of the subnational unit of the multi-purpose micro-region. Micro-regions at the time of their coming about in the 1990s were free associations of neighbouring settlements integrated voluntarily for functional purposes to provide services and coordinate development in the area. In this vein, the micro-regions of the 1990s displayed variety in terms of territorial scope, organisational form, and functional orientation. The coming about of multi-purpose micro-regions in 2004 meant "institutionalization" of these micro-regions. Institutional-ization meant that micro-regions' territorial scope was no longer defined by local actors on the basis of their functional and developmental needs, but rather by the central state based on sta-tistical data. In addition to territorial restrictions, multi-purpose micro-regions were restricted by earmarked funding for public service provision that they were expected to provide within the territory of the association. The coming about of districts in 2013 can be seen as an extension of the institutionalization of once freely associated subnational units of micro-regions. Districts, however, go beyond micro-regional institutionalization as they are public administrative gov-ernment authorities at the subnational level. The territorial logic following the boundaries of the jurisdiction of districts is mainly statistical and administrative: neighbouring settlements should be within 30 km range from district centre, all settlements should be in the same county, the district centre should have spatial organizational function.

RELOCAL has received funding from the European Union's
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under
Grant Agreement. N° 727097

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5. Final Assessment: Capacities for Change

The central goal of Give Kids a Chance was to resolve bottlenecks and inequality in service provision by introducing new services that improve living conditions for children and trigger institutional changes that not only "modernize" child welfare services through inter-institutional professional cooperation but also transform local institutions in a way that distribute authority more equally among diverse social groups and empower marginalized groups to have better access to services.

Factors that inhibited the implementation of these goals of Give Kids a Chance can be classified as structural and social factors. Structural factors are inhibitors within the institutional framework of the country's public policy regime, while social factors depict persistent social perceptions of poverty and marginalization, strongly attached to the Roma population.

The institutional design of Give Kids a Chance went through significant changes since its inception affecting the content of the programme, the freedom of local actors to implement the project according to place-based solutions. Overall institutional changes gradually reduced room for manoeuvre for local action as the number of mandatory programme components increased, while tender requirements became stricter and more burocratic. Contrary to the original methodology of Give Kids a Chance and the Sure Start Programme that focused on social integration through meddling middle-class and disadvantaged families, targeting most disadvantaged children has become the priority of the programme since 2011. While targeting was increasingly reshaped to focus on the most disadvantaged, the priority component of desegregation disappeared from the list of eligibility requirements. This led to the situation that instead of desegregating existing services and bringing about new ones, Give Kids a Chance focused on improving the quality of institutions and services operating under segregated conditions (Husz, 2016). In the absence of institutional incentives promoting desegregation, the priority programme did not encourage such initiatives.

Institutional changes in the Give Kids a Chance programme were triggered by all pervasive structural and institutional transformations of Hungary's public policy regime and state administration taking place between 2010 and 2016. This transformation represented a paradigmatic shift in the principles of governance, indicating inverse trends to the original place-based institutional logic of Give Kids a Chance developed through the Szécsény pilot project. They meant a move away from the logic of "good governance", horizontal coordination and the "enabling state" towards a neoweberian understanding of the "good state" based on hierarchies and burocratic solutions (Pálné, 2014). Institutional changes reintroduced centralisation, the strengthening of the central state's role in coordination and public service provision at the expense of local governmental autonomy in decision-making (Pálné, 2014). More concretely, they meant rigorous content regulations and increased control through the monitoring of the local level by the central state without channels for feedback based on dialogue.

Changes in the country's public administration and public policy system not only increased burocratic control mechanisms over local governments by the central state but also decreased their functions and room for manoeuvres in influencing public service provision in their jurisdiction. The new Public Education Act (2011) took the rights of settlements away to maintain educational institutions and recentralized the administration of public education. The Local Government Act (2012) took tax-extracting functions away from local governments and introduced earmarked financial mechanisms in public service provision that still remained in local governmental maintenance. Stripping local governments off of flexible financial resources was devastating for those settlements and regions that are characterized by heavy outward migration of its competent professional elite (teachers, social care, health-care workers) as local governments lost their minimal power to motivate these people to stay in the neighbourhood by offering additional resources in income. The project dependency of these local governments can also

be explained by these processes, as EU funded projects are the only means local governments can bring in extra resources to keep those professionals of the elite that so far stayed behind.

These changes in framework conditions had a pervasive impact on the overall as well as the local governance of Give Kids a Chance programme(s). They not only influenced the content and the legitimacy of the programme but also curtailed the capacity of the local level to make autonomous decisions about its own developmental needs and goals, leaving less room for manoeuver for local incumbents while introducing increasing burocratic control over programme implementation. The transformation of the governance of Give Kids a Chance thus indicated increasing central state control in the definition of the goals and means of local programmes, which resulted in the procedural and distributive unfairness during implementation (Bauer et al, 2015, Lannert, 2015, Ferge 2017). Ultimately it was the interplay between the capacities of the local level to influence its own development and local social relations, institutional conditions that shaped the implementation of spatial justice in Give Kids a Chance programmes.

The main mechanisms that have driven spatial injustice in the micro-region of Encs are the hierarchical dependencies of a variety of local actors, which also disable relationships based on dialogue and negotiations: the dependent position of small villages on the centre and on external resources, the dependent position of the centre on the central state and external project resources. The dominant role of local governments in local development and the absence of competing developmental visions is ensured by the lack of local civil society that would have the capacity to question existing perceptions of spaces and social groups. Under these circumstances the perceptions of social and spatial injustice and unequal power relations determined developmental outcomes in a given settlement. Hierarchical dependencies also paved the way for the lack of institutional means that would enable the representation of marginalized groups in developmental planning and the definition of the goals of the development of their locality.

These mechanisms are connected to the lack of external institutional pressure from the national or regional level that would enable multiple actors to participate in the definition of goals and promote institutional frames for inclusive mechanisms that better distribute authority and intelligence in the definition and implementation of developmental goals. "Well-defined policies can help these processes by encouraging networks but also by restraining their attitudes to collusion and rent-seeking" (Trigilia, 2001: 439). The role of the state is essential in supporting local actors from above through policies to mobilize their resources from below through deliberative networks and cooperation (Trigilia, 2001).The institutional framework of the Hungarian public policy regime is built on hierarchies, thus it is unable to transform existing social and power relations at the local level, and develop institutions that would construct more just space and society.

Give Kids a Chance was able to temporarily appease spatial inequalities in the district of Encs in both procedural and distributive dimensions. The procedural injustice of the way marginalized Romas were not given voice to make claims about the goals and means of the programme either by external, or by local actors is strongly connected to the unrealized goal of differentiated distribution of programme resources to localities where mostly Romas live. The programme only provided temporary improvement in the distribution and quality of child welfare services in those small settlements that were originally targeted by the programme. The programme was unable to realize those expectations that by introducing new services, approaches and methodologies, it would trigger institutional change to ensure a fairer distribution of child welfare services. Instead of changing institutions to ensure more equal distribution of services, it temporarily supplemented basic child welfare services that struggled once the programme ended. In the absence of institutional change within the overall framework of child welfare policy regime improvements of services remained sketchy locally. Overall, the impact of place-based development programmes remains weak as the short time frame of development projects does not support institutional change that is rather a process of incremental transformation than abrupt change. Furthermore, the impact of development projects is weakened if the overall institutional framework of the policy regime does not support the just distribution of public goods, but rather

carries counteracting institutional logics that are built on exclusionary mechanisms between state levels, among social groups and a diversity of policy actors. The role of the state, thus should not be disregarded in setting frameworks conditions of spatially just policy contexts.

6. Conclusions

Our research took place in the district of Encs, one of the traditionally disadvantaged micro regions, located in the Northern periphery of the country. The settlements are characterized by complex interplay of spatial, social and ethnic exclusion, have demographically polarized societies with very high unemployment rate and low level educational attainment. Within the micro-region, intra-regional inequalities are manifest in anomalies of availability, accessibility and affordability of services that are mostly supplied in the district centre but not in villages. Services offered in the district are not affordable or troublesome to reach by those who live in villages due to inadequate transport infrastructure services. The settlement hierarchy/slope also manifests in the quality of services available in villages. The general approach of the *Give Kids a Chance* programme combined the reduction of child poverty with the eradication of poverty among families, ending segregation and ensuring a healthy childhood that support children's capability expansion. The central goal of Give Kids a Chance was to resolve bottlenecks and inequality in service provision by introducing new services that improve living conditions for children and trigger institutional changes that not only "modernize" child welfare services through inter-institutional professional cooperation but also transform local institutions in a way that distribute authority more equally among diverse social groups and empower marginalized groups to have better access to services.

The main mechanisms that have driven spatial injustice in the district of Encs were the hierarchical dependencies of a variety of local actors. The dependent position of small settlements and neighbourhoods on the district centre and on external resources disabled relationships based on dialogue and partnership. The dominant role of local governments in development processes and the absence of competing developmental visions are the result of the general lack of local civil society that would have the capacity to challenge existing hierarchies and social relations. Under these circumstances the perceptions of social and spatial injustice and unequal power relations determine developmental outcomes. Hierarchical dependencies also mean constraints for the representation of marginalized groups in the design and implementation of place-based interventions.

Give Kids a Chance was unable to change spatial inequalities in the micro-region of Encs in both procedural and distributive dimensions. The procedural injustice of the way marginalized Roma were not given voice to make claims about the goals and means of the programme either by external or by local actors is strongly connected to the unrealized goal of differentiated distribution of programme resources to localities where mostly the Roma live. The programme only provided temporary improvement in the distribution and quality of child welfare services in neighbourhoods that were primarily targeted by the programme. The programme was unable to realize those expectations that by introducing new services, approaches and methodologies, it would trigger institutional change to ensure a fairer distribution of child welfare services. Instead of changing institutions to ensure more equal distribution of services, it temporarily supplemented basic child welfare services that struggled once the programme ended. In the absence of institutional change within the overall framework of child welfare policy regime improvements of local services remained sketchy.

Our findings suggest that in the absence of institutional incentives from the domestic policy field *Give Kids a Chance* program gradually lost its place-based character and failed to enhance local capacities for institution-building to guarantee more equitable distribution of child-welfare services through autonomous and participative local decision-making. Instead of triggering institutional change to challenge the local status quo based on prejudices and stigmatization, in the absence of institutional expectations vis-á-vis the local level for spatial justice, the program enhanced existing local hierarchies, fragmented social networks, unequal access to public goods and unequal power relations.

Give Kids a Chance program could only provide temporary relief for marginalized communities in accessing child-welfare services and alleviate scarcities fed by the dysfunctional bureaucratic institutional structure of child-welfare policies. The failure of this place-based intervention to change distributive and procedural aspects of spatial injustice locally was due to the lack of well-defined domestic policies and institutional arrangements suited to the logics of less hierarchical modes of governance applying principles of distributed authority, integration and partnership.

Changes in the country's public administration and public policy system had a pervasive impact on the governance of Give Kids a Chance program. Stripping local governments off of flexible financial resources was devastating for those settlements and regions that are characterized by heavy outward migration of its competent professional elite (teachers, social care, health-care workers). Changes in domestic framework conditions not only influenced the content and the legitimacy of the programme but also curtailed the capacity of the local level to make autonomous decisions about its own developmental needs and goals, leaving less room for manoeuver for local incumbents while introducing increasing burocratic control over programme implementation. The institutional framework of the Hungarian public policy regime is built on hierarchies and it lacks institutional frames for inclusive policy design that would encourage the fair distribution of authority and public services through procedures based on participation and deliberation.

Ultimately it was the interplay between the capacities of the local level to influence its own development and local social relations, and domestic institutional conditions that shaped the implementation of spatial justice in *Give Kids a Chance* programmes. The dual effect of local social relations and the lack of domestic institutional conditions supporting place-based logics in local institution-building resulted in temporary and unembedded institutional solutions for distributive and procedural justice in the local child-welfare policy design.

RELOCAL has received funding from the European Union's
Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under
Grant Agreement. N° 727097

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RELOCAL has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under Grant Agreement. № 727097

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8. Annexes

8.1 List of Interviewed Experts

Reference number of interview	List and type of experts	Date and time of the interview
1. .	Municipality officer	2017. 10. 04 1,5 hours
2.	Municipality officer	2017. 10.04. 2 hours
3.	Programme participant	2017. 10.04. 2 hours
4.	Civil activist	2017. 10. 05. 50 min
5.	Programme participant	2017. 10.05 1h 20 min
6.	Institutional actor	2017. 10.05. 50 min
7.	Institutional actor	2017. 10. 05. 1 hour
8.	Municipality officer	2017. 10. 18 1 hour
9.	Institutional actor	2017. 11.16 1 hour
10.	Institutional actor	2017. 11.16 1 hour
11.	Programme participant	2017.11.06 1h 20 min
12.	Programme participant	2017. 11.06 2 hour
13.	Municipality officer	2017. 11. 07 1 hour
14.	Programme participant	2017. 11.07 50 min
15.	Programme participant	2017. 11. 07 2,5 hours
16.	Institutional actor	2107. 11. 07 45 min
17.	Institutional actor	2017. 11. 14 40 min
18.	Municipality officer	2017. 11. 14 1,5 hours
19.	Institutional actor	2017. 11. 14 1 hour
20.	Institutional actor	2017. 11. 15 1 hour
21.	Institutional actor	2017. 11. 15 1 h 20 min
22.	Programme participant	2017. 11.16 1,5 hours
23.	Officer in Ministry for Human Resources	2017. 12. 05. 1 hour
24.	Officer in Ministry for Human Resources	2017. 12.13 1 h 20 min
25.	Programme coordinator by Málta	2018. 01.08 2 hours
26.	Sociologist, researcher of the Office of Give Kids a Chance Programme in HAS	2018. 03. 20. 2 hours
27.	Programme participant	2019. 01. 24. 1 hours
Focus group	Mayors from Encs districts	2019. 01.24 1,5 hours
Focus group	Programme participant in the Give Kids a Chance programme from different settlements	2019. 01.24 2 hours

8.2 Stakeholder Interaction Table

Type of Stakeholders	Most relevant 'territorial' level they operate at	Stakeholders' ways of involvement in the project (What do we gain, what do they gain)
Local politicians	Encs – district level Encs, Hernádvécse, Csenéyte –local level	Have taken part in interviews
Local administration	Encs district, Encs	Have taken part in interviews
Associations representing private businesses	Not relevant	
Local development companies/agencies	Encs – local level	Have taken part in interviews
Municipal associations	Encs district/micro-region	Have taken part in interviews some of them will be invited to feedback and stakeholder events
Non-profit/civil society organisations representing vulnerable groups	Encs – local level	Have taken part in interviews
Other local community stakeholders	Encs local level	Have taken part in interviews
Local state offices/representations	Encs district, Encs local level	
Regional state offices/representations	----	
Ministries involved in (national or EU) cohesion policy deployment	Ministry for Human Resources – national level	Have taken part in interviews, will be invited to feedback and stakeholder events
Cohesion Policy think tanks (national/EU-level)	----	
Primary and secondary educational institutions	Encs, Csenéyte, Hernádvécse – local level	Have taken part in interviews
Colleges and universities	National level (HAS)	Have taken part in interviews; some of them will be invited to feedback and stakeholder events
Social and health care institutions	Encs, Csenéyte, Hernádvécse – local level	Have taken part in interviews
Cultural institutions and associations	---	
Media	----	

8.3 Maps and Tables

Type of settlement	number of settlements	Population number	Rate of population	example from our sample
Encs	1	13187	61,6%	Encs
Core settlements	4			
Settlements with 1000-500 inhabitants	4	3492	16,3%	Hernádvécse
Settlements with 499-100 inhabitants	14	4459	20,9%	Csenyéte
Settlements less than 100 inhabitants	6	252	1,2%	
Encs district	29	21390	1	

Table 4 Distribution of population among the settlements 2011

Sources: National Census 2011

Table 5 Changing of population between 1949-2011 Sources: National Census 2011

	1949	1960	1970	1970	1980	1990	2001	2011
Encs District	22 283	23 201	23 295	23 666	22 928	21 658	22 380	22 525
Encs	2 999	3 337	4 022	4 007	5 487	6 323	6 666	6 659
Csenyéte	577	582	563	571	381	277	391	474
Hernádvécse	1 176	1 123	1 107	1 128	968	839	916	1 057

Table 6 Population of the chosen settlements and Encs district between 1949-2011

Sources: National Census

	Ratio of Roma people %	Ratio of 0-14 years old population %	Unemployment rate %	Ratio of population with low qualification %
Hungary	3,2	14,6	12,7	24,0
Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén	8,5	16,3	18,5	29,2
Encsi járás	23,2	21,9	27,2	42,1
Encs town	18,3	17,8	16,4	22,4
Hernádvécse	29,4	42,74	50,0	52,5
Csenyéte	89,5	44,9	64,9	96,5

Table 7 Socio-demographic characteristic of the localities

Sources: National Census 2011,

Quantitative indicators were gathered in order to support the representation of spatial patterns of socio-economic inequalities in case study areas at very low territorial levels. The data source for this process was Hungarian Census 2011 by the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (HCSO), which provided access to census microdata through the Safe Centre of HCSO and MTA KRTK. Census microdata was accessible to be aggregated at census district level (blocks with 200-250 persons), which is the lowest possible territorial level (sub-division within municipalities) available for spatial analysis from official sources in Hungary. Mapped indicators were selected from the wider pool of census variables on population dynamics, demography, labour market, commuting, educational attainment, household characteristics and housing amenities.

To make the mapping process transparent, common categorisation methodology was applied for the different indicators and cases study areas in Hungary. After defining the average value of a selected indicator in the case study area, value of standard deviation was also calculated. These two measures helped to define four classes in the case of each mapped indicator: High (higher than average + standard deviation), Higher than average (higher than average), Lower than average (lower than average), Low (lower than average – standard deviation). This combination ensures to keep different indicators and spatial patterns of different case study areas comparable, since the defined classes express the same level of inequalities in each case. Average values of indicators at higher administrative levels related to case study areas (járás – district, LAU1; megye – county, NUTS3; country level) were also calculated to support the interpretation of their quantifiable characteristics in a wider spatial context of these areas within Hungary.

The maps made by Gergely Tagai HAS Centre for Economic and Regional Studies 2018.

**Map 4** Ratio of Roma population in Encs case study area 2011

**Map 5** Ratio of 0-14 years old population in Encs case study area

Map 6 Unemployment rate in Encs case study area 2011

Map 7 Ratio of population with low qualification 2011

Programming periods	National Development Plan (2004-2006)		New Hungary Development Plan (2007-2013)		New Széchenyi Plan (2011-13)		Széchenyi 2020 (2014-2020) (until 2017 Dec.)	
	sum in million forint	number of project	sum in million forint	number of project	sum in million forint	number of project	sum in million forint	number of project
Encs	590.310	13	2.755.966	60	70.020	5	474.272	4
Hernádvécse	19.326	2	1.151.763[20]	10	0	0	0	0
Csenyéte	60.645[21]	2	0	0	0	0	0	0
Encs district	1.370.558	44	13.139.250	189	206.020	14	703.150	5
Cross-settlements/micro-regional project lead by								
Encs MPP	0	0	1.170.648	6	not relevant	0		
ALGA	14	1	7,4	1	not relevant	0		
Development of a regional waste disposal site			3.302.910	5	not relevant	0		

Table 8 Development sources of the settlements

	0,2 –10,0 (85)
	10,1 -15,0 (23)
	15,1 – 20,0 (16)
	20,1 – 25,0 (19)
	25,1 – 30,0 (7)
	30,1 – 77,8 (47)

Map 8 Proportion of disadvantaged children in kindergartens at the district/micro-regional level 2016/17

Source: Hungarian Statistical Office, 2016/17
http://www.ksh.hu/interaktiv/terkepek/mo/oktat.html?mapid=ZOI017&layer=dist&color=7&meth=sug&catnum=6

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[20] 77% of that subsidy is from two projects: one of them aimed to build a new elementary school (452 million HUF) the other to renovate and use as a wellness hotel the local mansion (441 million HUF) https://vecsecity.hu/
[21] These two projects are interconnected: one of them aimed to renovate the local elementary schools (up to 4 grade) (47 million HUF) the other to introduce new methodologies in order to successful education of disadvantageous children.

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Early childhood education and capability expansion services:	- Sure Start Houses - early childhood development - expanding kindergarten services
Integrated public education services,	- network of school coordinators, social workers - after school tutorials, study rooms - special developmental in-school class - trainings for teachers - summer day-camps
Youth development	- Second Chance programmes
Social and community care services	- Community Houses – private tutoring - family counselling - cross-sectoral networking - psychological counselling
Information Society Services	- IS mentors - IS houses
Healthy Childhood	- health screening programmes - support of purchasing medical appliances - public catering for children
Housing programmes	- individual case management - community house - community work
Parents' employment	- counselling - employment - social cooperatives
Sustainability	- social economy, social cooperatives - multiplication in local society: Committee for Children's Chances

Table 9 General programme components of Give Kids a Chance programmes

Source: Kistérségi gyerekesély programok, MTA GYEP Iroda, 2010. www.gyerekesely.hu

	Szécsény Pilot 2006	2009 tender cycle	2011 tender cycle	2012 tender cycle
		EU funded extensions		
Institutional background of programme coordination	Programme Office to Combat Child Poverty at HAS Prime Minister's Office		Give Kids a Chance research team at HAS The Order of Malta Ministry of Human Resources (background institutions)	
Funding	Norwegian Fund	European Social Fund		
Baseline methodology (horizontal objectives)	Social integration Desegregation	Social integration Desegregation	- Focus on the most disadvantaged - Early childhood education - Lack of desegregation objectives!	- Focus on the most disadvantaged - Early childhood education - Lack of desegregation objectives!
Number of micro-regions	1	5	6	15 micro-regions applied but 12 won
Priorities in mandatory programme components	-	- Cross-sectoral policy networks - Participation in methodological trainings - Improving access to child welfare services - Community house and complex services in segregated localities (at least 1) - Free-time, summer vacation programmes in settlements without kindergarten/school	- Cross-sectoral policy networks, including Family and Child Welfare Services - Participation in methodological trainings - Improving access to child welfare services - Community house and complex services in segregated localities (at least 2) - Sure Start House (at least 2)	- Cross-sectoral policy networks, including Family and Child Welfare Services - Development of Family and Child Welfare Services - Coordinated regulations of micro-regional child welfare services - Participation in methodological trainings - Improving access to child welfare services - Community house and complex services in segregated localities (at least 1) - Sure Start House (at least 3) - Free-time, summer vacation programmes in settlements where children competencies are low - Health screening of disadvantaged children - Prevention programmes for deviant behaviour, early pregnancy, early school leaving - Motivation trainings for parents to improve their parental competencies
Institutional context of tendering	Modell programme Long-term planning, not project-based Action research	Tenders based on invitation Innovative local solutions are the main criteria		- Competitive tendering - Evaluation based on formal administrative criteria

Table 10 Timeline of the evolution of Give Kids a Chance 2006-2013

| 2011	**New Public Education Act**: It centralised public education by taking primary schools away from local governmental jurisdiction. This major change caused serious problems for micro-regions in the first and second funding cycle as settlements "lost their schools" in the middle of their programme implementation. The new teacher career model, which created a standardized framework for salaries offered positive incentives for many to leave difficult teaching environments with many Roma kids. It also "took away" professionals with a teaching degree from Give Kids a Chance as many teachers with higher degrees went back to schools and kindergartens for a more permanent carrier path offering higher salaries.
2013	**New Public Administration Act:** the establishment of public administrative districts at the LAU 1 level to implement public administrative functions of the state at the local level (e.g.: document issuing, child protection, guardianship). At the same time Multi-Purpose Micro-regional Partnerships among local governments were not eligible for funding any more as settlements were arbitrarily regrouped into districts. Although the room for local governments to organize partnerships at their own will and interest ceased, in some cases – as in the micro-region of Encs – settlements decided to further sponsor their existing partnership in social service provision.
	The transformation of local governmental jurisdictions and financing: Following the centralisation of basic education service provision, local governmental tasks in service provision comprised the maintenance of kindergartens and nurseries, primary health and social care services, as secondary care was provided by the central state at the district or county level. Due to **decreasing local governmental responsibilities, the central government withdrew all resources from local governments that concerned basic education and secondary care functions**. In this vein, the local governments lost their tax extracting and levying powers that had left a given ratio of the personal income tax, and vehicle tax at the local level. With reference to local governments' indebtedness the central government introduced **a new task-based financing scheme of local governmental services** that directly earmarked to cover services directly from the central state to that service provision. E.g.: in kindergartens and nurseries this means the allocation of the exact amount to cover kids' meals, staff salaries and management based on the number of kids in a given institution.
	Changing the definition of "disadvantaged" and "multiply disadvantaged" children by removing the concept from the jurisdiction of education policy to that of social care and by tightening the conditions to receive the status. While previous definitions settled for the parents' voluntary confession of their education background being lower than 8 years in offering the status of multiply disadvantaged, according to the new definition "disadvantaged" are those kids who are being are raised by unemployed parent(s) or by parents with low educational attainment or live in a segregated/low amenity environment (Bauer et al, 2015). "Multiply disadvantaged" (halmozottan hátrányos helyzetű, "HHH") children are those who meet at least two of the latter three criteria (Bauer et al, 2015). The increasing control functions of the central state can be seen in the way the concept became burocratised through parents' voluntary statement, the obligatory environmental study by the notary. Due to these changes in the definition, micro-regions that used this as a central indicator in the design of local programmes, had to re-adjust their system of indicators and in some cases programme elements.
2015	**The reorganisation of Family and Child Welfare Services as well as Pedagogical Services.** Organisationally once separate Family Support Services and Child Welfare Services were integrated in each district within the Family and Child Welfare Centres. The integration took place based on a holistic, family centred approach. While previously each settlement maintained its own family support, child welfare and pedagogical services (this was voluntary task), the transformation affected theses services in a way that primary care and support services remained under the jurisdiction of local governments, while secondary care (severely and multiply disabled kids' status checks and care and regulatory affairs of child welfare were elevated to the district level that being a public administration unit was directly connected to the central state.

Table 11 Timeline of structural changes in state administration and policy regime

The RELOCAL Project

EU Horizon 2020 research project '**Resituating the local in cohesion and territorial development**' –**RELOCAL** aims to identify factors that condition local accessibility of European policies, local abilities to articulate needs and equality claims and local capacities for exploiting European opportunity structures.

In the past, especially since the economic and financial crisis, the European Social Model has proven to be challenged by the emergence of spatially unjust results. The RELOCAL hypothesis is that **processes of localisation and place-based public policy** can make a positive contribution to spatial justice and democratic empowerment.

The research is based on **33 case studies** in **13 different European** countries that exemplify development challenges in terms of spatial justice. The cases were chosen to allow for a balanced representation of different institutional contexts. Based on case study findings, project partners will draw out the factors that influence the impact of place-based approaches or actions from a comparative perspective. The results are intended to facilitate a greater local orientation of cohesion, territorial development and other EU policies.

	action location	action name	
1	Ostwestfalen-Lippe Region	Smart Country Side	D
2	Görlitz Town	Youth Centre	
3	Western Macedonia Region	Post-Mining Regional Strategy	GR
4	Thessaloniki Region	Alexander Innovation Zone	
5	Volos City	Overcoming Fragmentation	
6	Karditsa Region	Ecosystem of Collaboration	
7	Monistrol de Montserrat Town	Local Strategic Plan	ES
8	Neighbourhood of Premià de Dalt	Llei de Barris	
9	Neighbourhood of St Adrià de Besòs	La Mina Transformation Plan	
10	Eix Riera de Caldes Municipalities	Association of Municipalities	
11	Lieksa Town	Lieksa Development Strategy 2030	FI
12	Kotka Town	Activation of Youth	
13	Encs District	Give Kids a Chance	HU
14	György-telep, Neighbourhood of Pécs	Urban Regeneration	
15	Szentes Town and Szentes District	Production Organisation	
16	Balaton Uplands	Balaton LEADER	
17	Pas-de-Calais Mining Basin	Euralens	FR
18	Lorraine-Luxembourg Border Region	EPA Alzette-Belval	
19	Northeast Groningen Region	Induced Earthquakes	NL
20	Neighbourhood of Rotterdam	Rotterdam South on Course	
21	Łódź City	Participatory Budget for Łódź	PL
22	Brezeziny Town	Social Cooperative	
23	Maslomecz Village	Goth Village	
24	Domachowo, Potarzyce, Stara Krobia Villages	Rural Public Spaces	
25	Neighbourhood of Cluj	Pata Cluj Project	RO
26	Maramures County	Mara-Natur LEADER	
27	Neighbourhood of Codlea	Mălin-Codlea Project	
28	Neighbourhood of Bucharest	Plumbuita PIDU	
29	Västerbotten Region	Digital Västerbotten	SE
30	Stockholm City	Stockholm Commission	
31	Northumberland Uplands	NULAG LEADER	GB
32	Lewisham, Borough of London	Homelessness Project	
33	Isle of Lewis	Strengthening Communities	

The RELOCAL project runs from October 2016 until September 2020.

Read more at https://relocal.eu

Project Coordinator:

University of Eastern Finland
Contact: Dr. Petri Kahila (petri.kahila@uef.fi)